



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best military Critic that ever wrote."







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Written by the Late

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Lieutenant-General of the *French* Army; For the
Instruction of his Son.

Translated from the *French*.

With PRELIMINARY REMARKS and a
MILITARY DICTIONARY, explaining
the Difficult Terms in the Art of War,

By the TRANSLATOR.

VOL. I.

L O N D O N:

Printed for *T. Woodward*, between the two Temple Gates *Fleet-
Street*, and *C. Davis*, the Corner of *Pater-Noster-Row*. 1736.



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T H E

TRANSLATOR'S
P R E F A C E.

TH E following Memoirs have been received with so much Approbation abroad, that it was thought a Translation of them would not be unacceptable to an *English* Reader.

They comprehend a great variety of Civil and Military Events, and as they were written, by the Author, for the Instruction of his Son, the Work seems to be plan'd in a manner very consistent with that Intention.

It must be confessed, indeed, that the Marquis has related some Passages more favourably for the *French* Nation, than the true Circumstances of the Facts will allow; we have there-

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fore thought it necessary to confront his Account of those Particulars, with such Testimonies as have never yet been taxed with Partiality.

Our Author, for Instance, endeavours to justify the late King of *France's* Violation of the Partition Treaty*, which as it was a Circumstance that occasion'd a long and calamitous War in *Europe*, I shall transcribe the Account of that Transaction from an Author of good Credit†.

Soon after the Treaty of *Reswick*, there was a new Project form'd at Court, which was, coming to an Agreement, concerning the Succession to the Crown of *Spain*. The King of *England* having a serious regard to the present State of *Europe*, believed we should never enjoy a solid Peace, unless the King of *Spain*, *Charles* the 2^d,

* Vol. 1. Chap. 1st.

† See *Broderick's* Introduction to the compleat History of the late War in the *Netherlands*, *Germany*, *Italy* and *Spain*. 2^d Edition.

should

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should name an Heir in his Life-time, to the Exclusion of the Infants of *France*. To this Effect, his *Britannick* Majesty used all possible means, at the Court of *Madrid*, to engage the King of *Spain* to nominate the Electoral Prince of *Bavaria* (who was Grandson to his Sister that married the Emperor) to be his Heir and Successor: The King of *Spain* then made his Will, and declared, therein, that young Prince to be his Successor. Altho' this Will was made with abundance of Secrecy, the King of *France*, or his Ministers, found means to get a Copy of it, the very Day the King of *Spain* signed it. Hereupon the most *Christian* King gave clear Marks of his Resentment, and order'd the Marquis *de Harcourt*, his Ambassador at the Court of *Madrid*, to present a Memorial to his *Catholic* Majesty; importing, that the King his Master threatned to revenge himself, for their attempting to ex-

A 3 clude,

vi *The* TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

clude, forever, the lawful Right of his Children to the Succession of *Spain*. This made an Uneasiness for some time; but Count *Tallard*, the *French* Ambassador, at the *English* Court, declared that there might be an Accommodation found out, in Relation to the *Spanish* Succession, without the Effusion of Blood. He contrived the memorable Treaty of Partition, and communicated the Plan of it to the Marquis *de Torcy*, and Monsieur *de Pomponne*; and these Ministers proposed it to the *French* King. His Majesty approved of the Project, and the whole Court esteemed Count *Tallard* as a Person of an extraordinary Genius. Hereupon the King gave a private Audience to the Earl of *Jersey*, who succeeded the Earl of *Portland* in his Embassy to *France*, and told him, *That as the Peace of Reswick had reconciled him to the King of England his Master, he wished for nothing more*
3 *than*

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than such means as would contribute to render that Peace firm and lasting; not doubting, but his Britannick Majesty was of the same Sentiments: That notwithstanding, if the King of Spain should die, the indisputable Rights the Dauphin had to that Succession, would indispensably engage him to take up Arms again, and enter into a new War, which would be more prejudicial to the repose of Europe, than all that had occurred during the whole Course of his Reign: Yet, he was very well assured, that if the King of England would GIVE HIS CONSENT to a new Treaty; the Project of which he would communicate to him, it would, for ever, secure an inviolable Peace. After this Overture, the Earl of Jersey had several Conferences with the Marquis de Torcy, and Monsieur de Pomponne, upon the Treaty of Partition; and having inform'd the King of England of it, that Prince consented to it. At

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last it was agreed upon by both Parties, that the Negotiation should begin ; and it was carried on with so much Expedition, that on the 29th *August N.S.* the Treaty was concluded, whereby it was agreed,

Treaty of 1st, That the Peace of *Res-*
Partition. *wick* shall be confirmed.

2^{dly}, That in consideration of the ill state of the King of *Spain's* Health, and for preserving the publick Peace, in case of his Death without Issue, that *Naples* and *Sicily*, the Towns depending upon the Monarchy of *Spain*, on the Coasts of *Tuscany*, and the Marquisate of *Final*, on that side of *Spain*, and the Province of *Guipuscoa*, with *Fonterabia*, *St. Sebastian* and *Port Passage*, on the other side of *Spain*; should be given to the *Dauphin*, in consideration of his Claim to the Crown of *Spain*.

3^{dly}, That the Crown of *Spain*, and the other Kingdoms and Places
both

both within and without *Europe*, should descend to the Electoral Prince of *Bavaria*: And

4^{thly}, That the Dutchy of *Milan* should be allotted to the Arch-Duke *Charles*, the Emperor's second Son.

Thus the Treaty of Partition concluded, which was originally contrived to ensnare all the Princes of *Europe*, the Court of *France* plainly foreseeing the Consequences such a Treaty would produce. For, besides all other Objections, his *Britannick* Majesty had only a Letter under the *French* King's Hand, that he would be faithful in the Execution of this Treaty. And indeed it was universally thought, by those who were really in his Majesty's Interest, and that of all *Europe*, that the Security was not strong enough; and it even so happen'd: For, whilst *France* was courting King *William* into the said Treaty, the Marquis *de Harcourt*, the *French* Ambassador in *Spain*,

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Spain, was indefatigably industrious with the *Grande*s, in his Insinuations against the House of *Austria*. But the Queen of *Spain*, who was nearly related to, and entirely in the Interest of that House, fore-seeing the Designs of *France*, early concerted Measures with the Count *de Harrach*, the Imperial Minister, to disappoint them. So that after having prevailed on the King her Husband, to remove privately from *Madrid* to *Toledo*, under an Umbrage of preserving his Health, she there laboured hard with him, to support the Interest of the House of *Austria*, and to get a Ratification of the Will of *Philip* the 4th his Father; whereby the Succession, in default of Issue by his Son, was settled upon the *German* Branch of the *Austrian* Family.

But as Death respects Princes no more than other Men, it took the young Successor to the Monarchy of *Spain*,

Spain, out of the World; so that while the Parliament was Sitting, there was a second Treaty of Par- Second Treaty of Partition. titution concluded between

England, France and Holland. Whereby, instead of the Electoral Prince of *Bavaria* the Arch-Duke *Charles* of *Austria* was to have all the Dominions both within and without *Europe*, except what, by the former Treaty, had been assigned to the *Dauphin*, and to *France*; and that the Duke of *Lorraine*, instead of his own Country, which was likewise to be given to *France*, should have the Dutchy of *Milan*; and the Prince of *Vaudemont* the County of *Bilche* conferred on him. His Majestie's Plenipotentiaries for this Treaty, were the Earls of *Portland* and *Jersey*: But this, like the former, was but a present Amusement, and served the *French* King only for a more violent Breach of his Faith, and for a pretence of casting
more

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more Odium upon his *Britannick* Majesty and his Ministers.

For notwithstanding the former Treaty, the *French* King made use of all manner of Opportunities to push on the Interest of *Philip*, Duke of *Anjou*, second Son of the *Dauphin* of *France*, which was left to the Management of the Cardinal *Portocarero* the Prime Minister, upon a Result of the Intrigues of the Marquis *de Harcourt*; he having, during his Embassy, gain'd the King of *Spain's* Principal Ministers to his Party. So that his Majesty being taken with a violent Distemper, which daily increased, and the whole Court perceiving him to be near his End; Cardinal *Portocarero*, and the other Ministers presented him a Will, which was sometime before forged by the Court of *France*. Don *Anthoin D' Ubella*, Secretary of the General Dispatches, having read it aloud, the half dead King sign'd it,
October

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October the 2d, and ordered it to be Sealed in his Presence. Whereby he declared, that the very moment it should please God to take him out of this Life, the Duke of *Anjou* should be, *ipso facto*, King of ALL his Dominions, notwithstanding any kind of Renunciation; and ordered all his Subjects and Vassals of what condition soever, to acknowledge him as such. Soon after, his Majesty departed this Life, and the said Will was opened in the Presence of the *Spanish* Court, and a Copy of it forthwith dispatched to the *French* King, who soon after declared his Acceptance of it, without consulting those Allies with whom he had so lately concluded a Treaty of Partition. So that on *November* the 16th, *N. S.* 1700, the Duke of *Anjou* was, in his Grand-Father's Court, declared and saluted King of *Spain*.

The

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The *French* King being unwilling to stop here, caused his own Troops to take Possession of the *Spanish Netherlands*, and, by Stratagem, to seize several strong Towns*, partly garrison'd by the *Dutch*, for the Defence and Security of their Country; whereby the States were brought under a Necessity of acknowledging the Duke of *Anjou's* Title to *Spain*, to get their Soldiers again; who nevertheless were not, without a great deal of Difficulty, suffer'd to return. The King of *Great Britain* was highly exasperated at the *French* King's violent Breach of his Faith and Honour: But most of his Majesty's and the *Dutch* Troops being disbanded, they were, at that Junc-

* The *French* Troops that were let into the Garrisons of the *Spanish Netherlands*, were 800 Men into *Namur*; 2500 into *Luxemburg*, which were to be attended by 1000 Horse; 500 into *Mons*; 1500 into *Oudenard*; 600 into *Ostend*; 2000 into *Newport*; and *Antwerp*, which claim'd a Privilege of being exempted from receiving a *Spanish* Garrison, was forced to receive what number of Men the *French* were pleas'd to impose upon them.

ture,

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ture, altogether incapable of making Reprisal, and prudently forbore shewing a Resentment, till they were in a condition to demand Satisfaction. Soon after, his *Britannick* Majesty thought fit to dissolve the Parliament, *December* the 19th 1700, and to call a new one to meet at *Westminster*, the 6th of *February* ensuing. Monday *February* the 10th, the King went to the House, and, in his Speech, declared that the Death of the Duke of *Gloucester*, had made it absolutely necessary that there should be a further Provision for the Succession, in the Protestant Line, and that the present State of Affairs, embroil'd by the Death of the King of *Spain*, merited their Consideration. Whereupon the Commons made a very Loyal Address; asserting, *that they would stand by, and support his Majesty and Government; and take such effectual Measures as might best conduce to the Interest and*
Safety

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Safety of England, the Preservation of the Protestant Religion, and the Peace of Europe: And then came to a Resolution, that the Princess Sophia, Dutcheſs Dowager of Hanover, be declared next in Succeſſion to the Crown of England, in the Protestant Line, after his Maſteſty and the Princeſs, and the Heirs of their Bodies reſpectively: And then addreſſed his Maſteſty that he would be pleaſed to enter into ſuch Negotiations, in Concert with the States-General, and other Potentates, as might effectually conduce to the mutual Safety of theſe Kingdoms, and the States-General; and the Preservation of the Peace of Europe.

Whereupon his Maſteſty was pleaſed to make a Ratification of the Grand Alliance between the EMPEROR, HIMSELF and the STATES-GENERAL of the United Provinces, which was concluded at *Vienna* May 12, 1701.

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On Saturday *September* the 6th
1701, O. S. K. *James* the 2d depart-
ed this Life at *St. Germain's En ley*,
in *France*: Whereupon, the *French*
King immediately declared the *Pre-*
tended Prince of *Wales*, to be King of
England, Scotland and *Ireland*. King
William, who was a Prince of too much
Spirit to bear such an insolent Indigni-
ty, was no sooner informed of this
gross Affront, given by the Court of
France, but he forthwith dispatched a
Courier to the King of *Sweden*, as
Guarantee of the Treaty of *Reswick*,
to give him an Account of the mani-
fest Violation of that Treaty; and at
the same time his Majesty sent an Ex-
press to the Earl of *Manchester*, his
Ambassador at *Paris*, to come away
immediately, without taking Leave;
and soon after Monsieur *Poussin*, the
French Secretary here, had Notice
given him that he should forthwith de-
part the Kingdom. In the mean time,

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the Nation, as well as the King, began to resent this Affront offer'd his Majesty by the *French King*, and seeing there was no more credit to be given to a Monarch who made Treaties, and broke them again whenever he pleas'd, unanimously resolv'd to *defend and support his Britannick Majesty in his undoubted Right*; and accordingly Addresses came from the City of *London*, and all parts of the Kingdom, with Expressions of *Detestation of the Perfidiousness of the French King, and Assurances of asserting and defending his Majesty's unquestionable Right and Title to the Imperial Crown of these Realms.*

It appears, by this authentic Account, that the Partition Treaty instead of being projected by King *William*, and the *Dutch*, as our Author insinuates*, was originally Plan'd by Count *Tallard*, and that *England* was

* Vol. I. p. 1.

earnest-

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earnestly solicited by *France* to accede to it, as the properest Expedient to preserve the Tranquillity of *Europe*, upon the Demise of *Charles* the 2^d King of *Spain*. The Conduct therefore of *Lewis* the 14th in his perfidious Violation of that Treaty, and his dishonourable Methods of ensnaring the dying King of *Spain* into a Will so directly contrary to the Stipulations of that Treaty, were so many just Provocations to the *British* Crown and its Allies, to chastise the treacherous Proceedings of that Prince by a War, which would infallibly have reduced him to the lowest Humiliation, had not the Bravery of the *British* Nation been obstructed, by a Series of pernicious Measures, that will render the Memory of those who concerted them, detestable to the latest Posterity.

Our Author can seldom prevail on himself to allow that Merit to the Prince of *Orange*, by which he was so

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justly distinguished as a General and a Hero, both before and after his Accession to the Throne of Great *Britain*: But it cannot be thought very surprising, that a *Frenchman* should speak with some Acrimony, of a Prince who so gloriously promoted the Cause of Liberty, thro' the Series of his illustrious Life, and contributed, not a little, to the Humiliation of that vain and arrogant Monarch of *France*, who could bear to hear his Slaves ascribing to him the Titles of Invincible and Immortal.

The Battle of *Seneffe* is related in these Memoirs, with so many Circumstances to the Disadvantage of the young Prince of *Orange*, who commanded the *Dutch* Forces in that Memorable Action, that I thought it proper to cite the Account of it which has been given by an excellent Writer*, of our Nation whose admirable Works will be always read with Pleasure and

* *Sr. William Temple.*

Im-

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Improvement, as long as Learning, Politeness and Integrity are in any Estimation among us. This great Author has transmitted to us, the following Particulars of the Battle of *Senefte*†, to which our *French* Writer only allows the Name of an Encounter.

About the middle of *August*, came the News of the Battle of *Senefte*, between the Confederates, under the Command of the Prince of *Orange*, and the *French* under the Prince of *Conde*: but it proved not an Action so decisive as was expected between two Armies of so great Force, and so animated by the Hatred and Revenge of the Parties, as well as by the Bravery and Ambition of the Commanders. The Success of this Fight was so differently reported by those engaged in it, that it was hard to judge of the Victory, which each side challeng'd,

† Vol. 1. p. 387. Fol. Edition of that Author's Works.

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and perhaps neither with any great reason. The Confederates had for some days fought a Battle with great Desire and Endeavour; and the *French* avoided it, with Resolution not to fight, unless upon evident Advantage, whilst both Armies lay near *Rivelle*, and not far distant from one another. The reason of this was thought to be, on one side, the Ardour of the young Prince of *Orange* to make way, by a Victory, into *France* it self, and there revenge the Invasion of his Country; and at the same time to make his first Essay of a pitch'd Battle, against so great and renowned a General as the Prince of *Conde*. On the other side, this old Captain had too much Honour to lose, and thought he had not enough to gain, by entering the Lists with a Prince of three and twenty Years old, bred up in the Shade of a contrary Faction till he was forced into the Field by the *French* Invasion of his

his Country. Nor was the Advantage less on the *French* side, in the Reputation of their Troops, than of their General; composed of excellent Officers, chosen Soldiers, exactly disciplin'd, long train'd for Action before they began it, and now flush'd by the uninterrupted Successes of two Wars. *But the Dutch Troops, when the Prince of Orange enter'd upon the Command, were old or lazy Soldiers, disused with long Peace, and disabled with young unskilful Officers, (chosen by no other Merit, than that of a Faction against the House of Orange) then filled up, when the War broke out, with hasty and undistinguished Levies, and disheartned with perpetual losses of Towns and defeats of Parties, during the two first Campaigns.* The Prince of *Conde* had another restraint upon the usual boldness of his Nature upon such Occasions, which was the ill Posture he had been in at Court, since this King's

a 4 Reign,

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Reign, and in regard how much more he would have to answer for than another Man, upon any great Misfortune to his Army, which must have left the way open for the Confederates to enter *France*, unguarded on that side by any strong Frontier; so as no Man knew what Shake it might give to the Greatness of that Crown, with the help of great and general Discontents, whereof this Prince was thought to have his share.

Upon these Dispositions in the Generals, the Battle was for some time industriously sought and avoided; till the Prince of *Orange*, believing there was no way of coming to a Battle, but by the Siege of some place that might be thought worth the venture to relieve, broke up and marched away towards *Senefse*; his Army divided into three parts, whereof the *German* Troops under the Count *de Sauches* had the Van, the *Spanish* under

der the Prince of *Vaudemont*, the Rear, and the *Dutch* under Count *Waldeck*, the main Battle; with whom the Prince march'd, and commanded the whole Confederate Army.

The Prince of *Conde* observing their March, which was not far from one side of his Intrenchments; and that by the Straitness of some Passages, they were forced to file off in small Lines, stay'd till the Van-Guard and main Body were over one of these Passes, and the Rear beginning to enter upon it; when he drew out his Men, and fell with Fierceness upon the Rear of the *Spaniards*, broke them with great Slaughter, and not much Resistance, took their Baggage, several Standards, and many Prisoners of Note. The Prince of *Orange*, upon Notice of the *French* march towards the *Spanish* Troops, had sent three Squadrons back to their Assistance, with all the Diligence that could be; but the *Spaniards*

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niards already broken, brought the *Dutch* into Disorder by falling in among them; and the *French* pushing with great Bravery, broke the *Dutch* Squadrons to pieces, killing or taking all their Commanders, and several Standards.

If the Prince of *Conde* had contented himself with this Success and Execution he had left no Dispute of a Victory; but lured on by the Hopes of one more entire, and Belief, the *Dutch*, whom he esteemed the worst Troops, would not stand, after the *Spaniards*, and a great part of their own, were wholly routed, he followed the chase, and drawing out his whole Army upon them, brought it to a set Battle, which was more than he intended. In the mean time, the Prince of *Orange*, marching to the Relief of the *Spaniards*, and the Squadrons he had sent for, was at first envelop'd by his own flying Men, whom he could neither
stop

stop by Words nor Blows, by Promises nor Reproaches; till joining the rest of his own Forces that stood firm, and the *Imperialists* coming up to enforce them, the Battle began with as great Fury as any has been fought in the whole course of the Wars, continued so for about eight Hours, till Sun-set, and about two Hours after, by Moon-light; till that failing too, the Fight ended, rather by the Obscurity of the Night, than the Weariness or Weakness of either side. *The Prince of Orange, in the whole Course of this Action gave all Orders with such Prudence, and Observance of all Advantages, led up his several Squadrons with that Bravery; made such bold Stands against his own broken Troops, as well as against the Fierceness of their Pursuers, for six Hours together in the hottest of the Fire; sometimes charging into the midst of the Enemies, sometimes over-born by his own that fled,*
till

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till he rallied them and led them back to the Charge; exposed to more Danger than most private Soldiers in the Field; so that the old Count de Souches, in his Letter to the States upon this Occasion, told them, that in the whole course of the Action the Prince had shew'd the Conduct of an old experienced Commander, and the Valour of a Caesar. And indeed his Allies, his Friends, AND HIS ENEMIES agreed in giving him equal Glory from this Adventure. But he had more from none than the PRINCE OF CONDE'S Testimony, that he had done like an old Captain in all, but only in venturing himself too much like a young Man. Yet this old General had done the same in this Day's Action, as much as the youngest Cavalier in his Army could do, when he found the Battle fought so desperately, and all at stake; whereas 'tis certain that nothing could have given vigour to the Dutch Troops,
after

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after the first Rout, but the repeated Examples and Dangers of the Prince, and Shame of not following such a Leader in all the desperate Charges he made that Day, which both the Generals seem'd resolved to die rather than to lose.

As the Numbers were not much different when the Fight began, so were those esteem'd that fell in this Battle, and to reach to about six or seven Thousand on either side; but of the *French* many more Officers and Generals than was usual, in proportion to the Common Soldiers. When the Night parted the Armies, the *French* retired back to their former Quarters, and next Morning, the Confederates marched to that which they designed when they broke up the Day before. The Allies claimed the Victory, *because they were last in the Field*; and the *French*, upon carrying away the greatest Number of Prisoners and Standards :

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ards: But whoever had the Honour, they both felt the Loss.

I could point out some other Instances wherein the Marquis has expressed himself with a little of that National Partiality, which most Historians are too apt to indulge; but as these will be easily rectified by every Reader who has any Knowledge of the modern History of *Europe*, I did not think it necessary to lengthen this Preface with the Enumeration of each Particular that happens not to be related, by our Author, with the utmost Exactness; and instead of reproaching him for a few natural Prepossessions, in Favour of his own Country-men, he is rather be applauded for the generous Freedom with which he frequently represents and condemns their Errors, and Misconduct.

His Reflections upon the Variety of those great Events that are the Subject of these Memoirs, are very judi-
3 cious

The TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. xxxi

cious and instructive, and sufficiently prove him to have been well qualified for the Station wherein he was employed by his Prince. It may be justly said, that the whole Art of War is comprehended and digested in his Observations that are interspersed thro' the Course of this Work, which may therefore be consider'd as a compleat Body of Military Discipline, and a very useful, as well as an entertaining Collection of Historical Transactions.



T H E

[xxx]

T H E

AUTHOR'S P R E F A C E.

WHEN I had collected a Set of Maxims on the Art of War, for the Instruction of my Son, and which I intend he shall read with Deliberation, and make his serious Study, before he arrives at the proper Age for engaging in the Service; I thought it necessary to add to that Treatise, a Series of Memoirs, Historical and Military, digested into the Order in which the Maxims are exhibited: As these Memoirs are compiled with a View to corroborate my Maxims, I have, without the least Disguise, illustrated the Subjects of the several Chapters, with those Examples either good or bad, of which I my self have
been

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been a Spectator, or which have been transacted in my time, to make it more evident to my Son, that the happy or unfortunate Events, have either resulted from the Observance or Neglect of the Maxims I have recommended in the Military Art, or have been conducted by Motives very different from those that came within the Compass of publick Observation.

And as I seldom celebrate any Character, without some Intermixture of Reprehension, I have determined not to entrust these Memoirs with my Son, till I have Reason to believe him incapable of misimproving them, with Relation to those Persons who are still living, and whose Conduct has been disapproved in the Course of this Work. But should it be my Fate to be cut off by Death; before he has attained so much Discretion as may be necessary to furnish him with the Qualification of Secrecy; I flatter myself

c

xxxiv *The* AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

self that my Memory will not suffer in the Opinions of Persons of Honour, but that they will render me all due Justice, with Reference to my *sole View of forming the Education of my Son, in such a manner as may qualify him for the service of his Country, in a Military Capacity*; since they will not meet with any Particulars in these Reflections, but what entirely correspond with Truth, and were well known by several intelligent Persons, at the time when the Errors I have pointed out, were committed, and the Events, whose real Causes I have assigned, were introduced on the Stage of Action.

I shall observe the same Method in these Memoirs, which I have pursued in my Maxims, except where I shall find my self obliged to be silent, with Respect to those Chapters of the latter, on which I have neither any Reflections to make, nor any Instances to cite.

I have

The AUTHOR'S PREFACE. XXXV

I have sometimes expatiated on Subjects that in themselves are not strictly of a Military Nature; but as they have indirectly been the Source of some Martial Operations, I thought it proper to be a little copious in relating them. There are likewise some Passages, wherein I have repeated Particulars that have been mentioned before, but that Proceeding was render'd necessary by the Subject of the Chapter, which required such a Repetition, for the more commodious Application of my Maxims; and in order to give Perspicuity to the particular Topic of that Chapter, which differs from another wherein I have treated of the same Fact, but on a Subject of a different Nature.

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THE

MEMOIRS

Historical and Military.

CHAP. I.

A distinct View of the States of Europe.

I Thought it sufficient, in my Maxims, to make some Observations on the Constitution of *Europe* in general, with respect to the Nature of those States which are comprehended in this Part of the World, and without entring into any particular Examination of the Interests of the several Powers; because that Method seemed to me effectual to my first Design of qualifying my Son for the Camp. But as all the Essays which have been written, in the Interval of the last thirty or forty Years, on the Interests of Princes, are found to be entirely insignificant; and as *Europe* has changed its Aspect since the Beginning of this Century, I am of Opinion, that when I have given a summary Account of its political Situation, after the Peace of *Reswick*, it will be proper to expatiate a little, on the important Events which have been introduced with this Century.

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With

With this View, I shall consider each Event in its regular Period of Time, without enquiring into the Springs which put them in Motion; because the Sequel of these Memoirs will give them their proper Arrangement, in the Order of the succeeding Chapters, with Relation to the Circumstances which compose them.

In the War which preceded the Peace of *Reswick*, all *Europe* was in Arms, except the Crown of *Sweden* and some Princes of *Italy*, namely, the Grand Duke, the Dukes of *Parma* and *Modena*, and the Republic of *Genoa*. The two potent Houses were those of *France* and *Austria*: That of *France* supported itself by its own unassisted Power, and was victorious over that of the *Spanish Austria*, notwithstanding its Conjunction with the *German Branch*, which, if we except the War it sustained, with its own Forces, against the *Turks* and Malecontents of *Hungary*, whom *France* assisted, as much as she was able, in such a distant Situation, had, by its Credit in the Empire, found itself capable of engaging in a War with *France*, and with that View, was united in the Interests of the *English* and *Dutch*, whom *William* of *Nassau*, King of *England*, had brought over to his Party, with the Duke of *Savoy*, who likewise declared against *France*.

The House of *Austria* was, at that Time, divided into two Branches; that of *Germany*,
of

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of which the Emperor *Leopold* the First, who had two Sons, was the Head, and that of *Spain*, which was reduced to the single Person of *King Charles* the Second. Such was then the State of those two powerful Houses, who, by the Motives of Interest or Fear, drew after them all the rest of *Europe*. The House of *France* had so aggrandized it self, since the Peace of the *Pyrenees*, and was grown so formidable to all the Powers of *Europe*, that it was easy for the Emperor to engage them in the Interest of his House against that Crown. As he was a wise and politic Prince, and seemed to conduct himself with an Air of Moderation, though, in Reality, he was extremely ambitious, the Expedient to which he had Recourse, on this Occasion, had an artless Aspect, and subsisted in the Apprehensions he insinuated into those Powers, of the flourishing State of the House of *France*, and its ambitious Views, which would be the inevitable Ruin of their States, and expose them to an easy Conquest, after the Destruction of his House, which he represented to them as very near, unless they contributed to its Preservation by a timely Union with him.

The Prince of *Orange*, who at the close of the Year 1688, ascended the Throne of *England*, of which he had dispossessed his Father-in-Law, and who, by his Dignity of Stadtholder of *Holland*, had acquired an un-

limited Influence in that powerful Republic, being sensible that it was his particular Interest to join with the *German* Branch of the House of *Austria*, in order to maintain himself on the Throne, to which he had been raised by the Assistance of the *Dutch*, easily engaged that State in a War against *France*, and brought his new Subjects, the *English*, into his Measures, with the same Facility: And yet all the Vigour of these united Powers was unable to deprive *France* of the perfect Happiness she derived from each Enterprize she formed, nor could they prevent her from gaining as many Victories as she fought Battles. But as her Inclination to Tranquillity was a little too prevalent; she consented to a Treaty of Peace, which was concluded at *Reswick*; and thereby, though she had been constantly triumphant till then, she resigned the greatest Part of her Conquests. Some of those Reasons which might contribute to this Desire of a Pacification, may indirectly find a Place in the Sequel of this Discourse.

The present Century opened a new Scene of Affairs in *Europe*. *Charles* the Second, King of *Spain*, died without Issue, and by his Will, vested the Succession to all his Crowns, in the House of *France*. This Will was transmitted to that Kingdom, by the Council of the *Spanish* Monarchy; and when the King of *France*, the *Dauphin* and the

the Duke of *Burgundy*, had made their several Renunciations, the Duke of *Anjou*, the Dauphin's second Son, accepted the Legacy, and this new King was then acknowledged by all the States of the *Spanish* Monarchy, without Opposition; after which he went to *Madrid*, to take Possession of his vast Inheritance. This Event was a Blast of Thunder to the House of *Austria*, *William* of *Nassau* King of *England*, and the *Dutch*.

The Emperor, though of the House of *Austria*, was not so nearly related to *Charles* the Second of *Spain*, as the new King; but tho' his Imperial Majesty claimed this Succession as he was a Descendant of that House, yet he chiefly founded his Pretensions on the Wills of *Philip* the Third, and *Philip* the Fourth, Kings of *Spain*, who, in Default of Male Heirs of their Branch, had reserved the Succession to the *German* Branch, and even to all the Princes of *Europe* sprung from the Daughters of the *Spanish* Branch, excluding, by their sole Determination, and contrary to all Justice, the House of *France* from the Inheritance of their Dominions, in case the *Spanish* Branch should be destitute of Male Heirs.

The *German* Branch of the House of *Austria* had, by its prevailing Influence, caused these unjust Wills to be authorized by the Consent of the Councils and States of the whole Monarchy. *William* of *Nassau*, King of

England, a politic and ambitious Prince, and who, as I have already intimated, had raised himself from a very inconsiderable Beginning, to the Throne of *England*, and continued to preserve himself in that august Situation, without quitting the Charge of Stadtholder of *Holland*, or sustaining any Diminution of his Credit in that Republic, found himself in a new Perplexity, at this additional Grandeur of the House of *France*, and was apprehensive that it would make it difficult for him to maintain himself upon the Throne; because the King of *France* had acknowledged the young *Chevalier de St. George* in the Quality of King of *England*, and taken him into his Protection. King *William* therefore, readily came into an Alliance with the Emperor against *France*. The *Dutch* imitated his Example, and were influenced by two Apprehensions which they imagined were very reasonable.

By the Treaty of *Reswick* the *Dutch*, under the Pretence of securing their Dominions, were permitted to place Garrisons in the *Spanish Netherlands*, under the Name of a Barrier between *France* and *Holland*. When *Philip* the Fifth arrived in *Spain*, he no longer thought it necessary to have his Fortresses in the *Low-Countries*, guarded by *Dutch* Troops, for which Reason they were ordered to evacuate those Places, and they accordingly complied, in Consequence of which their Stations
were

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were filled up by the Troops of the King of *France*; so that it was easy for the Emperor and King *William* to persuade the *Dutch*, that the King might, in some future Conjunction, lend his Grandson, the King of *Spain*, a Body of Troops to invade them as his revolted Subjects, and that they must expect to be conquered, and brought into Subjection by their ancient Masters, if they were not in Alliance with those Powers, who had an Inclination to oppose the new Greatness of the House of *France*.

The *English* and *Dutch* had likewise two other Reasons to induce them to join with the Emperor, against *France* and *Spain*. One was a just Apprehension lest *France*, whose Naval Power was then very great, should divest them of all their Commerce which those two Powers maintained with *Spain* on its Continent, and which was prodigiously beneficial: The other was as plausible a Fear, lest *France*, when it had enriched it self with the Treasures of the new World, by its easy Trade with *Spain*, should be tempted to deprive them of their Settlements in the *Indies*.

These Motives of present Interest were so prevalent with the *English* and *Dutch*, as to make them employ all their Efforts to prevent the Ruin of their Commerce, which would naturally have been destructive to their Dominions; and therefore, these two

maritime Powers, without the least Hesitation, concurred with the Emperor, in every Particular he desired from them, preparatory to a War with *France*.

The Body of the Empire, being entirely devoted to the Emperor, declared likewise against *France*, in a Resolution of the Diet, which, however, had not the Concurrence of the two Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologne*, who were the new King of *Spain's* Uncles by the Mother. The other Princes, who were Members of the Empire, finding it advantageous to their particular Interests, to hire Men to the *English* and *Dutch*, supplied them with Troops for their Money.

As to *Italy*, the Duke of *Savoy* seemed, at first, to be inclinable to an Alliance with the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*. In the Year 1697. he married his eldest Daughter to the Duke of *Burgundy*, and it had been proposed to him to espouse his youngest to *Philip* the Fifth, King of *Spain*. These two great Establishments for his Daughters, seemed to have determined him in Favour of the House of *France*; but the Event has made it evident, that no Consideration was able to diminish his natural Aversion to that Kingdom. All the other Powers of *Italy* observed a Neutrality, except the Duke of *Modena*, who was suspected, with some Reason, to be in Alliance with the Emperor.

There

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There was one Circumstance peculiar to King *William* and the States General, and which proved very advantageous to them, as it increased the just Apprehensions of the future Power of the House of *France*, should it be permitted to acquire a peaceable Enjoyment of the great Succession to the *Spanish* Monarchy, and pass over the first Period of such a Revolution, without sustaining any Commotions through the whole Extent of its vast Possessions. The Fact is this : The declining State of Health of *Charles* the Second, King of *Spain*, who had no Children, raised the Attention of all the Powers who were not interested in the Succession, and created a Thought in King *William* and the *Dutch*, of proposing to the King of *France* and the Emperor, a Treaty of Partition of the Monarchy of *Spain* in its future Succession, which might be so regulated, as equally to interest the Houses of *France* and *Austria*, in that particular Addition to their Greatness which they were to derive from it, and which, at the same Time, would keep the Balance even between the two Houses, and contribute, in its Consequences, to the Tranquillity of the other Powers of *Europe*.

The King consented to the Proposal of the Treaty of Partition, but the Emperor, who thought himself certain of the entire Succession to the Monarchy of *Spain*, would not enter
into

into any Negotiation. However, this Treaty was made between the King of *England* and *Holland*, and all the other Powers were invited to accede to it, that they might be Guarantees for the Execution of it, against either of the interested Powers who should refuse to acquiesce with the Partition which had been stipulated; when the Death of *Charles* the Second should render the Operation of the Treaty practicable. King *Lewis* the Fourteenth was invited by the *English* and *Dutch* to accept the Partition, which he accordingly did; but the Emperor, who received the same Invitation, thought fit to reject it.

While this Negotiation was transacting, the King of *Spain* died, having by his Will reinstated the House of *France*, which had been unjustly disinherited by the Wills of *Philip* the Third and *Philip* the Fourth, and nominated the Duke of *Anjou* universal Heir to the Monarchy of *Spain*. The King of *France* could not decline the Acceptance of the Will, in Favour of the Prince his Grandson, whose Succession was demanded by the Councils and States of the *Spanish* Monarchy; since the Emperor's Rejection of the Treaty of Partition, justly left his most Christian Majesty in full Liberty to assert the equitable Pretensions of his House to the *Spanish* Succession.

It was the Acceptance of this Will, without the Participation and Concurrence of
the

HISTORICAL *and* MILITARY. II

the *English* and *Dutch*, which determined them to come into the Emperor's Measures : And this was the State of *Europe* at the Beginning of the present Century.

As I am a Soldier and not an Historian, I shall content my self with this general Plan of *Europe*, at the Opening of the present Century, and shall only take Notice of the Events which occurred in my Time, as they happen to correspond with the Particulars related in the first Part of my Memoirs; my Design being only to point out those Instances of Misconduct, which I have observed in the War, and to render the Means of avoiding them, for the future, demonstrable by my Maxims.

C H A P. II.

Of the Maxims and Character of a pacific Prince.

I Have not observed, in my Time, that it has been easy for any Prince or State in *Europe*, to engage in a voluntary Practice of those Maxims which ought to regulate the Conduct of a pacific Prince.

The Duke of *Lorrain* has never been involved in War, from the Time he first assumed the Government of his Dominions,
and

and in his present Situation, it is undoubtedly his political Interest to continue in his Neutrality, with the Consent of the Houses of *France* and *Austria*.

The Grand Duke has been equally disengaged from military Troubles, nor has he any Tendency to them from his natural Disposition; and since the Year 1690. when the Emperor's Troops marched into *Italy*, he has been more inclinable to purchase an Exemption from Winter Quarters, than to refuse them by Force of Arms.

Charles the Second, King of *England*, was the only Prince who was desirous of enjoying Tranquillity with Reputation; but the Jealousy which the *English* entertained of the *Dutch*, either with Relation to the Sovereignty of the Seas, or the Commerce of those two Nations; the Tripple Alliance between the Crowns of *England* and *Sweden*, and the States of *Holland*, for maintaining the Peace of *Europe* after the Death of *Philip* the Fourth; the Pride of the *Dutch*, who were grown too ambitious and enterprizing: In a Word, the Jealousy which the *English* conceived of the Advantage *France* had acquired over *Spain*, *Germany* and *Holland*, roused this Prince out of the Repose which his Inclinations prompted him to indulge, and frequently compelled him to engage in a War with Reluctance.

Those very Republics, who, from the
Frame

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Frame of their Constitution, should appear desirous of Tranquillity, have, in my time, been all agitated by the Emotions of Jealousy, Ambition, or Interest; so that upon the Result, I may venture to declare, that this Character of a pacific Prince, has never been exerted by any Power, with an Air of Unconstraint, since I have had any Knowledge of the World.

C H A P. III.

Of the Character of an ambitious Prince.

I Have seen *Europe* perpetually disordered by the Ambition of Princes and Republics; I have even observed that the Ambition and Interest of private Persons, have frequently created the same Impressions in Princes and Republics; and that the Powers of *Europe* have not always made the Welfare of their States the Motive to their Actions. I may likewise add, that this Character of an aspiring Prince, conducting himself by the sole Views of a well regulated Ambition, has not been exactly display'd in my Time, except by the Emperor *Leopold* the First, and the present Duke of *Savoy* *.

* The late King *Viſtor Amadeus*, Father to the Prince who now reigns, 1734.

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In order to prove what I have advanced, it will be necessary to examine the real Motives to those Wars which I have seen kindled in *Europe*, for the Space of the last forty Years, commencing from 1666, at which Time I engaged in the Service; and to evince the Reasons which induced the several Powers to undertake them: That we may discover whether these Wars have been agreeable, in their Nature, to those which arm Princes influenced by the Politics of a laudable Ambition, or whether Princes have not suffered themselves to be seduced into these Wars by the interested Views of their Ministers, or some other Persons, in whom they have reposed a Confidence.

I will take upon me to assert then, that the War which the King of *France* declared against *Spain* in 1667, was a War of Interest, and commenced with an Intention to vindicate the just Pretensions of *Queen Maria Theresa*, after the Death of *Philip* the Fourth, her Father, to Part of the *Spanish Netherlands*. The King gained considerable Advantages by this War, and had render'd his Conquests much more extensive than those which were accorded to him by the Treaty of *Aix la Chappelle*, notwithstanding the Tripple Alliance which was formed against him, had not the Progress of his Arms been restrained to those Limitations, by the Jealousy which *Monfieur de*

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Louvois entertained of Monsieur *Turenne*, and the Umbrage which the extraordinary Credit of Monsieur *de Louvois* with the King, gave the rest of the Ministers.

We may therefore conclude, that the King, in this War, did not strictly conduct himself by the Maxims of an ambitious Prince, intent on nothing but the Advancement of his own Grandeur, since he was influenced by Jealousy and particular Interests, as well in his Choice of the different Operations of that War, during its Continuance, as in the Negotiations for Peace.

The War, which in the Year 1672 was at first carried on against *Holland* alone, and in which *England* joined with *France*, may be imputed to several Causes. The King was offended with the *Dutch* for promoting the Tripple Alliance, which, in some Measure, had extorted from him the Peace of *Aix la Chappelle*; the impertinent Railleries inserted in their Gazettes, and the insulting Medals — which they struck, were considered by him, as so many new Provocations. The King of *England* and his Subjects were exasperated at the repeated Injuries they received, in their Commerce to the *Indies* and the *Levant*, from the *Dutch*, and their insupportable Arrogance at Sea; the Empire of which they were desirous of usurping over all Nations. These were the Reasons which induced the two Kings to declare War against the States of *Holland*.
The

The particular Interests of the *French* Ministers were of such a Nature, that Monsieur *de Louvois*, Secretary of War, endeavoured to turn the King's Thoughts entirely to military Operations, and to make it necessary for him to devote to those Attentions, the Time which his Finances, Buildings and naval Affairs caused him to pass with Monsieur *Colbert*, to whose Ministry the Regulation and Improvement of those particular Articles were confided. The King of *England* was desirous of appropriating to his Pleasures, more Money than the Parliament was disposed to grant him. He was likewise solicitous to increase his Land and Naval Armaments, that he might be capable of distributing his Favours among those who were more devoted to him than they were to the Parliament. This Prince, in the War against the *Dutch*, received from *France* a Subsidy sufficient to gratify the Avarice of his Mistresses and Ministers; and the Parliament, growing jealous of the Trade and Power of the *Dutch*, granted him Money to maintain a powerful Fleet at Sea, and a considerable Body of Troops at Land.

The two other Powers, who at first united with *France*, and delivered up their Dominions to the King, that they might advance nearer to *Holland*, were the Elector of *Cologne* and the Bishop of *Munster*. The first of these Princes was prevailed upon to engage in this

this War by the *Furstembergs*, who had an absolute Ascendant over him. They were influenced, in this Proceeding, by their own particular Interest; and the better to succeed in that View, they represented to the Elector, that it would be very advantageous to him to reconquer *Rhinberg* and those other Territories on the *Rhine*, which had long been possessed by the *Dutch*, and usurped from the Electorate of *Cologne*. The Bishop of *Munster* delighted in Commotions, and was very aspiring and avaritious: His Revenues were inconsiderable, but he received, by vertue of his Alliance with *France*, a Subsidy which enabled him to keep up a great Body of Troops, whose Subsistence he proposed to furnish at the Expence of the *Dutch* Dominions, in the Progress of the War; and he expected, in the Partition of the Conquests, to derive great Advantages to his Bishopric, part of which was then possessed by the *Dutch*.

These were the Motives which engaged *France* and *England*, with the Elector of *Cologne* and the Bishop of *Munster*, in a War with the *Dutch*. The Elector and the Bishop were actuated by the Principles of sound Politics; for as they were not sufficiently powerful of themselves to dislodge the *Dutch* by Force of Arms, from the Territories that Republic had usurped from their Domini-

ons, it was natural for them to embrace this Conjunction which was so favourable to their real Interest.

The Emperor, the *Spaniards*, and the Elector of *Brandenburg*, who engaged in this War, soon after it was declared, came into it from different Motives. The Emperor was apprehensive that the King of *France*, when he had conquered *Holland*, into which the former Progress of his Victories had penetrated, with a Rapidity that astonished all *Europe*, would keep that Country by Right of Conquest, or at least, that he would reduce it in such manner, that *Holland*, after the Conclusion of a Peace, would be tributary to *France*: His Imperial Majesty had likewise his Fears, that *France*, when it had subjected *Holland*, would easily conquer the remaining Part of the Catholic *Netherlands*, and that the King would consequently become the most potent Prince in *Europe*, and have it in his Power to overwhelm the House of *Austria*, after he had annexed the Seventeen Provinces to his other Dominions. The *Spaniards*, who were apprehensive of losing the *Netherlands*, after the Conquest of *Holland*, were desirous to retard the Storm which they saw gathering too near them; and with that View, they furnished the *Dutch* with all their Troops, and declared War against *France*, towards the
Close

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Close of the Year 1672, in order to interest the other Powers in the Preservation of the *Low-Countries*, from the Motives of that Jealousy which they ought to entertain of the growing Power of *France*. The Elector of *Brandenburg*, from whom the *Dutch* kept several Places on the *Rhine*, below *Rhinberg*, which originally were Part of the Dutchy of *Cleves*, or of those Territories which this Elector possessed in *Westphalia*, was apprehensive that the *French* would have no Inclination to restore those Places to him, after they had humbled the *Dutch*, who had lately made a Treaty with this Prince, very advantageous to his Interest; and this, in Conjunction with the Emperor's Sollicitations, determined him to engage in the Interests that were contrary to those of *France*.

With these Circumstances was the War commenced in 1672. It was on the Point of being discontinued, three Years after it had been proclaimed; but the particular Interest of a Minister, was the Cause of its Protraction. When the King was at *Utrecht*, the *Dutch*, who were apprehensive that his Resentment would end in their Destruction, sent a Deputation to his Majesty, with a Commission, to offer him such Conditions of Peace, as were very advantageous to *France*. Monsieur *de Pomponne*, in the Council held

upon this Occasion, declared for the King's Acceptance of the Terms offered by the *Dutch*; and added, that as the *Spaniards* had assisted them with Supplies, exceeding the Contingent, which, by the Treaty for their mutual Defence, they had stipulated to raise for that Republic, his Majesty might justly consider the Excess of those Supplies, as an Infraction of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, and consequently might compel the *Dutch* to engage, by an Article of the Treaty then in Agitation, not to furnish the *Spanish Netherlands* with the Succours stipulated in the Treaty with *Spain*; after which, the King's Forces, in their March back to *France*, might fall upon the *Spaniards*, and soon conquer the rest of their Dominions in the *Low-Countries*, which were then entirely defenceless; with the Pretext of retaliating their Violation of the Treaty with *France*. He likewise observed, that, in the present Conjunction, this Conquest was very practicable, and might as easily be confirmed by a Treaty of Pacification, since the Armaments of the other Powers were too inconsiderable, at that Time, to oppose the Execution of such a Scheme. On the contrary, Monsieur de *Louvois* maintained, in the Council, that the Conditions, on which the *Dutch* offered to treat, were not sufficiently humbling, and that it was necessary to reduce them

them to the lowest Ebb, which might easily be accomplished in a little Time. The Advice of this Minister resulted from his own particular Interest : He was conscious that, if the King adhered to his Opinion, the War would be protracted, by an unavoidable Rupture with the Emperor and the Crown of *Spain* ; the Continuance of a War would advance his Credit, by the Opportunity he should derive from it, of engaging the King's Attention ; Peace, on the other Hand, would be favourable to Monsieur *Colbert*, who would not fail, on that Occasion, to revive the King's natural Taste for Gardens and Buildings ; and Monsieur *de Pomponne* would likewise find his Advantage, in that Access to his Majesty which he would then enjoy, in Consequence of the Negotiations and Treaties which must undoubtedly succeed the Conquest of the *Spanish Netherlands*.

It will appear very evident, from what I have related, that the Interest of particular Persons prevailed, in this Conjunction, over that of the State ; and that this Monarch, without perceiving the incautious Measures he was taking, deviated from the true and perfect Character of an ambitious Prince, whom no Consideration can divert from his Interest to aggrandize his Power, which, as it always is the principal Point in his View,

he endeavours to arrive at, by every Step consistent with Prudence and Possibility: So that his Majesty, on this Occasion, mistook those Sentiments for solid Reasons, which, in reality, were no more than the personal Interest of his Minister; since this War, which might otherwise have ended in a short time, and have been carried on, with much Glory, against the *Dutch*, and with great Advantages against the *Spaniards*, was protracted to the Length of six Years. It was, at last, brought to a Period, by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, in the Year 1678, by which the King agreed to reinstate the *Dutch* in the Possession of *Maestricht*, which he had taken from them; the Conquests gained in 1672, having been already abandoned, towards the Close of the Year 1673; and he obliged the *Dutch* to deliver up, to the Electors of *Cologne* and *Brandenburg*, those Places on the *Rhine*, which that Republic had possessed for a considerable Time. The King likewise restored to the *Spaniards*, all his Acquisitions in *Flanders*, except *Ypres*, *Cambray*, *Bouchain*, *Valenciennes* and *Condé*: He evacuated *Aeth* and *Charleroy*, which had been yielded to him by the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, and kept the *Franche-Compté*, which he had conquered in 1674. The Circumstance which redounded most to the Glory of *France*, in this Treaty of Peace, was,

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was, that *Sweden*, who had declared for the King, against the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and the King of *Denmark*, having lost all *Pomerania*, and even some Part of the Province of *Schonen*, on the *Swedish* Continent, was reinvested with all the Dominions she had lost, by the sole Authority of the King, who stipulated, in the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, that his Army should have a free Passage over the *Rhine*, to compel the Elector of *Brandenburg* to that Restitution, which he had no Inclination to make, till he beheld our Army on the Banks of the *Weſer*.

In this manner did the War, which commenced in 1672, conclude; and it may be proper to observe, that its real Cause was founded on the Displeasure of the Kings of *England* and *France* against *Holland*, and their Desire of humbling that Power, which then began to be too imperious; but neither Ambition, nor the Avidity of Conquest was the original Motive, because it was inconsistent with good Politics, to resolve on the Destruction of the *Dutch* Republic, Part of whose Spoils must have been the Property of the *English*, to whom it can never be adviseable, to grant maritime Ports out of their own Islands; for which Reason, it was natural to imagine, that *Spain* would have declared against *France*, before such a Rupture, had this Power intended an entire Con-

quest of *Holland*; and therefore it would have been the prudential Part of an ambitious Prince, whose Thoughts were totally devoted to the Advancement of his own Grandeur, to have improved, in this Conjunction, the first Pretext of a Rupture with *Spain*, which would have been given him by that Crown, and in Consequence of which, it would have been easy for him, in that Situation of Affairs, to have conquered the rest of the *Low-Countries*, and even to have preserved that Conquest.

The particular Reasons, which contributed to the Conclusion of this War, are to be derived from the Jealousy which always subsisted between Monsieur *Louvois* and Monsieur *Colbert*. This last had married his youngest Daughter to Monsieur *de Montemart*, a Nephew of Madam *de Montespan*. Such a Match was a considerable Addition to his Credit at Court; and tho' it was easy, at this time, to foresee that one Campaign would be sufficient to compleat the Conquest of the *Netherlands*, this refined Minister, in concert with the Mistress of his Monarch, induced that Prince to decline the glorious Ambition to render himself the most potent Prince in *Europe*, in favour of indolent Pleasures and splendid Buildings.

These two powerful Ministers, during the first Years which succeeded the Peace of *Nimeguen*,

Nimeguen, were only engaged, in a sedulous Emulation, to engross their Master's Favour from each other. Monsieur *Colbert* endeavoured to bring the Finances into such an agreeable Regulation for his Prince, as to render all his Desires attended with the Facility of their Accomplishment : He made considerable Improvements in the Naval Affairs, which were under his Direction, and created, in his Majesty, an extraordinary Gust for Gardens and Buildings, by representing to him the easy Methods he had taken to furnish him with all his Expences.

Monsieur *Louvois*, in the mean Time, was indefatigable in fortifying the Frontiers, and fixing them in a good State of Defence ; he kept the King powerfully arm'd, that he might always be in a Condition to attempt new Conquests ; and even, amidst a profound Peace with all his Neighbours, made him Master of a large Extent of Land. He found Pretexs for seizing *Charlemont* and *Dinant*, in the Principality of *Liege*, and frequently poured Troops into the *Spanish Netherlands*. He established a Body of Commissioners at *Metz* and *Besançon*, who, by insensible Measures, re-united all the Territories between the *Rhine* and the King's Dominions, under Pretence that those particular Fiefs had formerly been held of the three Bishoprics, or Earldom of *Chiney*, a
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Branch of the Dutchy of *Luxemburg*; and thus, amidst a general Peace, he extended the King's Dominions to the very Banks of the *Rhine*. He likewise added the City of *Strasburg* to the Conquests of this new Plan, and made a Season of perfect Tranquillity instrumental to increase his Master's Power. He concluded a particular Treaty, in *Italy*, with the Duke of *Mantua*, in consequence of which, that Prince yielded up the Citadel of *Casal* to the *French*; and by the Possession of that Fortrefs, and *Pignerol*, he shut up the Duke of *Savoy* between those two Places, and was in a Condition to carry on a War against the *Spaniards*, in the *Milanese*, whenever it should appear consistent with the King's Interest.

In this manner did Mess. *Colbert* and *Louvois* gratify the Passions of their Master, with equal Success, and rendered him the greatest and most prosperous Prince in *Europe*. The vigilant Application of *Monf. de Louvois* gave daily Additions to his Credit, and a particular Event, which happened at that time, was entirely decisive in his Favour. *Monf. Colbert* died, in a manner, suddenly; *Monf. de Louvois* was constituted Surveyor of the Works, and had Interest enough to obtain the Finances for *Monf. Pelletier*, his Relation and Creature. *Madam de Montespan* was dismissed from Court, and
Monf.

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Monf. *de Louvois* might then flatter himfelf, that he was in fuch a Situation, as render'd it impoffible for any Perfon to counterpoife his Credit and Power. As he was created Mafter of the Works, he endeavoured, by propofing new Plans to the King, to increafe, if poffible, his natural Taſte for Building and Gardens. He purfued his former Meaſures to compleat the Re-unions: In a Word, he ſeemed to have no Competitor in Power, and engroſſed all his Maſteſty's Time to himſelf, except thoſe few Intervals, which that Prince devoted to his Finances, as well as to foreign and naval Affairs. But all this clear Stream of Proſperity was, at laſt, troubled by an incident which no human Prudence could have preſaged. Madam *de Montespan's* Retreat from Court was altogether involuntary; the King had entertained a violent Paſſion for Madam *de Maintenon*, the Widow of Monf. *Scaron*; Madam *de Montespan* had raiſed this Lady from a very deſtitute Condition, and had entrusted her with the Care of her Children, almoſt contrary to the King's Inclinations. This Woman, though ſhe was then advanced in Years, ſtill continued to be amiable; ſhe ſupplanted her Benefactreſs, and at laſt gained an unlimited Aſcendant over the King. Monf. *de Louvois* was extreamly diſguſted, to ſee a Woman, whom he had ſo frequently

quently beheld among the Crowd in his Anti-chamber, gain such an unbounded Influence over the King, and to find his own Credit daily diminishing, to such a Degree, that he was often obliged to hear very mortifying Expressions, because he was unable to practise a respectful Conformity to the new Taste of his Master: And as this Minister was naturally very haughty and imperious, he form'd a Resolution to turn the King's Attention to a new War, in order to disengage himself, as much as possible, from the Perplexities he daily sustained, in his Consultations with his Majesty in *Madam de Maintenon's* Apartment, and even in her Presence.

The Re-unions made by the Commissioners at *Metz* and *Besançon*, the Seizure of the *Spanish* Territories, as well as of *Strasburgh* and *Casal*, had sufficiently incensed the Powers of *Europe* against *France*. It was natural, therefore, to imagine, that when the Emperor had ended his War with the *Turks*, over whom he had obtained great Advantages in every Campaign; this ambitious Prince, finding himself Master of such a military Power, would not lose the Opportunity of placing himself at the Head of the League, which was then forming in all Parts against the King. *Monf. de Louvois* represented this League to his Majesty, as a Motive to induce him to
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begin the first Hostilities against the Emperor, by attacking *Philipsburg*, which had been yielded up to him by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*. This happened in the Month of *September*, but as that Declaration against the Emperor alone, would not have kindled a War that would have lasted long enough to have given *Mons. de Louvois* sufficient Hopes of diminishing the Credit of *Madam de Maintenon*, in that Period, and re-instating his own, the Minister was suspected to have been no dissatisfied Spectator of the Revolution in *England*, and the Prince of *Furstenburg's* Loss of the Electorate of *Cologne*, of which he had been declared Coadjutor. It was likewise thought, that he obliged the Duke of *Savoy* to break with *France*, by engaging the King to treat that Prince with too imperious an Air, and by causing, with a View to his particular Interest as Post-Master General, the *French* Mail to pass through the Dominions of that Duke to *Rome*, with a vast stock of mercantile Commodities, which he would not permit to be searched, and refused to allow the Duke of *Savoy* the Customs with which they were chargeable.

With these Circumstances was a new War kindled in *Europe* ; and though it might seem to have been commenced, in Conformity to the true Maxims of an ambitious

bitious Prince, who is determined to preserve by War, and the ensuing Treaties, the Acquisitions he had wrested from his Neighbours in a general Peace, on Pretences too inconsiderable to have any Validity; yet it really derived its Cause from the ambitious Views and Dissatisfaction of a Minister, who, under the Influence of his own particular Interest, had the Dexterity to make his specious Pretexts pass upon his Master for true Reasons of State, which ought to induce him to have Recourse to Arms. For it is certain, that if the King had not taken *Philipsburg*, the Empire would never have been provoked to declare War against *France*, whilst the Emperor was engaged in *Hungary*; it would likewise have been impossible for the Prince of *Orange* to have attempted a Descent in *England*, and the *Dutch* would have been equally incapable of assisting him. This War, which began in 1688, continued till the Year 1697, and was diversified by a vast number of Incidents, which, though they were foreign to the Operations of War, had their Efficacy in bringing on a Peace, in Opposition to the true Principles and Maxims of an ambitious Prince.

Monf. *Pelletier*, whom the Interest of Monf. *de Louvois* had placed at the Head of the Finances, after the Death of Monf.

Colbert, seeing the Preparations all around him for so great a War; found himself too much embarrassed with the Weight of the Finances, at a time which he was sensible would be rendered very disagreeable, by the Expedients it would be necessary to have Recourse to, for extraordinary Supplies of Money; he was desirous, therefore, to disengage himself from that arduous Province, and proposed *Monf. de Pontchartrain* to the King, who was pleased to honour him with his Approbation.

Monf. de Louvois was perpetually disconcerted in his Measures, by *Madam de Maintenon*, till the Month of *July* 1697, at which Time he died suddenly, and *Monf. de Barbezieux* succeeded him in the Post of Secretary of War. This young Minister found himself too happy, to be inconsolable at the sudden Death of his Father, and devoted all his Thoughts to the Preservation of the Power he had acquired. The Surveyorship of the Buildings was given to *Monf. de Villacerf*, and that of the Fortifications, to *Monf. Pelletier de Souzi*, Brother to *Monf. Pelletier*, the Comptroller General; so that the King had now three Men to transact with, instead of one, who was the late *Monf. de Louvois*.

The Events of this War were every where fortunate to the King, till the Beginning of
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the Year 1695, at which Time *Monf. de Luxembourg*, who commanded the Army in *Flanders*, died. This General was succeeded by Marshal *Villeroi*, during whose Command the Enemy recovered so much Vigour, that the King, though his Affairs were still in a flourishing Situation, consented to a Treaty of Peace at *Refwick*.

We have made it evident, that the Interests of particular Persons were more prevalent in this War, than the Glory of the King. *Madam de Maintenon* believed she should enjoy more Tranquillity and Repose in Peace, than in a War, which, in *Flanders* especially, was no longer maintained with the same Superiority that attended it during the Life of *Monf. de Luxembourg*. *Monf. de Pontchartrain*, who, upon the Death of his Father, was created Secretary of the Household and the Marine, represented to the King, the Difficulty of furnishing the necessary Supplies for the Land Forces; and as he was desirous of a solid Establishment for his Family, he was apprehensive, that he should no longer be in a Capacity to find Expedients for raising Money. *Monf. de Barbezieux*, who was not in any ministerial Station, had nothing but the State of the War to concert with the King; so that we may still continue to affirm, that this War, which was originally inflamed by

the Disgust which *Monf. de Louvois* entertained against *Madam de Maintenon*, was so far from being concluded by the Influence of those Maxims which an ambitious Prince ought to observe, in his Negotiations of Peace, that it rather owed its Period to the interested Views of those Persons who had an Ascendant over the King, and were desirous of Repose.

The War which began in the Year 1701, and is not yet concluded, must be referred to a Cause very different from any I have yet mentioned; but before I touch upon it, I shall take some Notice of the Changes which happened in the Ministry, because they are of such a Nature as renders them the principal Source of those unfortunate Events which will find a Place in the Sequel of these Observations.

The Lord Chancellor *Boucherat* being dead, was succeeded by *Monf. de Pontchartrain*, who, at the same Time, resigned to his Son the Post of Secretary of the Household and the Marine; and the Finances were given to *Monf. Chamillart*, by the Interest of *Madam de Maintenon*. *Monf. de Barbezieux* died suddenly at the Beginning of the Year 1701, upon which, *Madam de Maintenon* obtained the Post of Secretary of War for *Monf. Chamillart*; so that this Man, who was unacquainted with the Finances,

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and military Affairs, was charged with the Weight of both those Employments, to which *Colbert* and *Louvois*, who were very great and indefatigable Men, found it difficult to be equal.

The Cause of the War was this ; *Charles* the Second, King of *Spain*, was in such a declining State of Health, as made it easy to judge, he could not live much longer: He had no Children, and the Succession to his Dominions was the just Claim of the House of *France*, who derived it from the nearest Proximity of Blood ; but the *German* Branch of the House of *Austria* founded its Pretensions to this Succession, on its Descent from the same Line, as well as on the Renunciations of the Queens, *Anne* and *Theresa*, and the Wills of *Philip* the Third, and *Philip* the Fourth. The approaching Death of *Charles* the Second seemed to be a Conjunction which, in all Probability, would rekindle a long War between the House of *France*, and the *German* Branch of the House of *Austria* ; to prevent which, *William* of *Nassau*, King of *England*, in Conjunction with the *Dutch*, proposed to the Emperor and the King of *France*, a Treaty of Partition of the future Succession to the *Spanish* Monarchy, which was to be calculated, with a View to ballance the Power of those two potent Houses. The
2 King

King of *France* consented to the Treaty, of which the *English* and *Dutch* were to be Guarantees: But the Emperor, who believed the Succession to this Monarchy would infallibly devolve on him, refused to sign this Treaty of Partition. About the beginning of *September* 1700 the King of *Spain* died, having, by his Will, nominated the Duke of *Anjou* sole Heir to all his Dominions. This Will was transmitted to the King, and he accepted of the Donation, in the Name of the Duke of *Anjou*, whose Title to the *Spanish* Crown was acknowledged by all the States of that Monarchy, after which he began his Progress to *Madrid*.

The *English* and *Dutch*, who were Guarantees to the Treaty, expressed their Dissatisfaction at the King's Acceptance of the Will, before they had once more invited the Emperor to accede to the Partition, which had been concluded before the Death of *Charles* the Second. But that Treaty was rendered altogether impracticable, because the *Spaniards*, who were utterly averse to any Partition of their Monarchy, would have immediately offered it to that Prince, who would have received it in its undivided State: So that the *English* and *Dutch*, who were actuated in this Treaty of Partition, with the political View of securing the Tranquillity of *Europe*, by establishing a

Balance of Power between these two great Houses, finding that the Justice of *Charles* the Second had decided this Balance in Favour of the House of *France*, were easily induced to espouse the Interest of the *German* House of *Austria*, and drew after them most of the Powers of *Europe*, some of whom assisted them with Troops, whilst others made formal Declarations of War against *France*.

These are the Wars which I have seen commenced in *France*; and the Consideration either of the Cause or Conclusion, will make it evident, that Princes are guided by their Passions, and the particular Interests of those who approach them, much oftner than they are conducted by the real Maxims, either of pacific or ambitious Politics.

I shall now pass on to the Source of those Wars, with which the Monarchy of *Spain* has been agitated, in my Time. *Philip* the Fourth, King of *Spain*, after the Conclusion of the Peace of the *Pyrenees*, intended to reconquer *Portugal*, which, in the Course of a long War with *France*, had thrown off its Subjection to *Spain*, and placed upon the Throne the Duke of *Braganza*, who was descended from their antient Kings. *France*, who was suspected to have contributed, not a little, to this Revolution in *Portugal*, stipulated, by an Article in this Treaty, not to assist *Portugal* against the King of *Spain*,
who

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who was intent upon its Re-conquest, and would have effectually succeeded in that Design, had it not been for those Succours with which *France* indirectly furnished the *Portuguese*, under the Banners of Monsieur *de Turenne*.

This War, therefore, with respect to *Spain*, was more conformable to the Maxims of a pacific Prince, intent on the Preservation of all his Dominions, than to those of an ambitious Monarch, who would aggrandize his Power, at the Expence of his Neighbours, over whom he has no Prerogative : The Event, however, was unfavourable to *Spain*, because the War, which she was compelled to maintain with *France*, after the Death of *Philip* the Fourth, obliged her to enter into a Treaty with *Portugal*, by which she resigned the peaceable Possession of that Kingdom to its own Prince.

The War which *Charles* the Second, who was then an Infant, was constrained to carry on against *France*, in the same Year 1667, was the result of Necessity, and cost him several Territories in *Flanders* : I may add, that he would have lost all the rest of the *Spanish Netherlands*, had it not been for the Tripple Alliance, which was formed against the King of *France*, who, in Consequence of that League, was obliged to submit to the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle*.

The War which the same King commenced against *France*, in 1673, had a different Original. *France*, in the preceding Year, was engaged in a War with the *Dutch*, who had made a particular Treaty with *Spain*, which stipulated the Supply of a Body of Troops, to either of those two Powers, who should first be attacked. *Spain* had assisted *Holland* with more Troops than were specified by the Treaty, and yet that extraordinary Supply did not prevent *France* from obtaining very considerable Conquests over the *Dutch*, who, besides all the Losses they sustained in the Campaign of 1672, were dispossessed of *Maestricht*. Such a Series of fortunate Events made *Spain* apprehensive of losing all the rest of the *Spanish Netherlands*, should they be suddenly invaded by *France*. The Emperor, in Conjunction with the Elector of *Brandenburg*, having formed a new Alliance with the *Dutch*, were perpetually soliciting the King of *Spain* to declare against *France*, and as he thought such a Declaration very consistent with his Interest, in that Conjunction, he accordingly made it towards the Close of the Year 1673.

Spain, therefore, may be said to have engaged in a War wherein Ambition, and the Desire of extending her Power, had no Influence, and which was only commenced with a View to preserve the rest of her Dominions, in the
Spanish

Spanish Netherlands, which she was apprehensive of losing, should she be obliged to defend them with her own Forces alone; as she had already been dispossessed of Part in the Year 1667, when she was destitute of Allies, and sufficient Troops, to make a successful Opposition against *France*.

In the War which *Spain* declared against *France*, in 1689, she was actuated more by the Ambition of regaining what she had lost, in the two preceding Wars, than by any Desire of preserving the Territories she then possessed in the *Netherlands*. This Crown was, in Reality, much incensed at all the Transactions since the Peace of *Nimeguen*, which was concluded in 1678, as I have intimated elsewhere. She beheld *France* engaged, ever since the foregoing Year, in a War with *England*, the Emperor, *Holland* and the Empire, and imagined it to be her Interest to enter into that League, in Hopes of recovering all the Conquests which *France* had acquired from her, since the Year 1667; either in Consequence of some fortunate Events, which might happen during the Continuance of the War, or by an advantageous Treaty, which she believed would be infallibly concluded in the Result. The Event has, indeed, made it apparent, that she was deceived in her Expectations; but the Particulars I have already related, sufficiently

Justify my Assertion, that *Spain* engaged in this War, not so much for the Preservation of the Dominions she then possessed, as for the Recovery of those which had been wrested from her in the preceding Wars.

The War which commenced in 1701, is entirely different from all the rest, with relation to *Spain*. This Monarchy, by the Will of *Charles* the Second, had devolved to a Prince of the House of *France*, whom the King found himself obliged to maintain upon the Throne. The Emperor *Joseph Ignatius* the First disputed this Succession in favour of the Archduke *Charles*, his Brother, and all the Powers of *Europe*, except *Sweden*, were engaged in the Emperor's Interest against the *French*. This is the Subject of the present War, the Events of which have never been fortunate to *Spain*, tho' she has enjoyed the Protection of *France*.

It may therefore, with respect to *Spain*, be called a War of Necessity, commenced with an Intention to preserve that Monarchy, in its undivided State, and which has no Similitude to a War, undertaken with the Views of an ambitious Prince.

From what I have here advanced, with Regard to those Wars in which *Spain* has been engaged, in my Time, one may reasonably conclude, that the Kings of *Spain*, who succeeded *Philip* the Second, have be-

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gun their Wars from no other Motive than the Preservation of those large and separate Dominions which compose their Monarchy, and consequently, that the Character of an ambitious Prince is not to be sought for among the *Spanish* Monarchs who have reigned since *Philip* the Second.

I have seen *Portugal* twice engaged in War. The first was sustained by its King, against *Spain*, after his Dominions had shook off their Subjection to that Monarchy; it was a War of Necessity, in order to maintain the Duke of *Braganza* on the Throne, and was brought to its final Period in 1668, when the new King of *Portugal* was acknowledged by the King of *Spain*. The second, which still continues, is that wherein this Crown united in the League against *France* and *Spain*. This War might have two Motives for its Commencement; the first might be the Apprehension of being once more reduced under the Dominion of *Spain*, supported by the Power of *France*, if the *French* Prince, who now reigns, should continue in peaceable Possession of *Spain*. This Fear, according to my Sentiments, has no reasonable Foundation; for tho' the Monarchies of *France* and *Spain* are now vested in one and the same House, they will always habituate their Kings to the particular Interests, and true Politics of their Kingdoms.

France

France can never derive any Advantage by assisting a King of *Spain* to recover the *Portuguese* Dominions, on that Continent, and in other Parts of the World; and a Prince of the House of *Austria*, on the *Spanish* Throne, will always be more formidable to a King of *Portugal*, than a Prince of the House of *France*, because *Portugal* revolted and set up a new King of its own, when a Monarch of the House of *Austria* sat upon the *Spanish* Throne. The second View of *Portugal*, in the present War, seems to me, to be totally founded on Ambition, and consists in the secret Articles of some Treaties which this Crown may have made with the Emperor, the *English*, and the *Dutch*, either for the Augmentation of its Dominions on our Continent, at the Expence of *Spain*, or else for the Security of those it possesses on the Coast of *Africa*, the *East-Indies*, or in the new World; for which Reason, the Event of the present War will either vindicate the Conduct of this Crown, or expose it to Censure. For I can never persuade my self that *Portugal* could entertain any real Apprehensions of being invaded by *England* and *Holland*, in favour of the *German* Branch of the House of *Austria*; tho' its Fears of those maritime Powers have been made the Pretext for its Rupture with the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*.

England

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England has, in my time, been engaged in several Wars, either against *Holland* or *Spain*, in favour of *Portugal*, or in Conjunction with *France* against *Holland*, or else in Confederacy with *Holland* and *Spain* against *France*, or lastly, in Concert with the House of *Austria* against *France* and *Spain*. The first War of the *English* against the *Dutch*, commenced some Years before I engaged in the Service, and was occasioned by the Depredations committed by the *Dutch*, upon the *English*, in their *India* Trade; but it was soon terminated on our Continent. The *Dutch*, after an Engagement at Sea, wherein the Event was not very decisive, agreed to make the *English* due Reparations for what had been transacted in the *Indies*, and to pay the Honours of the Sea to the *English* Flag. *France* engaged, in this War, as an Ally to *Holland*. The other War, which *England* maintained in favour of *Portugal*, was only auxiliary, and owed its Cause to the Marriage of *Charles*, King of *England*, with the *Infanta* of *Portugal*; at which Time this Prince entered into Engagements with the King, his Brother-in-Law, against *Spain*. The Peace, which was concluded in 1668, between *Spain* and *Portugal*, ended, at the same time, the War between *England* and *Spain*.

The War, in which *England* associated
with

with *France*, against *Holland*, began in 1672. The Motive used by the King of *England*, to induce the Parliament to come into his Measures, and raise those Subsidies as might enable him to carry on that War, was the insupportable Pride of the *Dutch*, who persisted in refusing the Honours of the Sea to the *English*, and continually molested them in their Commerce to the new World, the *East-Indies*, and the *Levant*. But the Union between the two Kings is to be ascribed to the Dutchess of *Portsmouth*, a Lady of *French* Extraction, and Mistress to the King of *England*, and who, by her Ascendant over her royal Lover, determined him to engage with *France*, in the War with *Holland*; tho' its Continuance was but short, with Respect to the *English* Nation, who were induced to accept of a Peace, partly by the Submissions offered by the *Dutch*, in Relation to the Honours of the Sea, and the Satisfaction they gave in the Article of Commerce; and partly by the Measures of the Prince of *Orange*, Stadtholder of *Holland*, and Nephew to the King of *England*, and who, soon after the Conclusion of the Peace, espoused the Princess *Mary*, eldest Daughter of the Duke of *York*, and Niece to King *Charles*.

This Monarch was, in some Measure, forced into the first War which *England*, in my Time, declared against *France*. When he engaged

engaged in the *Dutch* War, he had concerted Measures to have a Body of auxiliary Troops in *France*, who, in Reality, did not serve in *Flanders*, against the *Spaniards* and *Dutch*, but were employed in *Germany* against the Emperor. The Paces of the Prince of *Orange* and the *Dutch*, in *England*, made it necessary for King *Charles*, not only to recal his Troops from *France*, but to declare War against the *French*, after they had taken *Ghent* and *Ypres*.

The second War, in which *England* was engaged against *France*, was that which commenced in 1688, between *France* and the Emperor. King *Charles* was then dead, and was succeeded by his Brother, *James* the Second, Duke of *York*. This Prince was a professed *Roman* Catholick, and too zealous to enjoy much Tranquillity in a Kingdom where the Protestant Religion was established by Law. He suffered himself to be entirely governed by his Confessor, who was a *Jesuit*, and would not permit his Sovereign to content himself with the Liberty of introducing Popery into the Chapel of his Palace, but would needs have the Pope's Nuncio make his public Appearance in *London*, and even caused Processions to pass thro' the Streets. The *Jesuit* was hanged for his insolent Proceedings; and all these Innovations embroiled the King with the Parliament

ment and the whole Nation, to such a Degree, that a secret Association of zealous Protestants was formed, and their Interest espoused by the Prince of *Orange*, Son-in-Law to King *James*. This Prince, with the Assistance of the *Dutch*, made a Descent in *England*, divested his Father-in-Law of the Crown, and caused himself, and the Princess *Mary* his Consort, to be proclaimed King and Queen of that Monarchy. It was not at all surprizing, that this new Sovereign, whose Birth, in Conjunction with his high Station and natural Disposition, inclined him to entertain a peculiar Regard for *Holland*, should induce the Parliament of *England* to declare War against the King of *France*, who had then received, and haughtily protected King *James*, with an Intention to re-establish him on the *English* Throne.

The third War, in which *England* was associated against *France*, began in 1701, after the Revolution in *Spain*. *William* of *Nassau*, King of *England*, who died about that Time, had prepared the State of Affairs, for such Operations against *France*, that Queen *Anne*, who succeeded him, and had espoused George Prince of *Denmark*, had nothing more to do, than to conduct herself by the Plan left her by her Predecessor, and to continue in the Alliances which

which had been already contracted with the *German Branch* of the House of *Austria*, and the *Dutch*. The Nature of this War was very different from all the rest, with Relation to *England*. A Queen was upon the Throne of that Monarchy, and as she had selected a Lady for her Favourite, the Husband, as well as the Friend of that Lady, were admitted to a Participation of her Majesty's Esteem. The Dutches of *Marlborough* was the Queen's Favourite, and had Interest enough to procure the Post of Lord High Treasurer of *England*, for her Friend the Lord *Godolphin*. The Duke of *Marlborough* had an Elevation of Mind, which was judged, by some, to be a natural Ambition, and he was not inclined to Profusion in his Expences; and the Lord *Godolphin* possessed the same Qualities. The Queen and her Favourite devoted themselves to Pleasure, and the Men were intent upon their own Affairs. The Emperor accommodated himself to the Ambition of the Duke of *Marlborough*, who was constituted General of the Army, whilst the Lord *Godolphin* was attentive to discharge the Functions of his Province. A great Number of the Subjects of *England*, deriving their own particular Advantages from the Liberality of the Queen, and the large Sums raised for the Payment of the Army, filled the Commons with Apprehensions

prehenfions of the Grandeur of *France*, ſhould the Succeſſion to the *Spaniſh* Monarchy devolve entirely on *Philip* the Fifth. The Nation dreaded the Loſs of their beneficial Trade with *Spain*, and the Deſtruction of their Woollen Manufactures in the *Levant*; and theſe were the Reaſons which induced the *Engliſh* to furniſh their Queen, ſo liberally, with Men and Money, to enable her to carry on a War with *France*.

The Reader may, perhaps, be ſurprized, that among all the Particulars of this third War, I have not taken any Notice of Prince *George* of *Denmark*, the Queen's Conſort; but this Prince never affected to make a dazzling Appearance in the World, and the *Engliſh* had no Inclination to inveſt him with the Title of King, which they had before given to King *William*, in Conjunction with Queen *Mary*, his Conſort, and to whom they continued the Exerciſe of the Regal Authority, after the Death of that Princeſs. The ſupreme Power, therefore, was totally veſted in Queen *Anne*, who always lived in the greateſt Harmony with Prince *George*, to the Time of his Death. This Princeſs had even raiſed her Conſort to the Dignity of Lord High Admiral, which is the firſt Poſt of Honour in *England*; but he had no extraordinary Credit in the Kingdom, excluſive of that which redounded to him, from this important

important Station, and was only considered by the People, as the Consort of their Sovereign.

From these Observations on the different Wars which *England* has maintained, in my Time, it may be naturally concluded, that according to the Constitution of this State, which is not a perfect Monarchy, and in which the Subjects have preserved a Branch of the Power to themselves, it is impossible for their Kings, when War is in Agitation, to conduct themselves entirely by their own Resolutions, or the interested Views of those who have an Ascendant over them; and that, without the Concurrence of their Parliament, they can never act from Principles of Ambition peculiar to themselves. The first War which this Crown commenced, in my Time, against the *Dutch*, was with a View to the Benefit of the *English* Commerce; for their Ambition to receive the Honours of the Sea, was not the principal Motive, tho' the *English* are very anxious after Glory. The Pretext for that which began in 1672, tho' it seemed to have been created by the Insolence of the *Dutch* on the Seas, and the Continuation of their injurious Practices against the *English* Trade, would not have been sufficiently prevalent with that Nation, had not the Intrigues of the Court of *France*, in the Parliament, and those of King *Charles*, with

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his Creatures in that Assembly, brought the Nation to resolve on a War, to which the Duchess of *Portsmouth*, the King's Mistress, prompted him with a View to the Interest of *France*, by which she was actuated.

Of the three last Wars, in which *England* engaged against *France*, the first, which began and ended in 1678, was intirely spirited up by the Intrigues of the Prince of *Orange* and the *Dutch*, in the Parliament of *England*, who compelled King *Charles* to recal his Troops from the Service of *France*, and to declare War against that Crown. The second was occasioned by the Union of the Republic of *Holland* with the Prince of *Orange*, who was created King of *England* in 1688. It became necessary for the new King to maintain himself upon the Throne, which he had ascended notwithstanding the Protection King *James* received from the King of *France*. King *William* was likewise ambitious to preserve his Dignity of Stadtholder of *Holland*; and it was easy for him to inspire his Parliament with Apprehensions of the Influence *France* would have in *England*, and the Danger their Liberty would sustain, if that Crown should re-establish King *James* and the Popish Religion, by force of Arms.

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The third War, which is not yet concluded, derives its Source from the Alliances contracted between King *William* and the *German* Branch of the House of *Austria*, against *France*, subsequent to the Revolution in *Spain*; but I have already enlarged so much upon this Subject, that I have no occasion now, to enter upon any other Particulars.

With Relation, therefore, to the Character of those ambitious or pacific Princes, whose Reigns have been within the Compass of my Observation, I may say, that from the Genius and Constitution of the *English* Government, it is almost impossible for a King of that Nation to conduct himself by the Principles and Maxims of an ambitious Prince; because the Parliament of that Kingdom will always take just Measures to incapacitate its King from making any Attempt upon the Liberty and Privileges of the People; but, at the same time, it is equally certain, that when a King of *England* acts conformably to the Maxims of a pacific Prince, his Parliament will concur with him in every reasonable Particular, and with a view to make him capable of sustaining this very Character with Dignity, in Relation to his Neighbours, because this Grandeur will constitute the Tranquillity and Reputation of the Kingdom.

Holland has, in my Time, either commenced or sustained several Wars. This Republic, which has formed itself in *Europe*, within the Space of a Hundred and fifty Years, by its Revolt from *Spain*, who possessed all the Territories of the House of *Burgundy*, has acquired such Riches by its Commerce, and is grown so powerful, by its vast Fleet, as well as its extensive Settlements in the three other Parts of the World, that it has even presumed to discover an Air of Imperiousness and Ambition, on our Continent. The *Dutch* would engross every Branch of Trade, and render themselves the only Merchants in the World. They are constantly interposing as Arbitrators, between the other Potentates, and are even watchful for every Incident which can aggrandize their Power. The Views of this Republic should create no little Jealousy, though they have been shadow'd, till this Time, with the specious Pretext of their own Security: And if the neighbouring Princes should neglect to consider them with a serious Attention, their ambitious and indefatigable Schemes will raise them to a Height, which, as they have not attained it by a rapid Ascent, will make it difficult to bring them down to their ancient Limits.

I now return to my Subject, which is, to discuss the Motives of all those Wars I have

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have seen commenced or sustained by the *Dutch*, that by the Consideration of their pacific or ambitious Character, I may form those Consequences which I have reserved for this Chapter.

This Republic partly owes her Establishment to *France*, in consequence of those immediate Succours she received from that Crown, in the first Struggles of her Revolt from the House of *Austria*; and she afterwards supported herself, by a strict Union with *France*, and a Series of mutual Alliances, during the long War which that Crown continued with *Spain*. It was by Vertue of these reciprocal Engagements, that *France* assisted this Republic with a Fleet, in the War she maintained against *England*. But as I have already intimated the Causes of this War, in my Observations on that wherein *England* was engaged, it will be unnecessary to repeat them here; and I shall only remark, that Pride and Ambition were the Motives which induced the *Dutch* to sustain the Course of this War.

The second War which *Holland* attempted, was against *Christopher de Galen*, Bishop of *Munster*, who had an Intention to recover a small Tract of Land, which its commodious Situation, and the Neighbourhood of their Province of *Over-Yffel*, had induced the *Dutch* to encroach upon, in Prejudice to that

Prelate. The King of *France* assisted them, in this War, with a Body of auxiliary Troops, who, in Conjunction with their own Forces, obliged the Bishop to leave them in peaceable Possession of what they had long usurped from his Bishopric. If the Motive to this War, were no more than an Intention to preserve what they then enjoyed, it must be acknowledged, at least, that it was an Intention to preserve what they had unjustly acquired, and which, originally, was no Part of the Seven Provinces, which separated at the Time of their Revolt.

The third War, which was not carried on, to a formal Declaration against *France*, was resolved upon, when this Republic, towards the Close of the Year 1667, took Umbrage at his Majesty's Conquests in *Flanders*, and promoted the Tripple Alliance; tho', in Reality, this ought not to be ranked among Wars, strictly so called, since the *Dutch* did not proceed to an open Rupture. However, I believe it will not be improper to bestow an Observation on the Alliance of *Holland*, with *Sweden* and *England*, in Favour of *Spain*, in order to make it evident, that this Republic had then no Apprehensions of her ancient Masters, but began to be sensible of her own Power, and suffered herself to be actuated by a haughty Ambition. We may therefore consider the Conclusion

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clusion of this Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, as the *Æra* in which this Republic began to discover her Pride and ambitious Views, on our Continent, by endeavouring to aspire at the Arbitration of all the Affairs of *Europe*; there having been no Transactions of any Importance, since that Period, in which she has not been solicitous to intermeddle. Her Insolence appeared in the haughty Airs her Ambassadors assumed in every Prince's Court, and the licentious Indecency with which her Writers treated the sacred Persons of Kings. She even irritated those Powers, by the arrogant Language of her Ministers in their Courts; a Language so extremely distant from the Respect due to their Dignity, that the King of *France* concerted effectual Measures to disengage the King of *Sweden* from taking any Part in those Transactions which his Most Christian Majesty might happen to have with *Holland*; and, at the same time, he concluded a Treaty with *England*, who was likewise incensed at the Insolence of the *Dutch* at Sea, by which Treaty the two Monarchs agreed to attack the *Dutch* by Sea and Land. The Elector of *Cologne* and the Bishop of *Munster* likewise acceded to this Treaty, in the Quality of Allies to the two Kings; the first with a View to recover those Territories of his Electorate which the *Dutch* possessed on the *Rhine*; the second, with an

Intention to regain those Branches of the Bishopric of *Munster* which kindled the War I have already mentioned.

From all these Particulars, it is natural to imagine that the War, which commenced in 1672, against *Holland*, was not occasioned by any Designs of that Republic to extend its Possessions on our Continent, but had its Source from their Pride, which became insupportable to the Princes who were now determined to chastise them; and if the King's Council had not been divided by their particular Interests, as I have already intimated, in my Observations on the Wars of *France*, this Republic would certainly have sustained a fatal Humiliation in the Year 1672; but the Fortune of the States had determined Events in a more favourable manner. The *Dutch* engaged *Spain*, the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and even *England* in their Interest; so that a War which continued ten Years, cost them only those Places on the *Rhine*, which they were obliged to yield up to the Electors of *Brandenburg* and *Cologne*; it likewise cost their Allies the *Spaniards* some Places in *Flanders*, and the *Franch-Comté*, with the secret Mortification of being obliged to owe the Protection of the *Spanish Netherlands* to those very *Hollanders* who originally were their Subjects, and revolting from their Dominions, dispossessed
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that Crown of part of the Seventeen Provinces, which it had acquired by virtue of its Succession to the House of *Burgundy*.

The War which broke out in 1689, may be imputed to two causes. The *Dutch* Republicans were apprehensive of the Power of the Prince of *Orange*, in their Territories. This Prince had secretly form'd a Party in *England*, against his Father-in-Law, King *James*. The *Dutch* assisted the Prince of *Orange* with their Fleet and Troops, to facilitate his intended Invasion, because they imagined, that by making that Prince King of *England*, they should secure a faithful Ally of their own Religion, instead of a professed Popish Prince, whose Alliance with *France*, and whose Resentments for their Insolence at Sea, they greatly dreaded. The King of *France* had lately declared War against the Emperor, by taking *Philipsburg*, and had likewise seized the *Palatinate*, and the Cities of *Mentz* and *Triers*; he was in Alliance with the Elector of *Cologne*, whom he had engaged to receive Cardinal *Furstemberg* for his Coadjutor; he was also in the Interest of *James* the Second, King of *England*, who had abdicated his Kingdom, and retired into *France*. All these different Engagements arm'd the *Dutch* against *France*, and inflamed a War in *Europe*, which lasted ten Years; at the Expiration of which, the *Dutch* lost nothing
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but the Money they had expended ; but their Power received a considerable Addition, since they were in a Capacity to support the Prince of *Orange* on the *English* Throne, and as they continued him in his Station of Stadtholder of their Province, which cemented their Alliance with *England*. But the most glorious Circumstance for this Republic was, that she was acknowledged by the Peace of *Reswick*, to be the Protectress of the *Spanish Netherlands*, from which she had dismember'd herself, by revolting from the Kings of *Spain*, her ancient Sovereigns ; and it was likewise stipulated, by an Article of this Treaty, that she **should** be allowed to garrison part of her Troops, in **some** of the *Spanish* Fortresses, under the specious Denomination of a Barrier against *France*.

The War in which the *Dutch* engaged against *France* and *Spain* in 1701, tho' it may seem to have been occasion'd by their Apprehensions of the Grandeur the House of *France* would acquire, by raising *Philip* the Fifth to the Throne of *Spain*, and the Diminution of their Trade, which they imagined would be the Consequence of that Event, in case *Spain* should grant to the Crown of *France* the Commerce of the new World, and the Woollen Manufactures, exclusive of the *Dutch* (which, however, seem'd to be an absolute Impossibility) I say, this War appears to me,
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to have been undertaken from a meer motive of Ambition. For how is it credible, that this Republic would have enter'd into such strict Alliances with our Enemies, and involved her self in the prodigious Expences she now sustains, if she had really no other Interest in this Affair, than the pretended Barrier, in the *Netherlands*, against *France*, which was stipulated by the Treaty of *Reswick*: or if she was only actuated by a Disgust against *France*, for receding from the Treaty of Partition, which, in some measure, was plan'd out by this Republic; in a word, how can this War be imputed to their Fears of suffering in their Trade; since I am persuaded the two Crowns would have enter'd into such Negotiations with the *Dutch*, as might have secured them against those Apprehensions which they pretended were so reasonable?

The Conclusion of this War will unfold the real Views of the *Dutch*; but in the mean time, I am very inclinable to suspect, that this Republic begins to be dissatisfied at her possessing so inconsiderable a Tract of Land on our Continent, while she is Mistress of so much Power and Riches in other parts of the World; I believe she is desirous of forsaking her Marshes, for a better Situation, and is spirited by the same Views which prevailed in the *Roman* Republic, who, for a
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long time, disguised her ambitious Designs, with the specious Pretence of protecting the Oppressed, and preserving Peace among her Neighbours. Upon the whole, I am persuaded that the Preservation of her Dominions, in the same Condition in which they were at the beginning of this War, and the Security of her Trade, in all its Branches, are so far from being her real Motives, at present, that they are no more than plausible Insinuations, by which she would conceal her ambitious Designs of aggrandising her self on our Continent.

I have seen but one War in *Denmark*; and it was that which this Crown maintain'd against the *Swedes*, when they declared for *France*, against the Elector of *Brandenburg*. *Denmark* was spirited up by the Emperor, in conjunction with the *Dutch* and the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and was intent to derive Advantages, in the Province of *Schonen*, from those Disorders and Calamities which *Sweden* sustain'd in *Pomerania*. This War was concluded, like the rest, by the Treaty of *Nimwegen*, which restored to *Sweden* all the Territories she had lost.

The War which the King of *Denmark* declared against *Sweden*, was purely a War of Ambition, and conformable to the Character of an aspiring Prince, who endeavour'd to make the Confusion of his Neighbour's Affairs

contribute to his Recovery of the Province of *Schonen*. It must indeed be granted, that this Province was formerly dismembred from the Dominions of *Denmark*; but then it was separated from that Crown, and united to *Sweden*, by an authentic Treaty: The Rupture therefore of *Denmark*, with the *Swede*, at this Conjunction, had no other Motive but the Misfortunes of the King of *Sweden* in the Battle of *Pultowa*; but if these had not happen'd, the King of *Denmark* would never have ventur'd upon a Declaration of War against that Monarch. The present War, therefore, which the King of *Denmark* declared against *Sweden* in the Province of *Schonen*, is a War which directly comports with the Character of an ambitious Prince, industrious to derive the Recovery of part of his Dominions, from the Misfortunes of his Neighbour; since we have seen this Prince concert Measures with the Empire, to secure the Tranquillity of those Territories which these two Northern Powers possessed on the Continent of *Germany*, at the same time that he employed the good Offices of the *English* and *Dutch* to engage the King of *Sweden's* Consent, that *Pomerania*, the Duchy of *Bremen*, and that of *Holstein Gottorp*, which belongs to the Duke of that Name who is Nephew to the King of *Sweden*; and that the Duchy of *Holstein Reswick*, and the Coun-
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ty of *Oldemburgh*, which are his own Domains, should continue in perfect Tranquillity, and, at the same time, that he should be at Liberty to prosecute a War against the Crown of *Sweden*, in the Province of *Schoonen*.

We must wait for the Event of this War; and should it prove fortunate to the King of *Denmark*, we must acknowledge his Conduct to have been consistent with the Maxims of an ambitious Prince, capable of forming just Measures to secure a Conquest he is sollicitous to obtain, without being disconcerted, or obliged to divert his Attention from its principal Object.

We may therefore conclude, that all the Wars which the Kings of *Denmark* shall hereafter declare against their Neighbours, will correspond with the Character of an ambitious Prince; and this Opinion seems the more probable, because they cannot reasonably propose the Advancement of their Grandeur in any Territories, except the Duchies of *Holstein Gottorp*, and some Hans-Towns in their Neighbourhood. As to all other Wars wherein they may happen to engage, in the Quality of Allies, and which they will never fail to do, when they have a commodious Opportunity; their only Motives will be the Advantage they shall obtain by hiring out their Men to foreign Service, and the Subsidies they

they must receive to enable them to keep up a Body of Troops, whose Pay their own Revenues are too inconsiderable to furnish.

I have seen two Wars maintain'd in *Sweden*. The first is that which King *Charles* the Eleventh commenced at the close of the Year 1674. against the Elector of *Brandenburg*, in Favour of *France*; but the Event of it prov'd unfortunate to the King of *Sweden*; who, in a little Time, lost all *Pomerania*, which was afterwards restored to him by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*. The second is that which the young King, *Charles* the Twelfth, was compelled to sustain against *Augustus* King of *Poland*. This unquiet Prince broke with *Sweden*, for no other Reason than because he imagined King *Charles* was too young to give him any Apprehensions; and he began with invading all *Livonia*. Every one knows the great Advantages which the King of *Sweden* obtain'd over the King of *Poland*, and the *Czar* his Ally, tho', in reality, they were Advantages of which he was entirely divested in one Battle*, which was a Misfortune he would never have sustain'd, had he been influenced by those Maxims which are peculiar to an ambitious Prince, whose Conduct ought to be regulated by Prudence and Circumspection, that he may avoid those Inconveniencies which generally flow from an inconsiderate Ambition.

* Pultowa.

Poland

Poland has, in my Time, been only engaged in Wars with the *Turks* and *Tartars*. The *Turks* were compelled to a Restitution of *Kaminieck*, in consequence of their unsuccessful War with the Emperor. As for the *Tartars*, they are only a Cluster of Robbers who wander about in large Bodies, not with a View of conquering any Dominions, but to commit Depredations, and carry off Prisoners, whom they afterwards sell for Slaves; but they assemble for Actions of Hostility against other States, when they are so commanded by the *Turk*. The War which the *Poles* maintain'd with *Sweden*, in Defence of *Augustus* whom they had elected for their King, was properly a War of Compulsion; because that Kingdom has always had a considerable Party who have opposed King *Augustus*. I may therefore say that *Poland*, which is a Monarchy blended with a Republic, will never be involved in any War, but what is calculated for its own Preservation and Quiet, and will not entertain any Thoughts of advancing its Grandeur at the Expence of the Princes of *Europe*.

The Emperor *Leopold* the First has either commenced or sustained several Wars, in my Time; and as long as the Imperial Dignity continues in the House of *Austria*, that House will be always forming ambitious and vast Designs, for which Reason the other Powers
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of *Europe* may justly concert such Plans in Politicks, as will most effectually disconcert the *Austrian* Schemes. The views of this House are aim'd at two main Points; one is the Advancement of its own particular Grandeur; the other, the Augmentation of its Power, with Relation to the Title of Emperor, whether it be at the Expence of the *Empire*, or of those Branches which have been separated from it for several Ages, and which this House will be always desirous of reducing to their original state of Dependency,

From the time of *Charles* the Fifth, who united under his own *Empire*, the Dominions of the Crown of *Spain* and the House of *Burgundy*, with those of the *German* House of *Austria*; these Princes have never turn'd their Eyes from those two great Objects. But as I have no Intention to assume the Air of an Historian, or deviate from the subject of this Chapter, I shall confine my self to what I have observed in my Time.

The late Emperor *Leopold* was a Prince of the greatest Ambition I have ever known, tho' he disguised it in the exterior Appearances of the calmest Moderation, which always secured to him the Confidence of his Allies, and furnished him with numberless Resources from their Money and Troops.

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I shall now enter upon a short Detail of those Wars in which he, either directly or indirectly, had a part.

In the year 1663, he had not an opportunity of engaging in a War with *France*, when the King marched his Army into *Flanders*, after the Death of *Philip* the Fourth, to vindicate the just Pretensions of the Queen; but he indirectly concerted Measures to form the Tripple Alliance, which brought on the Peace of *Aix la Chapelle* in 1668. There seem'd to be a reasonable Pretext for this War, in which the Emperor prepared to have a part: For it no way comported with an Emperor of the House of *Austria*, to suffer any Diminution of the *Spanish* Dominions, which were then possessed by the Eldest Branch of his House, and to which he himself expected to succeed, in default of Male Heirs of that Branch.

The King having declared War against *Holland* in 1672, as I have intimated above, the Emperor immediately improved that Pretext to enter into a War with *France*, which he declared, in Form, against that Crown in 1673, and found means, by his Influence in the Diet, to make his own particular War espoused by all the Princes of the *Empire*, who sustain'd the greatest part of its Weight, by furnishing his Troops with Winter Quarters, and by the extraordinary Subsidies they
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supplied: And if he lost *Friburg*, at the Conclusion of this War, he gain'd *Philipsburgh*, with a Subsistence for a large Body of Troops, who never created him any Expence for ten Years. The ambitious Views of this Prince, were evident in the whole series of this War, not by any successful Endeavours to aggrandize himself, at the Expence of *France*, but by the Sequel of an ancient Scheme of the *German House of Austria*, to arrive, by insensible Paces, at a predominant Power in the *Empire*, and to make it necessary for the Imperial Dignity to be hereditary to this potent House.

In the Year 1683, the Emperor sustain'd a very sudden Invasion from the *Turks*, whose Hostilities were palliated with the pretence of affording Protection to the Malecontents in *Hungary*, whom Count *Tekely* had spirited up to a Revolt from the Emperor. At the opening of the first Campaign, his Imperial Majesty was obliged to retire from *Vienna* with great precipitation. This Capital was besieged by the *Turks*, who would certainly have taken it, had they known how to attack fortified Places in a regular manner. But *John Sobieski* King of *Poland*, having had sufficient time to march to the Relief of *Vienna*, with all the Forces of that Kingdom, and the late Duke of *Lorrain*, having the same Opportunity of assembling the whole

Body of the Emperor's Troops, these two Princes defeated the *Ottoman* Army, and compell'd them to raise the Siege of *Vienna*. The Emperor, from that time, to the Year 1684, was always successful against the *Turks*, with his own Forces, in Conjunction with the Assistance he received from all the Princes of the *Empire*, whom he prevail'd upon to pour Troops into *Hungary*. And tho' the Siege of *Vienna* was an Event which forced the Emperor upon the Edge of a Precipice, and threaten'd him with Destruction, it created no change in his Conduct, with Relation to the Politics he pursued; nor did he once, in that calamitous Situation, make the least abatement of his Incomplacency to any Prince. He refused, with an imperious Air, the Supplies with which the King of *France* offered to furnish him, because he would have the Empire always consider that Prince as its Enemy, since he acted as such to his House; nor did he accept of the Service he received from the King of *Poland*, and all the Princes of the *Empire*, in any other construction than an indispensable Duty, which he had a right to claim from them on that occasion. I have taken notice of this Circumstance, only to shew with what Steadiness of Mind this Prince always pursued his secret and ambitious Politics.

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This is a true Idea of his Conduct, from the Year 1688, to 1698. He has continued the War in *Hungary* against the *Turks*, and obliged all the *Empire* to declare against *France*, in consequence of a Resolution of the Diet. He has carried on the War upon the *Rhine*, with the Army furnished by the *Empire*; he has supported the Duke of *Savoy* against *France*, and sent him considerable Supplies of his own Troops, with those of the Princes of the *Empire*; but these Succours, instead of exhausting his Finances, have been as serviceable to him as Money, and increased his Power, by the Contributions he extorted from all the Princes of *Italy*, whose Dominions, as he pretended, were Fiefs of the *Empire*; a Tenure which has been long antiquated in *Italy*, and now revived by Himself. The Peace of *Reswick*, and that of *Carlowitz* in 1698, having restored a Calm to all *Europe*, this Prince alone continued in Arms, greatly respected as well as dreaded by the whole *Empire*, and in the highest Estimation with all his Allies, of whom he never abandoned one. So that upon the Death of *Charles* the Second, King of *Spain*, he had the Dexterity to conduct his Views to his own particular Interest, and the Grandeur of his House, in such a manner, that he rekindled all the Jealousies he had formerly created in the other Powers of the am-

bitious Designs of *France*, and excited as many Enemies to that Kingdom, as there were Sovereign Princes, or States in *Europe*. Some time after which, Death divested him of his high Dignity; he left the Imperial Throne to his eldest Son *Joseph Ignatius* the First, and invested the Arch-Duke *Charles*, his younger Son, with the imaginary Title of King of *Spain*.

I have related all these Particulars of the Emperor *Leopold*, with no other view than to make it evident, that he was the only Prince in my Time, whose political Ambition has been ever most conceal'd, and most pursued. He always regulated his Conduct by his real Interest, and was never entirely diverted from it by any Cabals of his Court. The Emperor *Joseph Ignatius*, in all probability, will have no Pretension to the same Character: He seems, indeed, to be as solicitous to augment the Imperial Dignity, and the particular Grandeur of his House, and to imitate his Father's Politicks in those two points, but he has deviated from his Measures. He no longer proceeds with the deliberate Caution of his Father, and may happen, in the Event, to form as powerful a League for his own Depression, as that Prince established with a View to humble *France*, by augmenting his own Credit and the Grandeur of his House.

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I have but a Word to offer, with Relation to the pacific and ambitious Policies of the Republic of *Venice*. This Power believes her self to be the wisest in *Europe*, in the Administration of her Government. She will never have any direct Engagement in the Wars between the Princes of Christendom; She contents her self with a small Extent of Territories in *Italy*, and if the *Turks* will let her rest in *Dalmatia* and the *Morea*, she will always continue in that Situation: but then, it is absolutely necessary for her to be always cultivating a strict Alliance with the *German* House of *Austria*, to whose Motions she must entirely conform, with Respect to its Differences with the *Turks*, that so she may be reciprocally protected by the Princes of that House, against their common Enemy, the Infidels. I may therefore very justly affirm, that the Government of *Venice* will be always regulated by the Maxims of a pacific State.

If the Order I propos'd to observe, in examining the Subject of this Chapter, had not made it necessary for me to mention the Republic of *Venice*, before the Duke of *Savoy*, this Prince would have had his place immediately after the Emperor *Leopold*, in consideration of that Parallel which I should have had Occasion to draw between these two aspiring Characters, equally conducted

by ambitious Views, tho' these were executed in different Manners.

The Duke of *Savoy* is ambitious, and regulates all the Maxims of his Politics, by those which ought to be pursued by an ambitious Prince, intent upon his *Grandeur*, but, at the same time, avaricious and implacable. These two Qualities seem to have been always marked, too strongly, in the whole Course of his Conduct, and he has given all *Europe* too much Reason to be sensible, that he is as often actuated by sordid Interest and Resentment, as by real Glory. His Interest and his Passions, furnish him with all the Counsels he pursues, and neither his Ministers, nor his Mistresses, have the least Ascendant over him, when either of these predominant Qualities operate upon him. This Prince has been engaged in several Wars with his Subjects of *Mondevi*s, with no other view than to divest them of their particular Privileges, and he has generally succeeded in that Attempt. He has exercised as much Severity upon his Subjects the *Vaudois*, in Imitation of *France*, who was dissatisfied with this People, part of whom are Subjects to that Crown. But his Insincerity has been evident, thro' the whole Course of these Expeditions, and chiefly by the Intelligence he maintained with the *Vaudois*, at the very time when his military Operations seem'd

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to be conducted, in concert with *France*, against whom he, in reality, was concerting Measures to declare in Favour of *Spain*.

When the Duke of *Savoy* in 1690, declared War against the King of *France*, with whom he seem'd to have maintain'd a good Intelligence, and with whose Forces he had stipulated, by a Treaty, to join his own Troops, in order to penetrate into the *Milaneze*, and had agreed to act with the Title of Generalissimo; he betrayed this Crown, and concluded Treaties with the *Emperor, England, Spain and Holland*. When he made a separate Peace with *France*, unknown to the Allies, in 1696, he betrayed them, with a view to his own Interest, which indeed was very great, and capable of tempting such a Prince as the Duke of *Savoy*, to dispense with the Principles of strict Honour. The King restored *Savoy* to him, with the County of *Nice*, and *Susa*, and reinstated him in the Possession of *Pignerol*, and every other part of his Dominions, which *France* had kept from him, for a considerable Time; and his Majesty even concluded a Marriage between this Prince's eldest Daughter and the Duke of *Burgundy*, which did not cost him one Pistole. And thus we have seen this Prince, one day commanding the Armies of our Enemies, and the next day consenting to be our General, and cooperating with his own Troops at the Siege of
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of *Valenza*, in the *Milaneze*. In the year 1703. *France* seized part of his Troops who were acting in conjunction with ours, in *Lombardy*, and the King declared War against him, because his Majesty had received full Conviction of his secret Treaties and Alliances with our Enemies, and his Treachery to *France* and *Spain*, for a considerable Time; without the least Regard to the new Alliance he had lately contracted with *Philip* the Fifth, King of *Spain*, who had espoused his youngest Daughter.

The Situation of the Duke of *Lorrain's* Dominions, and the Examples of his Predecessors, will not permit him to adjust his Politicks by any Maxims but those of a pacific Prince. The generality of the *German* Princes receive Subsidies, and hire their Men into Foreign Service. They are commonly best affected to that Power who is most liberal to them, and to whose Assistance the Troops they sell, can be transmitted with the least Difficulty.

The Princes of *Italy*, with whom I rank the Republic of *Genoa*, are, and ought to be desirous of Repose, since all Interruptions of it tend to their Oppression, and perpetually create them the expence of Quarters which are forced upon them, or of large Sums of Money, demanded of them, in the Form of Contributions, or with a Pretext to exempt them from Quarters. The

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The Ecclesiastic Power of the *Pope* has lately suffered extremely, by the Pretensions of the Emperor *Joseph*, on the Territories which compose this State, and whose ancient Disjunction from the Western *Empire*, has been gradually forgotten through all *Italy*, in a length of Ages which have intervened since that Event.

This long Disquisition on the two Characters of a pacific, and an ambitious Prince, will tend to make my Son sensible, that Monarchs are Men like our selves, and as liable as the rest of Mankind, to be influenced by the Passions of those who approach them; and that these two Characters are generally intermixed with a set of bad Qualities, which often predominate over the good.

C H A P. IV.

Of the care Princes ought to take, in forming Generals for their Service, and how necessary it is for them to gain, by their own Experience, a competent Knowledge of the Persons they design for Command, and to reward them in Proportion to their Services.

ALL the Attentions I would awake in Princes, are very consistent with Reason, and necessary to the Establishment of their own Greatness, and the Glory of their

Dominions. But what I have already intimated, with respect to the Characters of those who have reigned, in my Time, is sufficient to make it evident, that since they are but Men, and liable to be influenced by their own Passions, or by the Emotions which prevail in those who approach them, it is very easy for them to act without Choice, in the Nomination of their Generals; they may be actuated by favourable Prepossession, or Sympathy of Disposition, or they, perhaps, may be guided by the Passions and particular Interest, of those, of either Sex, who have gain'd an Ascendant over them.

In order to prove what I have thus advanced, I shall bestow some Remarks upon the Events which have occurred in *France*, during my Time, with Relation to the Subject of this Chapter. I shall not take any Notice of other States, because all the Knowledge I can obtain of their Transactions, must be derived from the Information of others, who may possibly not represent the Fact in all its Circumstances.

The Reputation of Marshal *Turenne* was very great and well established. In the Year 1667, he was chosen, by the King, to command the Army in *Flanders*, under his Majesty; but this General, in the Operations of that Campaign, created so much Jealousy, in Monsieur *de Louvois*, the Secretary of War,
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who was young and ambitious, and would have no Competitor, in his Inclinations to govern his Master, who then seemed to entertain a Gust for War; that this Minister growing apprehensive, and, perhaps, with Reason, of the King's Esteem for the Marshal, resolved to raise him a powerful Rival, capable of ballancing his Credit, the Consequence of which he began to dread. This Rival he could find in none but the Prince of *Condé*; and he endeavoured to succeed in his Design, by proposing to his Majesty, the Invasion of the *Franche-Compté*, for a Winter Expedition; and as that Province lay near *Burgundy*, of which the Prince was Governor, he prevailed upon the King to entrust that Prince with the Preparations for the Enterprize, at which his Majesty, however, intended to be present.

This was the first Instance, wherein I beheld the Effect of private Interest, and if all the rest had been as little fatal to the State, it would have remained in a much more flourishing Condition, than it is at present; for the Prince was one of the greatest Generals of the Age; and this Jealousy of the Minister produced a good Effect, since it caused his Master to employ two Men of excellent Abilities for War, instead of one, who alone could not have commanded two Armies at the same time.

In 1668, after the Peace of *Aix*, the King created three Marshals of *France*, who were Messieurs *de Crequi*, *de Bellefonds*, and *d'Humieres*. The first arrived at this Dignity by his own Merit, for he had been long in Disgrace, by the Influence of Monsieur *Colbert*, for his Attachment to Monsieur *Fouquet*. The King was led, by his own Inclinations, to chuse Monsieur *de Bellefonds*; and the Regard which Monsieur *de Louvois* entertained for Madam *d'Humieres*, procured a Marshal's Staff for her Husband, and raised him in Preference to several Lieutenant Generals, who had been longer in the Service than himself, and were more worthy of that Promotion, as their Conduct has since discovered. We may therefore say, that among these three Men, whose Dignity intitled them to the Command of Armies, there was but one who really merited that Station. In the War which commenced in 1672, and continued to 1679, the private Interests of the Minister and the Mistress, have prevailed over the Interest of the State, in the Choice of Generals, and the filling up other Posts of Command.

The Prince, with all the Inconveniencies he sustained from the Gout, continued in the Service for some Campaigns, that he might find a proper Opportunity of substituting his Son to command the Army; and he thought
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this the more practicable, because, as the Marshal *de Turenne* was then dead, he might justly consider himself as the greatest Captain in *France*. But he had the Mortification to be deceived in his Expectations; for the Government rather chose to dispense with his Service, than confer the Command in Chief, of the principal Army, on the Duke, tho' the Prince offered to accompany his Son, and assist him with his Counsels.

The Command therefore, of the Armies, was distributed among several old Lieutenant Generals, who had been created Marshals of *France*, after the Death of Monsieur *Turenne*; and there were some among them, who owed their Advancement to their Merit, and the Event of Affairs sufficiently justified his Majesty's Choice; but there were two who derived their Dignity from particular Interest.

Madam *de Montespan* made Monsieur *de Vivonne*, her Brother, General of the Gallies. Monsieur *de Louvois*, who, at that Time, entertained a Passion for Madam *de Rochefort*, made her Husband a Marshal of *France*, and would have him intrusted with the Command of an Army; but these two Generals were unsuccessful in their several Employments. Madam *de Montespan* discontinued her Sollicitations for her Brother, after he had abandoned *Sicily*; and the Death of Monsieur *de Rochefort* disengaged Monsieur *de Louvois* from the Care of his Protection. In

In the War which commenced in the Year 1688, and ended in 1698, Monsieur *de Louvois* seemed, at first, to have all the Influence in the Distribution of Posts of Command in the Armies. He excluded his Enemy the Marshal *de Luxembourg*, for Reasons foreign to my present Subject. He induced the King to place the Marshal *d'Humières* at the Head of the Army in *Flanders*, and dispatched the Count *de Sourdis* into the Electorate of *Cologn*. These two Generals were unfortunate in their Conduct, and Monsieur *de Louvois* was obliged to abandon the Marshal *d'Humières*, after the Campaign of 1689, and to have Recourse to Monsieur *de Luxembourg*, though he was his Enemy. As to the Count *de Sourdis*, he acted so injudiciously in the Electorate of *Cologn*, that the King found it necessary to recall him; and yet Monsieur *de Louvois* had so much Credit, as to procure him the Government of *Guienne*, with very considerable Appointments.

At the Beginning of the Year 1690, the Command of the Army in *Italy* was conferred on Monsieur *de la Trousse*, by the sole Credit of Monsieur *de Louvois*. This General died before the Opening of the Campaign, and his Post was transferred to Monsieur *de Catinat*, the Lieutenant-General, who was to have served under Monsieur *de la Trousse*.

Trouffe. The Minister's Choice of this General has been justified, by a Series of Events which procured Monsieur *de Catinat* a Marshal's Staff.

From that Time, to the Year 1691, when Monsieur *de Louvois* died, we have seen him and the King's Mistresses in sufficient Credit to distribute the most important Stations, except that which was assigned to the Marshal *de Noailles*, whom his Majesty's own Gust, aided by the Insinuations of Madam *de Maintenon*, raised to the Command of the Army, in *Catalonia*; but it was impossible for the King to persist in so improper a Choice, and it became necessary to send Monsieur *de Vendôme*, who reinstated his Majesty's Affairs in that Country, and took *Barcelona*.

Monsieur *de Barbesieux*, upon the Death of Monsieur *de Louvois*, was advanced to his Place; he was young, and had a lively Capacity, but his Credit was not sufficient to procure him the Disposal of the most important Posts, as his Father had frequently done.

After the Death of Monsieur *de Luxembourg*, which happened at the Beginning of the Year 1695, the King, without any Solicitations, determined to place the Marshal *de Villeroy* at the Head of his Army in *Flanders*. The Promotion of this General, who was destitute of the Qualities essential to such a Station, as *France* has unhappily experienced,

enced, was destructive to the Glory of his Majesty's Arms, which were always victorious till that fatal Time; and yet he enjoyed his Command to the Year 1706, when it became impossible for the King to continue him in that Station, without exposing his Dominions to inevitable Ruin. Monsieur *de Barbesieux's* Death, happened at the Beginning of the Year 1701, when the Revolution of *Spain* began to inflame the present War; and it furnishes me with a new *Æra* for the Subject of this Chapter.

Hitherto the Ministers, who were employed by his Majesty, were distinguished by their Merit, and if they had been accessory to the Promotion of their Friends and Creatures, they at least conferred their Favours by such Measures as were not totally injurious to the King's Affairs; and we have always seen the Ministers, and even the Mistresses abandon their Relations and Friends, after their Advancement, when they became sensible that they could not support them, without prejudicing the Affairs of their Master, or their Lover.

Some Months before the Death of Monsieur *de Barbesieux*, the sole Credit of Madam *de Maintenon* had procured the Post of Comptroller-General of the Finances for Monsieur *de Chamillard*, for whom this Lady likewise obtained the Place of Secretary of War, after the Death of Monsieur *de Barbesieux*.

besieux. This Minister of the Finances and War, equally unacquainted with the Functions of those two capital Employments in a State, has, to the Misfortune of *France*, exercised both to the Year 1703, when he voluntarily resigned the Finances, after he had ruined the King, and exhausted the State; and he reserved to himself the Post of Secretary of War, in which he acted with as much Inexperience as he discovered in the Finances, and yet the King, to this very Moment, seems perfectly insensible of the State to which he has been reduced by the Incapacity of this Minister.

From the Time that his Majesty has taken this Minister into his Service, all military Promotions have been conferred without the least Choice or Distinction of Merit, and Stations of Dignity have been as numerous as the Minister judged it necessary to make them, that his Brother, his Son-in-Law, or his Creatures, might be comprehended in his Favours. When he raised Monsieur *de la Fuillade*, his Son-in-Law, to the Command of an Army, he prevailed upon the King to create a large Body of General Officers, that this Gentleman might have the Honour of being obeyed by a sufficient Number of Officers, inferior to himself. He afterwards intrusted him with the Command of the Army in *Piedmont*, and with

the Siege of *Turin*; and by the Conduct of this Son-in-Law, he has deprived the King of *Spain* of his Dominions in *Italy*, and caused his Master to lose immense Sums, besides a great Part of his heavy Artillery, and above 25000 Men; to which I may add, that this prodigious Number of General-Officers, most of whom are unworthy of the Rank to which they have been raised, receiving their Appointments, though they perform no Service on the Lines, create immense Charges to the King.

Most of the Marshals of *France* have owed their Dignity to various Intrigues. *Villeroy* and *Boufflers*, who were promoted in 1693, and who, as I have already observed, have been continued in their Commands, by the King's Pre-possession in their Favour, have greatly contributed to the fatal Events of this War. Monsieur *de Boufflers*, when he had lost the Electorate of *Cologne*, *Liege*, *Guelderland*, and *Limburg*, could no longer support himself in the Command of the Army. The Marshal *de Villeroy* was recalled, after he had suffered his Lines to be forced, and had lost the Battle of *Ramillies*, and the *Spanish Flanders*. Marshal *Tallard* lost the Battle of *Hochstet*, was beat out of *Bavaria*, and all the Acquisitions in *Germany*, and his Captivity alone, at the Battle of *Hochstet*, has delivered us from his ill Conduct. The
Marshal

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Marshal *de Tefse* was in Danger of losing all *Spain*: He raised the Siege of *Barcelona*, where he left a prodigious Quantity of Artillery and Ammunitions, with Provisions for his Army, at the flying Report, that a Squadron of the Enemy was hovering upon the Coasts of *Valentia*. Since that Time, he was intrusted with the Command of the Army in *Dauphiné*, where he permitted the Duke of *Savoy* to form the Siege of *Toulon*, and suffered him to retire very peaceably from that Place, and afterwards to take *Susa*, which, at that Conjunction, was of infinite Importance to the King, And yet, all these unfortunate Events, which he might easily have prevented, have only caused him to be recalled from the War, to be employed in a Negotiation at *Rome*, where he has been as unsuccessful as he was in the Field. It is to be hoped therefore, that his Majesty will not resolve, for the future, to expect from him any Instance of Merit whatever. It was very happy for the King, that the Marshal *de Marfin*, who, without the least Abilities for War, was raised by a Cabal devoted to the Court, did not long survive his Promotion. His Incapacity was the chief Cause of the fatal Consequences of the Battle of *Hochstet*, after Marshal *Tallard* had been taken Prisoner, and he infinitely contributed to the Loss of *Italy*, and the Event of *Turin*, in

which he lost his Life. It would be too tedious to enter into a particular Examination of all the injudicious Promotions to inferior Employments, in which the Ministers and Ladies at Court have had the chief Influence during the last eight Years; a number of Volumes would scarce suffice to describe them, and I leave this copious Subject to those Critics who have an Inclination to charge themselves with that Province.

I need only to observe, that the King's Neglect to form a right Judgment of the Abilities of his Ministers and Generals, has, in the Space of eight Years, reduced *France* from the most flourishing State in *Europe*, to such a Declension as almost seems preparatory to its Ruin.

The most material Reflections on the Attention by which Princes ought to be conducted, in suiting their Promotions to the Talents of those they intend to advance, and rewarding them in Proportion to their Services, have already appear'd in the Course of this Chapter; and I have made it evident, that in the Series of those Measures *France* has taken in my Time, this Maxim, so necessary to be observ'd by Princes who would consult the Welfare and Glory of their Dominions, has been very seldom pursued. I shall only add this Remark, that as Ministers and Generals have, in these latter Times
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been created without any due Choice, all subordinate Promotions and Rewards have corresponded with the Defects of the Administration. Because, as I have already observed, the subordinate Stations will be fill'd up by the same injudicious Choice, which advanced to the Head of Affairs, those Persons who are to give Motion to their Inferiors ; and when proper Talents are not considered as necessary Qualifications, all Rewards and Promotions will be influenced by the Interests of particular Persons, and the Cabals of a Court. This Conduct sufficiently accounts for the fatal Diminution of Glory, in a Nation which was once so sollicitous to distinguish it self, by Merit and Abilities, from its Equals in Point of Rank.

C H A P. V.

Of Military Discipline.

NO War can be long sustain'd, without a strict Observation of Military Discipline. This is such a Truth as can never be contradicted by any Man of Experience in Martial Affairs; and it has been made sufficiently evident, by the Declension of the most flourishing States, the moment they have either lost or too much neglected their Military Discipline.

It is to be wished that *France* may not afford a new Example, to justify what I have advanced. Ever since the Commencement of this War, which the *French* maintain against all the Powers of *Europe*, Military Discipline has been so neglected, and in a manner annihilated in the Army, that we may justly dread the Consequence.

I have Reason to be apprehensive of the Event, when I consider the Incapacity of the Minister, in the Choice of Generals and Subaltern Officers; and his Neglect to furnish the Troops with their regular Pay. For how can a Minister, who is unacquainted with the dangerous Effects that result from the Relaxation of Discipline, ever suppose that the Soldiers can be brought to a due Observance of it, when their stated Pay is discontinued? And will not an ignorant Subaltern Officer, who has been advanced with too much Precipitation, and is not obliged, by his General, to perform the Duties of his Post, be remiss in the Establishment of Military Discipline among his own Soldiers, when he sees that Neglect originally spring from his Superiors?

The Re-establishment of Military Discipline, after all these Relaxations, will require much Time and Attention, when it shall please Heaven to bless *France* with an able Minister, who will devote his Abilities to the
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real Interest of his Master; and with expert Officers, who will have Resolution enough to restore Military Discipline to its due Perfection.

C H A P. VI.

Of the Troops which compose Armies.

I Have discovered great Abuses, which are very prejudicial to the King, in the manner of forming the several Bodies of Troops that compose an Army. They have been multiplied to such an Extream, that they are little more than mere Names rang'd in Battle Array, and incapable of continuing in the Line, when the Army ought to engage.

The Advancement of young and inexperienced Men to the Command of Regiments, has disgusted the old Officers who were at the Head of Veteran Troops; because they have been obliged to obey a set of Children, who have even prevailed upon the Minister to raise such Persons to the Rank of Majors, as were altogether unqualified for that Station.

The insatiable Desire of Gain, and the Facility of maintaining a good Intelligence with the Commissaries of the Musters, have occasion'd the Reviews to be very defective; so that the King is continually impos'd upon at present,

present, with respect to the insufficient number of Officers in the Regiments, and the want of Men to compleat the Companies; tho' the Pay is always issued for the full Quota of both. A Battalion, therefore, is now thought to be very compleat, when it brings 500 Men into the Field; whereas, under the former Ministers, a Captain has been broke, or at least a considerable Sum has been stoppt in his Pay, if his Company was not found to be compleat, at its first Appearance in the Field; and a Colonel has received a very severe Reprimand, when it has appear'd that several Companies in his Regiment were incomplete.

Another Abuse, infinitely prejudicial to the King, has been introduced in the present War. The Minister found it most commodious for him to recruit the Armies of *Bavaria*, *Italy* and *Spain*, by obliging the several Parishes in the Kingdom, to furnish such a Number of Men as was deficient in those Armies; but this bad Expedient, occasion'd a very considerable Abuse, and it became very profitable to the Captain to be weak in Men, during the course of the Campaign. For after the first Review, when his Company appear'd compleat to the King, he received the Pay of those Men whom he no longer retain'd in the Service; and as the Dismission of such a Number of his Soldiers, was so
advan-

advantageous to his private Interest, he never had any Inclination to replace them.

I am sensible that those Colonels who are disposed to be indolent, alledge in their Vindication, that the King has appointed Inspectors, who are charged with the care of compleating the Troops, and examining the Qualifications of the Soldiers: But tho' it be granted that those Persons are to transmit to the Minister, an Account of the State in which they find the Troops, yet can this be any Reason why the Colonels should take so little care to have the Companies of their Regiments in a good Condition?

The Weakness of the several Companies, and their excessive Number in the Battalions and Squadrons, frequently produce very fatal Inconveniencies; for in order to make a Battalion or Squadron extend as much in Front as those of the Enemy, the Officers are obliged to form the Battalions but four Men deep, and the Squadrons, two, which is such a Disposition as can never enable them to sustain a long Attack, from a Troop whose Battalions are six, and their Squadrons three deep.

From hence I infer, that the Service can neither be so good, nor performed with that Effect as formerly, for which Reason the present Discipline ought to be discontinued in Favour of the ancient. And it must be evident, that a number of Irregularities and

Abuses

Abuses contribute to the Calamities our Armies sustain, and if they are not effectually redressed, they will end in the Destruction of all our Forces.

C H A P. VII.

Of the different Kinds of War, and the manner in which they ought to be maintained.

I shall comprehend all my Reflections on this Subject in one Chapter; and by pointing out those Instances of Misconduct which either we or our Enemies have committed, in the Course of all the Wars I have seen, I shall make it evident that this Misconduct has occasion'd the present Diversity in Wars, and render'd them very different from what they originally were.

My first Reflection will relate to the offensive War commenced in 1667; and which the King declared against *Spain*, in Vindication of the Queen's Pretensions to *Brabant*. His Majesty asserted the Claims of that Princess, in the Manifesto's published by his Command. The Proceeding was well concerted, and seem'd capable of producing a good Effect, in the Minds of a People whom *France* determined to conquer by Force of Arms. But it would have been a-

greeable to the true Maxims of a Prince who prepares to engage in a War, to have raised a considerable Body of Foot, antecedent to the Publication of his Manifesto's, and the Declaration of War; since it was reasonable to suppose, that a large number of Men would be necessary, to garrison the great Towns that were intended to be conquered. Such a Levy was easily practicable, without giving the least Alarm, because *France* was then very populous, and the King needed only to have paid the effective Men, whom a Captain might have raised, from one Review of the Commissary of the Musters, to another, in order to compleat his Company. After which, each Company, at the opening of the War, might have easily been doubled for the good of the Service, and the Creation of a greater number of Officers.

The Army should likewise have been obliged to act with more Vigour. The *Spaniards* had very few Troops; their Towns were in a bad state of Defence, and destitute of all Ammunitions of War; to which we may add, that the King was Master of the Country. The Army therefore, should have marched directly to *Brussels*; and as that Capital was in no Condition to sustain a Siege, the Gates would have been immediately opened; and the other Cities, being in no Posture of Defence, would have done the same.

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The Reduction of *Brussels*, and the Towns that lie round it, would have been succeeded by the Resignation of their Authority and Riches. What could Troops do, who were blocked up in Towns of War, but lay down their Arms, one after another? By which means, the King would have compleated the Conquest of the *Netherlands* in a short time.

Some Persons may perhaps object to me, the Difficulty of accommodating the Army with Provisions, in their March from the Frontiers of the Kingdom, to that Center of the *Netherlands*; but if the Army had been only provided with a sufficient Subsistence, for a March of five or six Days, is it credible that it could possibly fail of a Supply, from the large, and defenceless Towns that are round *Brussels*? I am sensible I may be likewise told, that it would have been impracticable to convey, to so great a distance, the heavy Artillery, and those Ammunitions of War which would have been necessary for the Conquest of *Brussels*, had that City been disposed to make a vigorous Defence; but I may justly reply, that in the Season of the Year, when that Campaign should have opened, the Horses would not have been employed in any part of Husbandry, for which Reason, all the Carriages in *Picardie* and *Champagne* might have been appropriated to this Conveyance; so that it was not any Impossibility

possibility of effecting this great Movement, that prevented its Accomplishment, as I have observed in another place.

His Majesty's Army, instead of pursuing these effectual Measures, for the Conquest of the *Netherlands*, lost three Weeks in Repairing the Breaches which the *Spaniards* made in *Charleroy*, when they withdrew from that Town; and the rest of the Campaign was employed in taking a few places which could no way facilitate the Conquest of the *Netherlands*. And even these Expeditions were all interrupted by two Journeys which the King took to visit *Madam de Montespan*, whom he had caused to reside near the Army, in Company with the Queen, under a Pretext of shewing that Princess to a People who were then to be consider'd as her Subjects.

The *Spaniards* were, afterwards, assisted by the *Dutch*, and the Tripple Alliance was form'd against *France*; so that we were compelled, by the Treaty of *Aix la Chappelle*, to be contented with our Acquisitions in *Flanders*, and to restore *Spain* to the Possession of the *Franche-Comté*, which the King had conquer'd in the Winter-season, in the latter part of the Year 1667, and the beginning of 1668; since he had obliged himself to make a Restitution of all the Conquests he had gain'd, since his Acceptance of the Mediation for a Peace, in case the Treaty which was then
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in Agitation, should accord to him the Possession of the Towns he had taken in *Flanders*, and in which he had placed Garrisons.

These Particulars make it apparent, that *France* pursued very imprudent Measures in this War, which was intirely offensive on her part; and that the *Spaniards*, whose Negligence had left all the *Netherlands*, and the *Franche-Comté* defenceless, acquired a Peace on very advantageous Terms, after their Misconduct in disregarding the Insecurity of their distant Dominions, when they had six Months time to foresee the Storm that was gathering in that Quarter.

With Respect, therefore, to the Precepts I have laid down, as necessary to be observed in the manner of conducting the different kinds of War, I may venture to declare, that *France*, in this Conjunction, has departed from my Maxims of proper Conduct in an offensive War; and that *Spain* has not acted with the Sagacity and Precaution which ought to be exerted by a State, either for the Prevention of an offensive War with which it may be threaten'd, or for sustaining the Operations of a defensive Campaign, and fixing on proper Expedients for changing the Disposition of such a War, into the Nature of that which is maintain'd by two equal Powers.

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The offensive War which *France* carried on against the *Dutch*, in the Year 1672, was as ill conducted as that I last mentioned, with Relation to my Maxims on that Species of War, which never ought to be undertaken, but with a View of deriving Advantages from the Event, and with an Ability of concluding it, without the Necessity of seeing it degenerate into such a War as is sustain'd by two equal Powers.

The Kings of *England* and *France* were offended at the Pride and injurious Language of the *Dutch*, as was intimated in our Declaration of War. An imperious State is punish'd by its Humiliation, which can only be accomplished by the Diminution of the Territories it enjoys, or divesting it as much as possible of its Riches in Money, or lastly by constraining it to make due Submissions. If these had been the Views of the two Confederate Kings in this Expedition, and of the King of *France* in particular; he should have thought it sufficient to have dispossessed the *Dutch* of those Places on the *Rhine*, which they had taken from the Princes to whom they belonged; and this would have diminished the *Dutch* Dominions. It was likewise incumbent on him to accept of the Submission tender'd to him by their Deputies, and the Expences of the War which they offer'd to reimburse. By compelling

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them to make the first of these Offers, he humbled their Pride, and by the second, he chastised them at their own Expence. It was very proper therefore, to conclude the War three Months after it had been declared, since a full Satisfaction was offer'd on those Points which had been the Motives to it. And yet, in direct Contradiction to the Maxims of an offensive War, which it is always advantageous to conclude, before it gains Time to degenerate into a War between two equal Powers, the Offers of the *Dutch* were not thought sufficient; and instead of proceeding in the manner necessary, to preserve the Acquisitions which had been wrested from them, the Inactivity of the *French* gave them time enough to receive the powerful Succours sent by the Emperor and the Elector of *Brandenburg*, to the very Banks of the *Rhine*; and to be join'd by all the *Spanish* Troops in the Low Countries; and likewise to make a separate Peace with *England*: In Consequence of all which, the King of *France* was obliged to resign his Conquests, and withdraw his Army, because the Emperor's Forces had made themselves Masters of *Bonn*, seized the Electorate of *Cologne*, and were in a Condition to secure the *Spanish* Territories on the Lower *Maes*: So that the *French* Army, amidst their *Dutch* Conquests, had no longer a Communication with
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their Kingdom, but what was open'd by *Grave* or *Maeſtricht*, and which would have been ſoon render'd impracticable.

Had the King therefore accepted the advantageous Propoſals made by the *Dutch* at *Utrecht*, he might have brought this War to a glorious Period, and by improving the Pretext that the *Spaniards* had broke with him, by aſſiſting the *Dutch* with their Troops, he might have conquered the *Netherlands* in a ſhort time; and been in a Condition to preſerve that Conqueſt, notwithstanding all the Efforts of the Houſe of *Auſtria* and its Allies. For the powerful Party which *France*, at that Time, had in *Germany*, might, in Conjunction with its own Forces, have prevented the March of the Emperor's Army to the *Maes*. And thus the King might, almoſt in the ſame Year, have commenced and made a glorious End of two offensive Wars, which, in the Event, were changed into Wars between two equal Powers, without much Advantage to *France*, and were brought to a final Period by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, in which the *Dutch*, who had been the principal Parties in declaring the War in 1672, were conſidered as little more than Auxiliaries to the Houſe of *Auſtria*.

This ſecond Inſtance of an offensive War, will make it ſtill more evident, that we deviated, not a little, from the Maxims pe-

culiar to this Species of War; and that the *Dutch* who were our first Enemies, made an artful Improvement of our Misconduct, and had the Dexterity to transfer the Seat of War into the Territories of their Allies, with whom they only acted in the Quality of Auxiliaries, and eluded that total Ruin to which their excessive Pride had exposed them.

The offensive War which *France* commenced against the Emperor in *September* 1688, was occasion'd by the Circumstances I have already mention'd, in my Reflections on the Characters of pacific and ambitious Princes.

The Pretext alledged in its Justification, was the political Necessity of preventing the Emperor from making too near Approaches to our Frontiers, and involving us in a War, after the Conclusion of that in which he was engaged against the *Turks*. It was natural, therefore, to imagine that the King of *France* would not wait for the Expiration of the Truce he had agreed to observe for twenty Years, after he had taken *Luxemburg* from the *Spaniards*; and it was certain that as the *Empire* was offended at our Reunion of so many Territories, it would willingly concur with the Emperor's Designs, as soon as his Troops made their Approach to the *Rhine*. Nor was it reasonable to believe that all *Europe* would be indolent Spectators of his Majesty's Conquests, at a time when he pretend-
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ed to be in Peace with all his Neighbours, who were then disarm'd; or that those Powers would not join with the Emperor, as soon as he was disengaged from his War with the *Turks*, and had replenished his Dominions and the *Empire*, with all the Troops that maintain'd the War in *Hungary*.

With all these general Reasons, there was one that was very material. The Emperor carried on the War against the *Turks* with such a Series of Success, and the *Ottoman Empire* was reduced to those Extremities, as made it very probable that if we had delay'd to support it by some Diversion against the Emperor, this Prince would have extended his Conquests to the Walls of *Constantinople*, and dispossessed the *Turks* of all their *European* Dominions.

This Addition to the Territories and Power of the *German* House of *Austria*, would certainly have excited its Views against all the Christian part of *Europe*, and this ambitious House would, according to all Appearances, have render'd the *Empire* Hereditary to its own Descendants. This Circumstance alone, would have vested it with an unlimited Power, and enabled it to revive the pretended Rights of the Roman *Empire*, which the Emperor *Joseph* endeavoured to re-establish with such an imperious Air. The King of *France* therefore was obliged, in good Po-

litics, to save the *Turks* from a total Ruin in *Europe*, and we could only preserve them by a powerful Diversion. This Expedient prevented the fatal Consequences of their Fall, and we took effectual Measures against the Establishment of a Power superior to all others, which would have been that of the House of *Austria* our professed Enemy.

All these political Reasons, which became the more important as they were supported by Truth, after all that *France* had done to exasperate the Emperor, and the *Spaniards*, were represented to the King, so effectually, by his Minister who was secretly disgusted, as I have intimated before, that they had all the Effect he could desire, in the Mind of this Prince, and determin'd him to attack *Philipsburg*, which he had yielded to the Emperor by the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, when his Imperial Majesty, by the same Treaty, gave the King possession of *Friburg*, which was the ancient Domain of the House of *Austria*.

As the Domain of *Philipsburg* is a Dependency on the Bishoprick of *Spires*, the Emperor was only Master of the Fortifications, in the same manner as the King of *France* possessed them, when that place belong'd to him; and as these were demolished when the City was taken, and left in that Condition, as a Residence for the Bishop of *Spires*,
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the Emperor had not sufficient Credit in the Diet, to declare War against *France*, for this Enterprize, which, in Reality, was only represented by the Emperor. But the most prudent Method of convincing the Diet that we had no Intention to offend the *Empire*, by taking this precaution against the future Designs of the Emperor, would have been to have withdrawn the Army from the *Rhine*, after the Demolition of *Philipsburg*. But instead of a proceeding so judicious, and which, at the same time, was so necessary to make the *Empire* acquiesce with our Acquisitions from our Neighbours, in a time of Peace, the *French* committed the severest Depredations in the Dominions of the Elector *Palatine*, the Emperor's Brother-in-Law; dispossessed him of his Towns, razed the Fortifications, and burnt the Houses of the Inhabitants. They repeated the same Barbarities in the Bishopricks of *Spires* and *Worms*, tho' these two Capitals were Imperial Cities. They seized *Mentz*, and the greatest part of that Electorate; and committed the same Hostilities in *Triers*, and all that Electorate, except *Coblentz* which they bombarded. Cardinal *Furstemberg* resign'd to our Troops, all the Electorate of *Cologne*. They likewise possessed themselves of all the *Necker*, with the Duchy of *Wirtemberg*, and the Dominions of the House of *Baden*, and raised Contributi-

ons in all the States of the *Empire*, that lie between the *Maes*, the Upper *Bavaria*, and the *Danube*, and even to *Ausburg*. These Contributions were exacted with the pretext of reimbursing their Expences in the Siege of *Philipsburg*, but which it was very unreasonable to compel the Members of the *Empire* to discharge.

The Politics of *France*, in all her preceding Wars, were very different from the Maxims she pursued on this Occasion. This Crown was always industrious to avoid any Difference with the Body of the *Empire*, even in the Course of a War with the Emperor, as Prince of the House of *Austria*; and had treated the Protestant Party, and even the Catholic Princes, with the utmost Tenderness, to prevent the Emperor from obtaining Credit enough, in a general Diet, to engage the Body of the *Empire* in a War with *France*. But the Rules of these ancient Politics were no longer observed in this Conjunction, and both the Emperor and the *Empire* were so incensed at these Hostilities, that in consequence of a Resolution issued by the Diet of *Ratisbone*, all the *Empire* concurred with the Emperor in a formal Declaration of War against *France*.

It might be naturally expected that the *Spaniards* and *Dutch* would not be indolent enough to see so great a War kindled, without
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out engaging in it themselves; and it would have been consistent with the Politicks of a Prince who is determin'd to undertake and sustain an offensive War, to have secured himself from all Pretexts of inflaming another, at a Distance from the Country he proposes to make the Seat of an Offensive War: And yet *France* took no Measures to frustrate the *Dutch*, in the Expedition they were on the point of accomplishing against *England*, in Favour of the Prince of *Orange*, who sailed with a very powerful Fleet, and landed in that Kingdom, with a Body of *Dutch* Troops; and being join'd by his Adherents, he dispossessed King *James*, his Father in Law, of his Dominions, established himself on the Throne, and was proclaimed King by the Parliament of that Nation.

The Arrival of the Royal Family of *England* in *France*, engaged the King to grant them his Protection. *Scotland* and *Ireland* were still devoted to the Interest of this unfortunate Prince; *Scotland* was soon reduced, but *Ireland* being assisted with Troops from *France*, continued to espouse the Cause of the late King, all the following Year. But the *English*, after its Reduction, having engaged themselves to support their new Monarch, were easily induced to join with the *Spaniards* and *Dutch*, in a War against *France*, who had those three Powers for her Enemies

mies while she was engaged in a War with the Emperor, and the Body of the *Empire*.

During the Minority of the Duke of *Savoy*, and from the Time he assumed the Government of his Dominions, our Measures with that Prince have been extremely rigid; but any particular Enquiry into the Causes of that Conduct, would be foreign to the Subject before me. As the self-interested, ambitious, and vindictive Disposition of this Prince is generally known, it created a just Suspicion that he would enter into Engagements with our Enemies, and give us some unseasonable Trouble for *Cazal*, *Pignerol*, and *Dauphiné*. But we insisted upon such Precautions, to prevent his forming a Confederacy against us, as were too severe; for he was required to deliver up his Citadel of *Turin*, as a Security for the Performance of his Promise, and we marched an Army to the Frontiers of his Dominions, during the Course of this Negotiation, under the Pretext of carrying on a War against the *Spaniards* in the *Milaneſe*.

This politic Prince, finding himself in no Condition to sustain our first Operations against him, drew the Negotiation into such a length, as gave him an Opportunity of concluding secret Treaties with the Emperor, and with *England*, *Spain* and *Holland*; after which he himself declared War against us
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in the beginning of *May 1690*. *Italy* was the only Quarter where *France* had any Tranquillity; but this Crown, upon the Duke of *Savoy's* Declaration, was threatened with War from all parts.

I have indulged my self in this long Digression, with no other View than to make it evident, that *France* has deviated from those Maxims of good Politics which ought to be attended to, in the Commencement of an Offensive War, and the Endeavours to bring it to an advantageous Conclusion. The Event has sufficiently confirmed the Truth of my Observations on this Subject; since *France*, after she had conquer'd in every Battle she fought; taken a great Number of important Towns, and sustain'd this War for the Space of ten Years, was reduced to the Necessity of restoring to the Duke of *Savoy*, all her Conquests in his Dominions, with the Important City of *Pignerol*, and the Territories around it, in order to disengage herself from such a Number of potent Enemies. She was likewise compell'd, by the Treaty of *Reswick*, to resign to *Spain*, the greatest part of the Towns she had wrested from that Monarchy; and to yield up the Cities of *Philipsburg*, *Friburg* and *Brisack* to the Emperor; and all that we retain'd on the other side of the *Rhine*, was *Strasburg* dismantled of its Fortifications.

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As I have thus pointed out the Dangers a Prince incurs, when he departs from the Maxims he ought to pursue in all offensive Wars; it may now be proper to represent the imprudent Steps that have been taken, in the only defensive War *France* has sustain'd in my Time.

When the entire Monarchy of *Spain* devolved to a Prince of the House of *France*; the Grandeur of the King seem'd to be fully compleated, and it appear'd improbable that any Prince in *Europe* could be capable of reuniting all the other Powers, to oppose the Happiness of *France*; and yet the formidable League which was then promoted, has hitherto been attended with such a Series of Success, as I believe has much exceeded all Expectation.

In order to place the Circumstances of this defensive War in a proper Light, it will be necessary to represent the State of *Europe*, at the time of this great Event; because I am sensible that such a Description, will make the Deviations from the Maxims of a defensive War, much more evident, and easy to be comprehended.

The Death of *Charles* the II. King of *Spain*, was preceded by the Treaty which settled the Partition of the future Succession to the Monarchy of *Spain*, and was concluded between *England*, *France*, and *Holland*,

land, with a View to secure, for all the other Powers of *Europe*, a due Ballance between the House of *Austria* and *France*. This Treaty was compleated without the Participation of the *Emperor*, and was actually sign'd by *France*; after which his Imperial Majesty was invited, by the *English* and *Dutch*, to accede to it, as the best Expedient to preserve the Ballance so much desired by the rest of *Europe*. The Emperor disapproved of this Treaty, and refused to sign it, as judging it to be injurious to his Interest, and the pretended Right of his House, in default of Male Heirs of the *Spanish* Branch. The other Powers of *Europe* were invited to be Guarrantees of this Treaty, against such of the Parties as should afterwards refuse to acquiesce with its Execution.

All *Europe* was in this Situation, when *Charles* the II died, after making a Will, by which he acknowledged the just Pretensions of the House of *Bourbon*, and vested the Succession to all his Dominions, in the Duke of *Anjou*, the *Dauphin's* second Son.

This Will was transmitted to *France*, by the Lords who were deputed by the Council of the *Spanish* Monarchy, and was accepted by the Duke of *Anjou*, after the King, the *Dauphin*, and the Duke of *Burgundy* had made their several Renunciations in his Favour.

William

William King of *England*, and the *Dutch*, immediately complain'd of the King of *France's* Conduct, in permitting his Grandson to accept of this Testament, and without making them the least offer to acquiesce with the Treaty of Partition, for the Execution of which, these two Powers were Guarrantees; but must it not be granted, that the Observance of this Treaty was render'd impracticable in the present Conjunction? This Testament would not permit the Monarchy to be dismember'd; and the Council of *Spain* insisted on the precise and formal Execution of it, in every Article, with a Resolution to offer the Succession to the Emperor, in case the King should refuse to accept the Will for his Grandson, the Duke of *Anjou*. The Emperor had even refused to sign the Treaty of Partition, notwithstanding all the Invitations he received from the *English* and the *Dutch*, and there was, no longer, any possibility of engaging in a second Negotiation with that Monarch, to induce his Assent to that Partition. And by what Means, or in whose Hands, could such a Monarchy as this be deposited in Sequestration? No Person of sound Judgment, could imagine it practicable to execute the Treaty of Partition, after the Death of *Charles* the Second, and in case the Emperor had then persisted in his Refusal to sign it.

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There were two Events which the King of *France* might naturally expect, after his Acceptance of the Testament. One, that the *German* Branch of the House of *Austria*, which seem'd to influence the Council of *Spain*, during the Reign of *Charles* the Second, would secure it self a Set of secret Partisans in that Council. The other, that King *William*, with the *English* and *Dutch* who were entirely at his Devotion, would be disposed to favour the Emperor's Interest.

As the Emperor was not in a Condition to vindicate his Pretensions to the *Spanish* Succession, by his own Forces, he made it his first Attention to form a powerful Party against the House of *France*. *William* of *Nassau*, King of *England*, tho' he was then in the last period of his Life, was apprehensive of two great Disadvantages that would result from the new Grandeur of *France*. The first of these was personal to himself, as he might imagine *France* would endeavour to cultivate a Disposition among the *English*, in favour of King *James*. The second related to the *English* Nation in general, who had assured him of the Concurrence of its Parliament against *France* and *Spain*; as being apprehensive that these two Nations would act in Concert, to divest them of the Commerce they carried on, not only in *Spain*, for their Woollen Manufactures, but in the

new World, for other Commodities of *Europe*; and that their Trade in the *Levant*, for their Woollen Manufactures, would be obstructed in Consequence of this Revolution in *Spain*. The *Dutch*, besides the Jealousies they might reasonably entertain, with Respect to several Branches of Trade, might likewise imagine they had some Cause to be apprehensive for their own State, which had been form'd by a Revolt of part of the *Spanish* Monarchy in the Low-Countries. Some of the *German* Princes who became Parties to this League, were influenced by their particular Attachment to the Emperor, and others by the Profits they derived from the Men they raised for foreign Service, and particularly for the *Dutch*, from whom they received very considerable Subsidies on that Account.

The King of *Portugal*, and the Duke of *Savoy*, were the two considerable Princes who last acceded to the League against the Crowns of *France* and *Spain*. The first of these Powers, who for some time seem'd inclinable to a Neutrality, and even desirous of continuing on good Terms with *France*, thought fit to palliate his Breach of Promise, by his pretended Fears of the *English* and *Dutch* Fleets, that threaten'd his foreign Settlements with the Ruin of their Trade in both the *Indies*; and seem'd disposed to open them-

selves

selves a Passage, by Force of Arms, into the
 River of *Lisbon*, and the other Ports of that
 Kingdom. It is very probable, however,
 that the League had promised the King of
Portugal an Augmentation of his Domi-
 nions, at the Expence of the Continent
 of *Spain*; and that the Subsidies which *En-
 gland* and *Holland* had stipulated to afford
 him, would render the War less incommodi-
 ous to this Prince. Besides, he might be ap-
 prehensive that *France*, who had supported
Portugal in its Revolt from *Spain*, would en-
 able the new Sovereign to reannex that lit-
 tle Kingdom to the Crowns of the *Spanish*
 Monarchy. All these Reasons, suggested by
 Fear and Interest, might have prevailed on
 the King of *Portugal* to confederate with
 the Enemies of the two Crowns; by which
 proceeding he engaged them to protect him
 against *Spain*; and they afterwards compre-
 hended him in the Treaty of a general Pa-
 cification, and stipulated that Guaranty of
 his Dominions which still subsists.

The Duke of *Savoy* seem'd to have very
 powerful Motives to espouse the Interest of
 the confederate Crowns, in Consequence of the
 Marriage of the Princesses his Daughters.
 But a Prince, whose Character was such as I
 have already represented it, is not easily in-
 duced to vary from such a Disposition. He
 was attentive to new Advantages by siding

with the opposite Party, and enter'd into private Engagements with the Enemies of each Crown. When he was even at the Head of the Armies of *France* and *Spain*, he maintain'd a Correspondence with Prince *Eugene* who commanded the Emperor's Forces. The King of *France* was convinced of his Insincerity, long before he discover'd his Resentment, and had sufficient Reason to apprehensive of the Effects of this Prince's Treachery, when his Majesty declared War against him, and ordered the Duke of *Vendome* to sieze the Troops of this Prince, part of which acted in Conjunction with the associated Crowns.

From this short Account of the particular Motives which influenced the Powers in Confederacy against the two Crowns, I shall pass on to my Subject of a defensive War; and point out the principal Violations of those Rules that should always be observed in this Species of War, which never ought to be chosen in preference to one that is offensive.

I may lay it down as an undeniable Principle, that a Prince should employ all his Efforts in Negotiations and Arms, to disunite those who are preparing to associate against him, and to prevent the Forces of the confederate Powers from acting in Conjunction. Let us now examine whether the Conduct of the two Crowns has been regulated by this Principle.

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Tho' the Emperor was, in reality, the only Party immediately interested in the present Conjunction, it is certain that his own Forces could only act against the united Crowns on the Upper *Rhine*, and in *Italy*, and while the *Dutch* continued indisposed for War, this Prince could never have made his Army capable of any Operations on the Lower *Rhine*, with a View of advancing towards the *Spanish Netherlands*: And if we had prevented the *Venetians* from leaving the Pass of *Tirol* open to the Emperor's Forces, it is certain they never could have penetrated into *Italy*, nor made the *Milanese* the Seat of War. I may add too, that if the *Dutch* had not acted in Conjunction with the Emperor, against the two Crowns, they would have prevented a War in the Low Countries and *Spain*, where it would have been impossible for the Emperor to have marched his Troops, and consequently the Partisans of his House could have had no sufficient Inducement to espouse his Interest with any Vigour.

It was incumbent therefore, on the King of *France*, after his Acceptation of the Will, to have given the *Dutch* full Satisfaction with respect to their Commerce, and to have engaged the Crown of *Spain* to invest them with several Places, in the Nature of a Barrier, for the Preservation of their Dominions, which would have extinguished all

their Apprehensions of the new Greatness of *France*.

I shall not enter upon any Consideration of those political Expedients that were necessary to remove the Jealousy of the *Dutch*; but it appears evident to me, that a Treaty of this Nature, and which ought to have been concluded to the Advantage of that Republic, without the least Hesitation, would infallibly have been productive of two good Effects to both Crowns. One of which would have been this; the *Dutch* finding themselves disinterested in that Affair, would not have enter'd into any Engagements with the Emperor, in the support of an Interest peculiar to his own House. The other, that the same Republic having received entire Satisfaction, with Regard to their Dominions and Commerce, would have readily concurred with us, to ruin the Trade of the *English*, and with a greater Certainty of Success; because the Death of King *William*, which happen'd about that time, would, in all probability, have disunited those two Maritim Powers, whose jealous Competitions in Traffick, as well as for a Superiority at Sea, will always subsist. But instead of taking these Measures with the *Dutch*, they had Reason to be apprehensive that we were forming others to their Disadvantage.

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By an Article in the Treaty of *Reswick*, the *Dutch* were in Possession of those *Spanish* Towns that were nearest the Frontiers of *France*, under the Denomination of a Barrier, for securing the Tranquillity of their own State; and they had about twenty three Battalions, and some Horse in those Places. Orders were sent to them, in the Name of King *Philip*, to evacuate those Towns, since *Spain* had no longer any Apprehensions that they would be conquer'd by the Arms of *France*; and thus they were deprived of the Barrier, stipulated by the Treaty of *Reswick*, for their Security, without receiving an Offer of any other that was nearer to their own Dominions. But in order to have left them no pretext for Fear, it would, in my Judgment, have been a proper Circumspection in Politics, to have secured those Troops, after their Evacuation of the *Spanish* Towns, till such time at least, as *France*, by a Treaty with the *Dutch*, had afforded them full Satisfaction, with Respect to their Territories and Trade.

The two Electors of the House of *Bavaria*, and the Duke of *Wolfembuttle*, who were in the Interest of both Crowns, were prevailed upon to take Arms, and Troops were poured into all the Towns of the Electorate of *Cologne*, under the name of Troops of the Circle of *Burgundy*, which for a consi-

derable time, had ceased to furnish its Contingent to the Empire. This new Proceeding of *France*, before any Measures had been adjusted with the *Dutch*, gave them too much Reason to be sensible that we intended to surround them from the Quarters of the *Rhine*, as they had already been enclosed on the side of *Brabant* and the *Maes*; and this determin'd them to form an absolute Alliance with the Emperor and the *English*.

I shall consider the Conduct of the two Crowns to *England*, in a different Light. This Nation is a professed Enemy to *France*, from a natural Inclination, and its ancient and chimerical Pretensions; but, in this Conjuncture, it did not seem so indispensably necessary to take any cautious Measures with *England*, and it would have been sufficient to have treated with the *Dutch*, exclusive of that Crown: For tho' King *William* had cultivated a strict Union between those two Powers, there would have been nothing for *France* to apprehend from *England*, had the *Dutch* been entirely disinterested in that Situation of Affairs. Whatever Treaties the *English* might have concluded with the Emperor, they could not, without the Conveniency of the *Dutch* Ports, and the Consent of the States, have landed any Troops on the *Continent*, to assist the Emperor

peror in the Conquest of the *Spanish Netherlands*. They would have been equally incapable of opposing us at Sea, had we acted in Conjunction with *Holland*, nor could they ever have transmitted such a Number of Troops to *Spain*, as would have been sufficient to invigorate the *Austrian* Party in that Kingdom. They would have been in no Condition to have sent a Fleet into the *Mediterranean*, to strengthen the Emperor's Interest in the *Spanish* Territories in *Italy*, because they could not have had Access to any Port on the *European* Continent. It would have been sufficient, therefore, for the two Crowns to have been certain that the *Dutch* would have continued pacific, by having nothing to fear from the *English*; notwithstanding their unfavourable Intentions, as well as their Dissatisfaction at the Affair of the Partition Treaty, and their Apprehensions for their Commerce.

All these injudicious Steps were taken by both Crowns, before the Troops of the Confederate Powers had join'd; and antecedent to any Operations of an offensive War. *France* had likewise another Expedient to evade the Effects of this offensive War, by not reducing herself to the Necessity of sustaining the defensive, and by a vigorous Prosecution of the offensive against those

Powers who were raising Troops, and making the first Preparations for War.

I shall now proceed to those Instances of Misconduct which were acted in *Italy*, at the opening of the War, in contradiction to those Maxims which are the Subject of my present Reflections.

The Emperor form'd two Pretensions to the Territories of the *Spanish* Monarchy in *Italy*, the first was his general Claim to all the Dominions of *Spain*, as a Prince of the House of *Austria*. The second was his Prerogative as Emperor, to possess the Duchy of *Milan* as a Fief of the Empire.

The most effectual Method then, of defeating this Prince in his Pretensions, would have been to have prevented the Army he had assembled under Prince *Eugene*, from marching into *Italy*. But it seems we were not disposed to let that General be incommoded by the Elector of *Bavaria*, who espoused the Interest of the two Crowns, and had raised a considerable Body of Troops; and it was thought proper to instruct his Electoral Highness not to oppose the March of the Emperor's Army into *Tirol*. These Forces, after they had crossed the Mountains in the *Trentine* were obliged to pass through a considerable part of the *Venetian* Dominions, before they could open the War in the *Milanese*.

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The Kings of *France* and *Spain* were contented with a Treaty of Neutrality from that Republic, who had no Disposition to oppose either of those Powers. The imaginary Effects of this Neutrality were reserved for the two Crowns, whilst the Advantages of a real Assistance redounded to the Emperor, with whom the *Venetians* are always prompted, by their common Interest against the *Turks*, to preserve very amicable Measures. The M *de Catinat* who commanded the Forces of both Crowns, had orders to subsist them in an inconsiderable Corner of the *Venetian* Territories, and even to pay for Wood and Straw; whilst the same *Venetians* took Bills from the Emperor's Commissaries, only in meer Form, for those Accommodations his Troops were to be supplied with from that State, but insisted on ready Money from the two Crowns. Our General had Instructions likewise to permit the Emperor's Army to march into the Plains of *Verona*, without the least Opposition, and to let them begin the first Hostilities.

It is certain that if the two Kings had, in this Conjunction, which was so essential to the Prevention of a War in *Italy*, obtain'd *Verona*, from the Republic, either by Compact or Force, or had stored their Magazines in any fortified Places on the *Adige*, or on the other side of that River, and that the Army,

my, after crossing the *Adige*, had pursued its March, and opposed the Emperor's Forces, where the Pass of the *Tirol* Mountains opens into the Plains, it had almost been impossible for the Emperor to have marched his Army into *Italy*.

This Precaution was injudiciously omitted, and we likewise neglected to secure a Communication with the Elector of *Bavaria*, and the Duke of *Wolfembutte*, which was very practicable while we possessed the Towns in the Electorate of *Cologn*, on the Lower *Rhine*, and we might have opened another Communication, on the Upper *Rhine*, by *Hunninghen* and *Strasburg*. So that the Elector of *Brandenburg*, and the House of *Hanover* crushed the Duke of *Wolfembutte* who had raised, at our Expence, above twelve thousand Men, most of whom were taken into the Service of the Allies; after which these two Princes advanced towards the Lower *Rhine*; where another Neglect was committed, in not providing sufficiently for the Defence of the Towns in the Electorate of *Cologn*. The Elector of *Bavaria* was likewise suffered to remain in a state of Inaction, while the Emperor, by his Credit in the Diet and the Empire, was accomplishing the Ruin of this Prince, without the least Opposition. Our Army advanced to the Gates of *Nimeguen*, and then retreated, without any visible Reason;

son; we lost *Keiserwert*, with a Number of other Towns in the Electorate of *Cologne*; besides *Gelders*, the *Spanish* Territories on the *Maes*, with *Limburg* and *Liege*.

I mention these particular Losses, because they naturally resulted from our Inattention to the Rules necessary to be observed in the Choice of a defensive War. I shall now proceed to a third Species of War; namely that which is maintain'd by equal Powers.

I have already intimated that a War of this Nature, depends altogether, on the Capacity of the General to whose Conduct it is intrusted; and on the Superiority of his Genius over that of the General who opposes him; that so he may be enabled to change the Constitution of this War, into one that will prove offensive in the Event. I shall establish the Truth of this Maxim, by some Instances of expert Generals who, in my time, have altered the Constitution of a War, without any decisive Action.

In the Year 1673, *M. de Turenne* was on the *Tauber* with the King's Army, to prevent *M. de Montecuculi*, who commanded the Emperor's Forces, from advancing to the Lower *Rhine*, to join the *Spaniards* and *Dutch*. The King's Army was supplied with Bread from *Wirtzburg*, by Virtue of a Treaty made with the Bishop of that See, and wherein
that

that Prince stipulated to suffer our Bread to be baked in that City, and not to permit *Montecuculi* to introduce any of his Troops within the Walls, to incommode our Convoys. *M. de Turenne*, in Confidence of this Treaty, neglected to send a sufficient Escort to receive our Chests of Bread at the City Gate, and to conduct them in Safety to the Army; but *Montecuculi*, who durst not advance to the Lower *Rhine*, while *M. de Turenne* was in the Heart of *Franconia*, concerted such effectual Measures with the Bishop of *Wirtzburg*, that this Prince, in Violation of the Treaty with *M. de Turenne*, permitted the Emperor's Troops to pass through the City, immediately after our Chests were carried out, in Consequence of which proceeding, the weak Troops that guarded them, were defeated, and the Convoy seized. The King's Army was left destitute of Bread, and could receive no Supplies, either of that or Corn, from any place nearer than *Philipsburg*; so that *M. de Turenne* was obliged to furnish the Army with Bread from that City. *Montecuculi* having disengaged himself from the Troops of *M. de Turenne*, and being fully persuaded that this General could not subsist his Army in the very Center of *Franconia*, marched to the Lower *Rhine*, and committed the Siege of *Bonn* to the Conduct of the Prince of *Orange*.

This

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This single Event, which changed the Constitution of the War in *Germany*, obliged the King of *France* to abandon the Places he had taken in *Holland*; gave the Emperor's Army an Opportunity to secure Winter Quarters between the *Rhine* and the *Maes*; and enabled them, in the next Campaign of 1674, to join the Troops of *Spain* and *Holland*, who by this considerable Reinforcement, had almost changed the Nature of the War, so as to render it Offensive, on their part, against *France*. And tho' the King had made himself Master of the *Franche-Comté*, at the beginning of the Year 1674, the War in *Flanders* would have been altogether defensive on our part, by the Conjunction of the Emperor's Troops with those of *Spain* and *Holland*, if the Prince of *Condé* had not changed the Circumstances of this War, by defeating the Enemy in the Battle of *Seneffe*. This successful Event was partly owing to the Presumption of our Enemies, who were tempted, by the superiour Number of their Troops, to decamp from *Seneffe*, with a persuasion that they might attack the Prince of *Condé*'s Army in Flank, with Impunity; and partly to the Capacity of that Prince, who had the Art to place himself in a proper Disposition to improve the Temerity of that Motion.

At the Beginning of the same Year, M. *de Turenne* had defeated a Body of Troops at *Zintzheim*, and tho' the Success of that Action was not entirely decisive, it however had a very good Effect. But with all these Advantages, the War in *Germany*, which, in the Course of this Campaign, had always appear'd in the Species of a War between equal Powers, would have degenerated into a defensive War on our part, in Consequence of the great Reinforcement the Enemy received from *Germany*, and the Necessity which compelled M. *de Turenne* to leave them in possession of all the Plains of *Alsatia*, and to retire into the *German Lorraine*; if this great General, after he had refreshed his Army, for some Time, in good Quarters, and waited for the Arrival of the Succours sent to him from *Flanders*, at the close of the Campaign in that Country, had not, by a March, of which the Enemy was not apprised, led his Army into their Winter Quarters in Upper *Alsatia*, where he made a great Number of them Prisoners of War, and defeated those who had rallied at *Mulhausen*, and *Colmar*; and, by these fortunate Proceedings, compelled the Enemy to repass the *Rhine*, to provide for their Security, in Winter Quarters very distant from our Army.

In

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In the Year 1675, the War in Germany began with the Offensive on our part; but the Death alone of *M. de Turenne*, would have changed it into the Defensive, if *M. de Montecuculi* could have defeated the King's Army at *Altenheim*: But this Battle happen'd not to prove decisive, and his Majesty's Forces having repass'd the *Rhine* without any Molestation, whilst *Montecuculi* was preparing to march back his Army over the Bridge at *Strasburg*; *M. de Duras* who was arrived to take upon him the Command of the King's Troops, conducted them, in a very expeditious March, to *Schlestat*, where he form'd his Camp with that City on his Right, and a Hill with the Town of *Chastenois* to his Left, with an Intention to anticipate *Montecuculi*, who was on his March to that Quarter, after he had pass'd the River at *Strasburg*. So that the Prince of *Condé* having arrived from *Flanders*, and maintain'd the Post in which he had station'd his Troops, the War, for the Remainder of the Campaign, resum'd the Nature of that which is carried on by equal Powers; and the Operations of it were conducted with so much equality, that *Montecuculi* having formed the Siege of *Hagenau*, was oblig'd to raise it, because the Prince was marching to give him Battle.

During

During the Course of this Year, and of all those which were antecedent to the Peace of *Nimeguen*, the War perpetually opened in *Flanders* with the Offensive, and the Capture of some *Spanish* Towns; after which it changed into a War between equal Powers, who were only attentive to preserve their several Acquisitions, and not to hazard any Event capable of diversifying the War, from the Shape into which it had been cast, and without being forced upon the Defensive, which is a Circumstance that should always be avoided.

In the same Year, 1675, the M. de *Crequi's* Contempt of an Army composed of the Troops of the House of *Hanover*, and some other Princes, betrayed him into a Defeat at *Consarbrick*, and occasioned the loss of *Triers*. The Enemy instead of having any Intention to make an Offensive War, against *France* from that Quarter, tho' they were much superior in the Number of their Troops, were only solicitous to dislodge M. de *Crequi* from *Triers*, and would have thought themselves very happy in an Opportunity of forming the Siege of that City, without Interruption. But the Marshal disregarded those Attentions to which he ought to have had Recourse, when he found himself near the Army of an Enemy, which was superior to his own. He imagined that the

Bravery

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Bravery of his Troops would supply their defect in Number; but he lost the Battle, and by this Instance of his Misconduct, changed the Nature of this War, which was and ought to have been of the third Species, and render'd it entirely Offensive on the part of the Enemy, who indeed made no other Improvement of it than the retaking of *Triers*, where the Marshal had retired after his Defeat. This Event gave the Duke of *Lorraine* an Opportunity of forming the Project of his Campaign in 1677, as I shall observe in the Sequel of this Chapter.

In the Year 1676, the Enemy, whose Numbers were much superiour to ours in *Germany*, opened the Campaign with an Offensive War, and endeavoured to dislodge *M. de Luxembourg*, who commanded the King's Army, from *Alsatia*. This General, by fixing his Station at *St. John de Choux* near *Zabern*, made it very practicable for him to be joined by the Succours which the King sent him, after taking *Condé* and *Bouchain*; and he might afterwards have prevented the Duke of *Lorraine*, who commanded the Emperor's Army, from taking *Philipsburg*, which he besieged, after several ineffectual Endeavours to bring *Monfieur de Luxembourg* to an Engagement, before his Conjunction with the Troops that were marching from *Flanders*. *Monfieur de Luxembourg* might even

have made himself Master of *Strasburg*, while the Duke of *Lorraine* was before *Philipsburg*, or might have obliged him to raise that Siege, in order to relieve *Strasburg*. But the Politicks of the Cabinet prevailed over all the Expedients proposed by this General, to prevent the Loss of *Philipsburg*. By which means the War in *Germany* varied, in this Campaign, from the third Species, of which I am now treating, and became Offensive on the part of our Enemies; tho' Monsieur de *Luxembourg* is not to be blamed, since he was continually fetter'd by the Orders of the Court, which were inconsistent with his Views.

The taking of *Triers* in 1675, and of *Philipsburg* in 1676, made the Duke of *Lorraine* form the Project of an Offensive War against *France*. His Intention was to open a Passage into his Dominions, from *Triers* and *Luxembourg*, and another into the Upper *Alsace* from *Philipsburg*; and with that View, had prepared a Body of Troops, commanded by the Duke of *Sax-Eisenac*, with a full Persuasion that the Bridge of *Strasburg* would be offer'd to him by the Regency of this Imperial City, whenever he wanted that Accommodation; and he had likewise a very powerful Army to facilitate the Plan of an Offensive War. The Duke of *Lorraine* therefore, assembled his main Army near *Triers*,
and,

and, at the same time, caused a Body of Troops, which Monsieur *d' Eifenac* was to pour into *Alsatia*, to pass the *Rhine*: But the Marshal *de Crequi*, who commanded the King's Army in *Germany*, having acquired more Circumspection since his Misfortune at *Confarbrick*, opposed the Duke of *Lorrain*, and Monsieur *de Montclar* was appointed to march against Monsieur *de Eifenac*, in *Alsatia*.

It was natural to imagine, that the Duke of *Lorrain* expected his Subjects to form a Revolution in his Favour, when they beheld their Prince at so inconsiderable a Distance from his Frontiers, and at the Head of a powerful Army. This Event, however, did not happen; whether such Precautions were taken as prevented an Insurrection, or whether the People expected their Prince to form his Camp in his own Dominions, to give them a more agreeable Opportunity of testifying their Affections to him, is uncertain. The Duke of *Lorrain*, after he had passed the *Saer* with all his Army, thought fit to station his Camp near *Mentz*; but the Marshal *de Crequi*, by the use he made of *Thionville*, render'd it so difficult for that Prince to subsist his Troops, and not only contracted the Bounds of his Forrage to a very inconvenient Degree, but always incamped in such an advantageous manner near the

Duke of *Lorraine*, that this Prince, after an unsuccessful Attempt on the Pass of the *Saer*, was obliged to discontinue the first part of his Project, in order to attempt a Passage into *France* by the *Maes*. In the pursuance of which Design he continued his March to the Country opposite to *Mendon*, but was always so judiciously watched by the Marshal *de Crequi*, that it was impossible for him to make any Attempt either on our Frontiers, or our Army.

The greatest part of the Campaign was employed in these Motions, from which our Enemies derived no other Effect, than the Loss of a great Number of Men and Horses, with their Equipage; and in this Situation they determined to march into *Alsatia*, in order to finish the Campaign. But as their Rout to this Province was much longer than that which the King had to take, his Majesty arrived there before the Duke of *Lorraine*, who had the Mortification to hear that the Troops commanded by Monsieur *de Eisenac*, having continued too long on the *Kintze*, were obliged to retire for their Preservation to an Island on the *Rhine*, near Fort *Kbel*, from whence they could not retire without a Passport from the Marshal *de Crequi*, into *Germany*, by the way of *Philipsburg*.

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All these Particulars make it evident, that this Campaign opened with an Offensive War on the part of our Enemies, and that the Genius and prudent Conduct of the Marshal *de Crequi*, suddenly changed it into a War between equal Powers; and that at last, the Marshal's perpetual Attention to gain the Superiority over his Enemy, so effectually succeeded, at the close of this Campaign, that the Duke of *Lorraine*, being obliged by the bad State of his Army, to separate it before the King had dismissed his, our General, who had made secret Preparations for the Siege of *Friburg*, had sufficient time to make himself Master of that Place, before the Duke of *Lorraine* was in a Condition to reassemble part of his Cavalry, in Order to march to the Relief of that Town.

At the Beginning of the Year 1678, the War in *Flanders* began, as usual, with several Sieges, before the common Season for Military Operations. The King, after the taking of *Ghent*, had consign'd the Command of the Army, to the Marshal *de Luxembourg*, with Orders to prevent the Prince of *Orange* from raising the Blockade of *Mons*, with which Monsieur *de Montel* was charged, and to watch the Enemy's Motions, without coming to an Engagement. This General acquitted himself of his Commission in such a Manner, that the Prince of *Orange*, in

Concert with the *Spaniards*, who were mortified at the signing of the Peace of *Nimeguen*, between the King and the *Dutch*, attacked his Majesty's Forces, who were encamped on the Heath of *Chasteau*, with an Affectation of being unacquainted with the Signing of the Peace. The Rivulet St. *Dennis* separated the two Armies, and render'd it impossible for them to come to a decisive Action. The Prince attacked the King's Troops at the Abby of St. *Dennis*, and at *Chasteau*; the Battle was fought with great Loss on both sides; and the Prince of *Orange*, being sensible that this Action, which was undertaken without any Probability of Success, and in meer Complacency to the *Spaniards*, could not invalidate a Peace that had been already signed, dispatched a Messenger to Monsieur de *Luxembourg*, at Midnight, to acquaint him that he had received Intelligence of the Signing the Peace.

At the Beginning of the Year 1689, the King of *France* became Master of the whole Extent of the *Rhine* from *Nimeguen* to *Rhinberg*, except *Coblentz* and *Cologn*. Marshal *Duras* commanded in *Germany*, and Marshal *d'Humières* in *Flanders*: The Duke of *Lorraine* was opposed to Marshal *Duras*, and M. *Waldec* to M. *d'Humières*. The Enemies Troops were much superior to the King's, in the Quality of the Soldiers, because
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most of our Cavalry was newly raised; for which reason his Majesty determin'd to be upon the Defensive in this Campaign, in order to give the new Levies time to acquire the Military Discipline. The King was unprovided with a Body of his own Troops, in the Electorate of *Cologne*, and had only those in his Service, which were raised by Cardinal *Furstembourg*; and might easily be dispersed by the Emperor's Letters of Revocation, as well as by their own bad Disposition. We had only a good Garrison in *Bonn*, where M. *d' Hasfeld* commanded. The Elector of *Brandenburg*, who had dispersed Cardinal *Furstembourg's* Troops, that were station'd in *Westphalia*, and the Electorate of *Cologne*, had form'd a very powerful Army, out of his own Troops, and those of the Princes of *Germany*; and furnished himself with all the Necessaries for a great Siege, which could be no other than that of *Bonn*, which was only furnished with a good Garrison, and an insufficient Quantity of Provisions and Ammunition. These were the Measures by which the King proposed to accomplish his Project of a defensive War this Campaign.

If we consider the Maxims necessary to be observed, in the judicious Execution of a defensive War, by the General who is charged with that Commission; the *Rhine* should

have been judged to be a very good Barrier, for the Prevention of the Duke of *Lorraine's* passing that River, before our Army, which was commanded by *M. de Duras*; and for making him incapable of forming the Siege of *Mentz*, which was the only Enterprize that could be concerted by that Prince, to enable him to transfer the War to the other side of the *Rhine*, and to subsist the Emperor's Forces. And yet *M. de Duras* drew off his Army, too far, to be in any Condition to oppose the Duke of *Lorraine's* Passage over the *Rhine*: By which means he gave him an Opportunity of besieging *Mentz*, which the Marquis *d'Uxelles*, who commanded in that City, defended very gallantly, till he was obliged to surrender for want of Ammunition. When this Expedition was over, the Duke of *Lorraine* marched a great Body of his Infantry down the *Rhine*, and assisted the Elector of *Brandenburg* in the taking of *Bonn*. And thus did the injudicious Execution of this defensive Campaign, cost the King all his former Acquisitions on the *Rhine*, from *Philipsburg* to *Rhinburg*, and fix the seat of War in the *Palatinate*.

It may possibly be alledged, in Vindication of *M. de Duras*, that the Emperor's Army was composed of a very powerful Body of *Veteran* Horse, habituated to War, since
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it was chiefly drawn out of *Hungary*; and that the greatest part of the King's Horse had been newly raised, and consequently that it would have been imprudent in *M. de Duras*, to engage so superior an Enemy. This I acknowledge to be true, and should never have blamed that General, if the Duke of *Lorraine* had not been obliged to pass the *Rhine* to attack *Mentz*, which is on the other side of that River. But it is not the Superiority in Horse, which enables a General to throw a Bridge over such a River as the *Rhine*, or facilitates the Passage of an Army. If *M. de Duras* therefore, who had no Enterprize, but the Siege of *Mentz*, to apprehend, had marched his Army nearer the *Rhine* than he did, may it not be naturally imagined that he might easily have compelled the Duke of *Lorraine* to pass that River at *Coblentz*, if he was determined to cross it? The War could not then have been carried on to the Gates of *Landau*, nor sustain'd by the Duke of *Lorraine*, without *Mentz*, because he would have been at too great a Distance from his Provisions. The Marshal *d'Humières* conducted himself as indiscreetly in *Flanders*, where he received a very unreasonable Check at *Walcourt*; so that the King, after the Loss of *Mentz*, transferr'd the Command of his Forces in *Germany*, to the Marshal *de Lorges*, and at the beginning of
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the Year 1690, placed *M. de Luxembourg* at the Head of his Army in *Flanders*.

During the Course of the same Year, *M. de Luxembourg* made it very apparent, that an expert General can find Expedients to change the Constitution of a War. That which was proposed to be carried on in this Campaign in *Flanders*, was a War between equal Powers, wherein the Generals ought to be vigilant in acquiring those Advantages which alter the Nature of such a War; and *M. de Luxembourg* employed his utmost Application with this view. *M. Waldeck* was an over-match for him, because the Court would have *M. Boufflers* at the Head of a Body of *Veteran* Troops, to watch the Motions of our Enemies, against the Places of the lower *Maes*: For which Reason, tho' *M. Boufflers* was under the Command of *M. Luxembourg*, yet this General could receive no Service from the Troops commanded by *M. Boufflers*. *M. Waldeck*, after several Motions on the other side of the *Sambre*, in which he was perpetually watched by *M. de Luxembourg*, on this side of that River, fixed his Camp at *Flerus*. This was a Conjunction which *M. de Luxembourg*, who was always solicitous to gain some Advantage which might change the Nature of the War, was so capable of improving, that he succeeded in the Design he had formed; and to effect it,

it, placed himself opposite to the Army of M. *Waldeck*, where the River was fordable by the Horse; and proceeded, with a very expeditious March, to join the Troops of M. *Boufflers*, before M. *Waldeck* could receive any Intelligence of that Motion.

M. *de Luxembourg*, that he might the better conceal the Conjunction of the King's Forces from the Enemy, ordered a Body of Horse to pass the *Sambre*, the Night before the Battle, in order to amuse M. *Waldeck* with a slight Skirmish, and disguise the Passage of his whole Army: after which he engaged him with so much Success, that the Superiority of the King's Forces over those of the Enemy, was effectually established for the Remainder of the Campaign. A remarkable Example indeed; and which makes it evident, that in the Course of a War between equal Powers, an able General, whose Genius transcends that of his Enemy, may, without exposing himself to the Fluctuations of Fortune, and by the sole Effort of his Capacity, find Expedients to change the perplexing Constitution of such a War, into one that will prove Offensive on his Part.

In the same Year 1690, *Piedmont* affords us an Instance directly contrary to that which I have related; since I shall have no Difficulty to prove, that the War which
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was commenced this Year, against the Duke of *Savoy*, ought to have been Offensive on our part; tho' in its first Operations, it assum'd the Nature of a War between equal Powers; but the Battle of *Stafarda* restor'd it to its original Form; after which it degenerated into a War between equal Powers, without the least Necessity for that Change; till at last the Campaign closed with an Offensive War on our Part. It is very apparent then, that the War in *Piedmont* changed its Nature four times.

I have already observed, that at the time when the Duke of *Savoy* seemed to act in Concert with the Generals of the King's Army, he maintain'd an Intelligence with his Majesty's Enemies, and made the first Declaration of War against him. But tho' he had proceeded in this manner, he was in no Condition to sustain that War: His Troops were not drawn together; the *Spaniards* durst not quit the *Milanese*, to march into *Piedmont*, with *Casal* in their Rear; and the *Germans* could not arrive there, in less than three Months. The greatest part of the Infantry, with which the King intended to form his Army in *Piedmont*, had passed the *Alps*, part of the Cavalry had taken the same Rout, and the Artillery and Baggage were in a readiness to follow.

In this Situation, it is certain, that if those Forces, who had already past the *Alps*, had been
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been encamped near *Turin*, nothing could have prevented their being join'd by the rest; and it would have been impossible for the Duke of *Savoy* to have drawn his Troops together for the Preservation of his Capital, since some of them were dispersed in the County of *Nice*, and other extreme Parts of his Dominions.

It is easy to comprehend, from all these Circumstances, that if M. *de Catinat*, part of whose Army was assembled at *Avigliano*, in the Valley of *Susa*, had marched to the Plain of *Milseurs*, and if the other part, which was near *Pignerol*, had join'd him the same Day, the Duke of *Savoy*, who was then at *Turin*, with only two Battalions of his Guards, could never have been join'd there by the Rest of his Troops, who were separated in the manner I have mention'd. Consequently the War might have opened in *Piedmont*, by the Siege of *Turin*; and the Duke of *Savoy* would soon have been compelled to accept of any Conditions of Peace imposed by the Conqueror. But these Measures were so little attended to, that M. *de Catinat*, when he quitted the Valley of *Susa*, with part of his Troops who were posted there, appeared only one Night on the Plain of *Melseurs*, and advanced, the next Day, near *Pignerol*, to join the Remainder of his Army. This Retreat afford-
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ed the Duke of *Savoy* sufficient time to draw his Infantry together, from their separate Stations; and open'd an easy Passage, out of the *Milaneſe*, to the *Spaniſh* Troops, who had now the good Fortune to evade the Storm they ſo lately apprehended. The firſt Inſtance, therefore, of our Miſconduct, in aſſembling our Troops, and opening the Campaign, effectually determined the Conſtitution of this War. It ought to have been Offenſive on our part, inſtead of which it aſſumed the Nature of a War between equal Powers; in which Form it continued for three Months; and the King's Army would have been compelled to retreat from the Plain of *Piedmont*, upon the Arrival of the Troops which the Confederates diſpatched to the Duke of *Savoy*, if M. de *Catinat* had not, by a very fortunate Conjunction, preſerved an Equality of Forces, even when that Prince's Troops had been reinforced by the Succours from *Germany*.

To evince this Truth, I need only take notice, that M. de *Catinat* was encamped at *Brillant*, and the Duke of *Savoy* at *Carignan*; and therefore M. de *Catinat* could not prevent the Conjunction of the *German* Forces with the Troops of this Prince, nay, it was even impoſſible for him to attack the Enemy in their Poſt of *Carignan*, where they had intrenched the whole Front of their Camp. It was neceſſary for the King's Forces

ces not only to come to a Battle, but to conquer, in order to secure themselves an Equality, at least, with the Enemy, after the Arrival of those Succours they expected from *Germany*; for which reason *M. de Catinat* determined to march his Troops to *Saluzzo*, on the side of the *Po*, with a view to draw the Duke of *Savoy* after him. This March could only be effected by disposing the Troops in Flank, with respect to the Enemy, and the General was willing to hazard this Motion, to tempt the Duke of *Savoy* to quit his Post at *Carignan*, which he accordingly did, in a full Persuasion, that if he advanced his Front against the Enemy's Flank, he should be able to attack them, to Advantage, in their Passage over the *Po*, where he imagined he should defeat their Rear-Guard or at least, encamp himself in a favourable Situation, between the King's Army and *Pignerol*, from whence they were supplied with Bread. When the Van-Guard of his Majesty's Troops had advanced near *Saluzzo*, *M. de Catinat* attacked the Eminences, which surrounded that City, and were covered with the *Milice* of the Country; he likewise gave Orders for some of the Cannon to fire upon *Saluzzo*, that the Noise might engage the Duke of *Savoy* to march, and fall upon our Rear-Guard. Towards the Close of Day, the General had Intelligence that a Body of Horse, that cover'd our Rear-Guard,

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was in View of the Enemy, who, according to the Account of two Deserters, were in Motion to pursue us: But as the Day was too far advanced, to give us an Opportunity for a General Engagement; M. *de Catinat* employed the rest of the Day, and the following Night, in recalling his Troops, who had attacked the Heights, that encompassed *Saluzzo*, and disposing his Army in Order of Battle. The next Morning, at Break of Day, he had Information that the Enemy had passed the Night in the Plain of *Stafarda*, upon which he immediately directed his March to that Place, attacked them, and gain'd a compleat Victory.

It appears, by this Example, that it is very dangerous to precipitate an Action, when a little Patience would create a reasonable Hope of changing the Form of a War to Advantage. I have already observed, that the Error committed by M. *de Catinat*, in his manner of assembling the Army, at the opening of the Campaign, lost him the Opportunity of making it Offensive, and changed it into a War between equal Powers. In the same manner, the Duke of *Savoy* was impatient to engage us, before the Arrival of his Succours from *Germany*, through a Persuasion that he should derive some Advantage from that Action, as not imagining we should employ the Hours of Night

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in disposing our Troops for Battle; and by this Misconduct he lost all the Advantages of changing a Defensive War on his part, into a War between equal Powers, from the very first Operations of the Campaign, and likewise lost the Opportunity of carrying on an Offensive War against us, even after the Arrival of his Succours. The Advantages which ensued upon this Victory, were so great, that M. *de Catinat* might have improved the Offensive much more than he really did; but however, the Conjunction of the *German* Troops with the Duke's Forces, could not deprive M. *de Catinat* of his peaceable Station on the Plains of *Piedmont* beyond the *Po*, and between that River and the *Tanaro*, where the King's Army subsisted, till it was judged proper to retreat, in order to finish the Campaign with taking the City and Castle of *Susa*.

I ought to observe, on this Occasion, that M. *de Louvignies*, who commanded the *Spanish* Troops, that marched from the *Milanese*, and join'd the Duke of *Savoy*, endeavoured, as much as possible, to dissuade that Prince from hazarding an Engagement, and for the Reasons I have already mentioned; but the Duke, for want of sufficient Experience in War, obstinately rejected the Advice of that judicious Commander.

In the Year 1691, the King of *France* form'd the Siege of *Mons*, before the usual Season for opening Campaigns. The Prince of *Orange* determin'd to place himself at the Head of an Army strong enough to raise that Siege; but M. de *Luxembourg*, to whom his Majesty gave the Command of the Troops appointed to observe the Enemy's Motions, placed himself with so much Judgment before them, that he compelled them to be Spectators of the loss of that City, without the least Ability to relieve it. All the Motions of M. de *Luxembourg* were in the Nature of a Defensive War; while the King was carrying on the Siege, and acting Offensively. This sufficiently proves that a War Offensive and Defensive, is practicable at the same time, when the Measures for those different Operations are properly conducted.

The Campaign was to be opened this Year in *Piedmont*, with the Siege of *Turin*, and the Preparations for this Expedition were all compleated; but the Orders from Court were changed, when this Project was on the point of Execution, and the Campaign began with the Siege of *Carmagnole*; the changing the Garrison of *Casal*, and the Remittance of large Sums of Money to that place, which it was thought could have no Communication with the
King's

King's Army in *Piedmont*, for a considerable time. The Arrival of the Elector of *Bavaria*, with a great Body of Troops, changed the Disposition of the War in that Country, and made it entirely Offensive on the part of our Enemies, tho' they were only superior to us in the Number of their Horse, for we exceeded them in Foot. M. *de Catinat* form'd all his Instructions from the Enemy's Conduct, and regulated his Motions by theirs, which, in my Judgment, was a Proceeding incapable of any Vindication. But I shall examine these Motions in a more proper place, and only touch upon them here, to make it evident, that a proper Conduct would have enabled our General to have carried on such a War as is maintained by equal Powers, instead of reducing himself to the Necessity of sustaining the defensive.

I am very sensible that after the Death of M. *de Louvois*, in *July* 1691, the Enemies of that Minister persuaded the King that an Offensive War in *Piedmont*, would be very expensive, and produce but little Advantage. I likewise know that his Majesty dispatched M. *de Chamlay* to M. *de Catinat*, to be better inform'd of the State of that War, and to concert Measures for sustaining the Defensive, by preserving his Acquisitions from the Duke of *Savoy*. But all this Project

which only related to the future, ought not to have been executed by Anticipation; and *M. de Catinat* was in a Condition to support, in the remaining Course of the Campaign, such a War as is maintain'd by equal Powers, without exposing himself to any disastrous Event of a Battle; which he could easily decline, and might have sustain'd this third Species of War, which is never so incommodious as the Defensive.

The Year 1692, produced a Variety of Motions, which will demonstrate the Importance of an exact Conformity to the Rules I have represented as necessary to be observed in the different Classes of War.

The King opened the Campaign with the Siege of *Namur*, which he took notwithstanding all the Impediments of a rainy Season, and the Efforts of the Prince of *Orange*, who marched to the Relief of that Place with a powerful Army. *M. de Luxembourg*, who commanded the precautionary Troops appointed to observe the Enemy, was order'd, by his Majesty, to oppose the Prince of *Orange's* Advance to the *Mehaigne*; and this was an Operation of War purely Defensive. This General conducted himself so well, in all the Motions he was obliged to form, in opposition to those made by the Prince of *Orange*, to facilitate his Passage to the *Mehaigne* with his whole Army; and

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and all his Measures were concerted with so much Vigilance and Capacity, that it was impossible for the Prince of *Orange* to pass the *Mebaigne*, before *M. de Luxembourg*, tho' this General was much weaker in Infantry than his Enemy; which seem'd to be a Circumstance entirely decisive in their Favour; whose Infantry were to support, by their Fire, the Passage of the Horse to the other side of a little River, which was fordable in several places, at the same time that it was easy for the Prince of *Orange* to throw Bridges over those Parts of the Stream that were impassable in any other manner. In a word *M. de Luxembourg* had always the Dexterity to prevent an Engagement between the Foot, tho' the Prince of *Orange* employed his utmost Endeavours to accomplish it, and he effectually improved his Superiority in Horse, by the Motions he caused them to form, and by his manner of securing them, at a proper Distance, from the Fire of the Enemy's Foot, at the same time that they were so station'd as to be always in a condition to oppose the Efforts of the Enemy with Success; by which means he conducted himself in such a manner, as always to seem desirous of a general Engagement, tho' it was his constant Endeavour to avoid it.

The same Year 1692, was render'd memorable by the famous Engagement at *Steen-*

kirk in Flanders; and tho' the Event was very fortunate for us, it did not entirely free *M. de Luxembourg* from the Imputation of some Inadvertency in his Conduct.

After the taking of *Namur*, that General was only commission'd to preserve the Conquests, and to prevent the Prince of *Orange* from surprising *Courtray*, where *M. de Luxembourg* intended to fix his Quarters for Forrage. With this View he posted himself near the Enemy, in such a manner, as to be always able to command the Country between the *Scheld* and the *Lys*.

It is now generally known that *M. de Luxembourg* had a Spy in the Prince of *Orange's* Cabinet, who was discover'd by that Prince, and compelled to send a Letter to *M. de Luxembourg*, acquainting him that the Enemy's Troops were to be out next Day, on a great Forrage, near his Quarters. The Prince of *Orange's* design, by this false Intelligence, was to prevent *M. de Luxembourg* from receiving any Alarm at the Approach of those Troops, of which he might possibly receive Information from other Spies; and that he might only consider them as a large Escort appointed for the Security of the Forragers. This Prince's Stratagem had so good an Effect, that *M. de Luxembourg* paid very little regard to the first Advice he received of the Enemy's March, from a Partisan,

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so that the greatest part of their Troops had passed the Defiles, which separated the two Armies, and they advanced to the Head of the Camp, before M. *de Luxembourg* had any Thoughts of preparing for his Defence.

A Brigade of Foot, which covered the Front of the Horse to the Right, was attacked and compelled to abandon their Camp. And the Disorder was, at first, very great to the Right: But M. *de Luxembourg*'s Vivacity in forming a Front, and regaining the Ground from whence the Enemy had dislodged the Brigade of Foot, was so successful, that after a very long and sharp Encounter, in which the Enemy lost a great number of Men, they were repulsed into the Defiles and constrained to make a shameful Retreat.

This Example makes it evident, that a General of a superior Genius may, not only in a Defensive War, but even in an Action purely defensive, be capable of making such a judicious Improvement of his Enemy's least Errors, in their Measures to attack him, that his Conduct may even change the Nature of the Hostility, and enable him to be the Invader of those Troops who were his Aggressors at the beginning of the Action. For it is certain that the Prince of *Orange* was too remiss in pursuing the Brigade of

Foot, which cover'd the Horse, after he had dislodged them from their Camp, and he exerted as little Vigour against the Dragoons on the Right, who were posted along the Brook which bounded that Quarter. This Tardiness gave M. *de Luxembourg* time to mount all the Cavalry to the Right, and draw from the second Line some Battalions of Foot which cover'd the Front of the Horse, who were too much expos'd to the Fire of the Foot I have already mentioned: These Battalions soon forced the Enemy to quit the advantageous Ground, where the Brigade had encamped. By which means, when the Engagement became equal to the Right, the King's Troops obtain'd the Advantage in the Front of the Center.

As it is not my Intention, at present, to enter into a Detail of particular Actions, I therefore, only mention this as it relates to the Subject of this Chapter, and with an Intention to prove, that the principal View of a General, in every Species of War wherein he is engaged, should always be to act on the Offensive, because this is a Form of War most easy to be sustain'd, at the same time that it produces the greatest Advantages to the Prince.

In the same Year 1692, the Marshal *de Lorges* commanded in *Germany*. His Orders were only to preserve *Alsatia*, and its fortified

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fied Places, and to subsist his Troops at the Expence of the Enemy, as much as possible. The Conduct to which he was limited, was that of a Defensive War, but it did not render him incapable of obtaining an absolute Superiority over the Enemy; without once engaging in any Action whose Event could possibly be doubtful. And yet this General, during the course of that Campaign, neglected three Opportunities of changing the War, into the Offensive.

Our General, after he had opened the Campaign at *Mentz*, and exhausted all the Forrage in that Neighbourhood, returned to *Altzey*, in the *Palatinate*. The Enemy's Troops were divided into two Bodies: That which was commanded by the *Landgrave* of *Hesse*, was near *Mentz*, and on the other side of the *Rhine*; the other was towards the lower *Necker*, and likewise on the other side of the *Rhine*. When Marshal *de Lorges* had quitted the Neighbourhood of *Mentz*, the *Landgrave*, who commanded a Body of 12000 Men, passed the *Rhine* at *Mentz*, and marched up that River, to attack the Towers of Worms, which were defended by 2000 Men, who sustain'd the Fire of the Cannon so long, that the Noise was heard by the King's Forces, who immediately advanced to the Relief of the Towers, and arrived at a very seasonable Time, in full View of the *Landgrave's*

grave's Camp. This Prince was so incommodiouſly ſituated, and his Camp ſo little defenceable, that the King's Army might eaſily have formed themſelves in Order of Battle, on an Eminence that commanded the Enemy's Camp, and from thence have deſtroyed their Army that lay between the Eminence and the *Rhine*, and deſtitute of a Bridge to ſecure their Retreat over that River. And yet *M. de Lorges*, who was a Man of great perſonal Bravery, would never permit his Army, tho' ſecure from the Enemy's Shot, to march, in two or three Columns, over a little Stream, in order to confront the Enemy, from the Eminence that commanded their Camp: But rather choſe to form his Troops in order of Battle, at the Head of the Stream, and march from thence to the Enemy. The remainder of the Day was waſted in this Motion, and the next Day was employed to as little Effect, which gave the *Landgrave* ſufficient time to be ſenſible of the Danger he had ſuſtained, and to retire, as far as he thought convenient, from our Army.

Tho' *M. de Lorges* was only commiſſion'd to be upon the Deſenſive in *Germany*, yet if he had deſtroy'd, upon this Occaſion, the Body of Troops commanded by the *Landgrave*, as he eaſily might have done, with his ſuperior Force; it is certain, that he would

would then have changed the Constitution of the War, without, endangering his Majesty's Affairs, and had preserved a Superiority, agreeable to his Master's Interest, during the Remainder of the Campaign, without engaging in any other Action.

The second Instance wherein *M. de Lorges* neglected to gain an entire Superiority over the Enemy, and to change the Nature of the War, without the least Hazard, was this.

Some time after, the Enemy advanced with their whole Army, near the Outlet of the *Necker*, with an Intention to throw a Bridge over the *Rhine*, at the Isle of *Santhoven*, in order to pass into the *Palatinate*. *M. de Lorges* had detached a small Body of nine Battalions, and some Squadrons, encamped at *Altry*, to observe the Motion of the Enemy; and retired with the rest of his Army, nine Leagues from the detached Body, under the Pretext of a commodious Forage. This Body, by Reason of its Weakness, and distance from the main Army, could not prevent the Enemy from making a Bridge, in which they were favour'd by a swell of the *Rhine*, or from passing that River as soon as the Waters were abated. I commanded this Body, and had sent constant Intelligence to the General, both of the Building and Completion of the Bridge, and

and the Passage of all the Enemy's Forces. And yet M. de Lorges did not think fit to send me any Order, till the Enemy's Front had advanced to the *Landwart* of *Spires*. The Import of that which I then received was, that I should retire to *Philipsburg*, which was impracticable, without dividing the King's Army into two Bodies, and leaving a free Passage for the Enemy into *Alsatia*, because it would have been impossible for the rest of the Army to have join'd me. However, I prepared to execute this Order, with all the Punctuality in my Power; but the Activity of the Foe, in their Advance to the *Landwart*, obliged me to post my self on the Bank of one of the Branches of the *Spireback*, which I disputed with the Enemy, long enough to have been sustain'd by our Army, before I could be repulsed, and they, at last, came up to my Assistance, after a sharp Encounter which continued a very considerable time.

All our Forces therefore, had sufficient time to arrive at the *Spireback*, and to form themselves before that River. The Enemy's Troops had enter'd the *Landwart*, and could not leave it without passing through two Gates. The Form and Disposition of *Landwarts* are known to most. In Order to attack the Enemy, with a Certainty of Success, nothing was necessary but a due Attention

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tion to their Motions, which they were unable to conceal, and a Preparation for our Passage over those Rivers where our Strength was indisputable. And yet, after all the Remonstrances that could possibly be made to Marshal *de Lorges*, he permitted this Army to march unmolested out of the *Landwart*, thro' the same Avenues by which they enter'd. Thus did our General neglect a second Opportunity of changing the Disposition of the War, which he might easily have effected, without the Hazard of any doubtful Engagement; and he entirely confined himself to the Defensive, which was too contracted in its Nature, to make it practicable for him to improve the Enemy's Misconduct, to our own Advantage.

The third Instance of the Marshal's Omission to secure a Superiority over the Enemy, and accommodate his Army with good Quarters, at their Expence, was this.

Towards the end of the Campaign, the King's Army marched, to secure a Subsistence, on the Plain of *Ethelingen*, after they had obliged the Enemy to quit *Nagenbach*, where they had laid a Bridge over the *Rbine*. We afterwards advanced to *Portzheim*, on the River *Entz*, where Marshal *de Lorges* received Intelligence that the Administrator of *Wirtzburg* was encamped near *Entzwabingen*, with 4000 Horse; upon which he advanced

ced to this Body, defeated them, and took the Administrator Prisoner. It was easy, upon this Event, to have station'd the Army in the Duchy of *Wirtemberg*, and along the *Necker*; but our General was more disposed to abandon all that Country, and march his whole Army to the Relief of *Erbourg* Castle, which was then besieged by the *Landgrave*, than to retransfer all the *German War* to the other side of the *Rhine*, and, consequently, to maintain it at the Expence of the Empire.

These three Examples, cited with Reference to the Maxims of a Defensive War, make it very apparent, that when a General, who is Master of a Genius requisite for the Commander of an Army, can make an advantageous Improvement of his Enemy's Misconduct; he is frequently capable of changing the Constitution of a Defensive War, and rendring it more Beneficial, and less Expensive to his Prince.

After the Death of *M. de Louvois*, which happen'd in the Campaign of 1691, the War entirely changed its Aspect in *Piedmont*, and the King was determined to have the Operations of the next Campaign, in that Country, carried on by a Defensive War, and with the sole View of securing *Susa*, *Nice*, and *Savoy*. This System of War, which was recommended by those who were unacquainted with that Country, was approved

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proved by *M. de Catinat*, who commanded in *Piedmont*, with a Commission to conduct the Execution of this Defensive Campaign, in order to which he was furnished with a hundred Battalions and forty Squadrons.

M. de Catinat encamped his Horse at *Sablou*, near the *Rhofne*, for their more commodious Subsistence, and posted all his Foot in several Bodies, where he judged they would be most capable of sustaining the Defensive. In the mean time, the Duke of *Savoy*, who was stronger in Horse, but much weaker in Foot, than our Army, was so vigilant, notwithstanding this Disposition of our Troops, as to penetrate, through the *Quiras*, to *Ambrun*, where he conveyed his Cannon, besieged and took that City in *M. de Catinat's* Rear. He would even have descended into the Plains of *Dauphine*, had not the small Pox, which seized him in a dangerous manner, prevented that Expedition.

Had *M. de Catinat* been furnished with proper Carriages, for the conveyance of Bread to the Army, in the Plain of *Piedmont*, and with Horses for drawing the Artillery, it is certain that he might have defeated the Duke of *Savoy* in all his Views, because this Prince would have always been apprehensive of our Re-entry into *Piedmont*, which he was absolutely determined to prevent. But when he saw, by the Disposition and Circumstances

ces of the King's Army, that they were no longer capable of advancing into that Plain, by Reason of the Impossibility of their obtaining a Subsistence, when they would be at too great a Distance to be supplied with Bread from *Pignerol*; he resolved to act in the Offensive, tho' much inferior to us in Foot, in a mountainous Country, where Forces of that Nature alone can be supposed capable of securing all the Operations of War.

The first Error, with Relation to the Mismanagement of a Defensive War, is entirely to be imputed to the Court, who ought to have calculated the Expence necessary to its Execution: It would then have been evident, that the Reparations of the Carriages appropriated to the Bread and the Artillery, and which had been all left in *Pignerol*, at the close of the last Campaign, would have created much less Expence, than such a Body of Foot as was sent to *M. de Catinat*, and whose Presence elsewhere would have been more serviceable to the King: The Court, therefore, would have been induced, by these Computations, to have chosen an Offensive War, which, at least, would have had the Appearance of a War between equal Powers, in Preference to the Defensive, which was limited to such inconsiderable Operations.

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The second Error relates to *M. de Catinat*. This General, who knew the Plain of *Piedmont*, and the vast Curve of the *Alps*, from *Nice* to *Geneva*, ought to have been sensible that this Plain form'd a Center to that bending Range of Mountains; and consequently, that he must be weaker in every part of that Situation, the Moment he separated his Foot, as he did by the Disposition into which he form'd them. 'Tis true, he was apprehensive, that if he did not station them, so as to secure all the principal Quarters, and even the *Ware*, the Enemy's Horse, who were much more numerous than his own, would penetrate into *Provence*, or *Dauphiné*, and commit great Disorders in those Provinces: But, in my Judgment, that Fear was ill founded, and for two Reasons. The one, that if the Enemy's Cavalry had passed the *Alps*, without Opposition, he might easily have cut them off, in their Return, by posting his Infantry, properly, in the narrow Passes through which they were to march. The other, that *M. de Catinat* needed only, in that case, to have advanced into the Plain of *Piedmont*, with all his Forces, and have marched against the Duke of *Savoy*, whom, in all probability, he would have found posted with his Infantry, at the Entrance into the Valley, in order to receive the Cavalry at their Return; and as *M. de*

Catinat was so superior in Infantry, he might easily have destroyed those of the Duke of *Savoy*. It may therefore be said, that this General conducted himself very injudiciously: For he divided his Infantry into too many Bodies, which were always weaker than those that confronted them; because the Enemy proportion'd their Force by the Numbers they knew would oppose them. He likewise drew off his Cavalry, too far to employ them to any Purpose; not even to make the Duke apprehensive of their Excursions into the Plain, at too great a Distance to be incommoded in their Expedition by his Cavalry. So that *M. de Catinat*, who was Master of a Body of Troops, twice as numerous as the Enemy, appear'd always weak, when opposed by this Prince, who executed whatever he undertook, through the whole course of the Campaign.

It appears, by this Instance, that when a Defensive War is the Effect of Choice, it ought to be better concerted than this; and that it can never be prudent in a General, to fix upon a Point of Conduct in so absolute a manner, as to be incapable of improving those hazardous Motions which an enterprising Foe is sometimes inclined to form; and lastly, that his Disposition for the Defensive, should be always of such a Nature as to enable him, in a proper Con-
juncture,

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Juncture, to change the Constitution of this sort of War.

In the Year 1692, the Campaign seem'd to be projected for the Offensive, in *Flanders*, and altogether for the Defensive, in *Germany* and *Italy*.

Pursuant to this Plan, two great Armies were assembled in *Flanders*: The King headed that of *Gemblours*, and M. de *Luxembourg* was appointed to command the other at *Geury*, near *Mons*. These Armies were to overwhelm the Prince of *Orange*, and all the Forces of the Confederacy, in their Camp at *Park*, near *Louvain*. All the Measures for the Completion of this great Design, had been previously concerted, with true Judgment, by M. de *Louvois*, who was charged with the chief part of the Affair; and they were even conducted to the point of Execution, when by a sudden turn, and for Reasons universally known, tho' they are foreign to my present Design, this Plan for the Offensive, in *Flanders*, was changed into the Defensive, and instead of the Defensive, in *Germany*, the Operations were to be all in the Offensive. The best Troops were drawn from M. de *Luxembourg*'s Army, and their Places supplied by the worst Infantry in his Majesty's. The Troops thus taken from M. de *Luxembourg*, with others drawn from the King's Forces, composed a third

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Army which marched into *Germany*, under the Command of the *Dauphin*.

A Change so unexpected and injudicious, revived the expiring Hopes of the Prince of *Orange*, who, till then, beheld himself threaten'd with Destruction, without any Resource. He thought this Diminution of his Majesty's two Armies, gave him a favourable Opportunity of confronting M. de *Luxembourg*; but this General had the Precaution to confine him to his Camp at *Park*, by posting himself very seasonably at *Meldert*. And thus did M. de *Luxembourg*, notwithstanding the great Deduction from his Army, and the Change in the Quality of his Troops, find Expedients to preserve a Superiority over his Enemy, from those Resources which were open'd to him, by his Genius for War.

The masterly Conduct of this General, will be render'd still more apparent, by the Events of this Campaign; but before I enter upon the Particulars, with Relation to the Subject of this Chapter, it may be proper to draw a general Plan of the Situation in which the Affairs of our Enemies appeared, at the opening of the Campaign.

The *Spaniards* were only capable of approaching our Frontiers of *Champaign*, by *Charleroy*, which is seated on the *Sambre*. Our Enemies were Masters of *Liege*, on the *Maes*; the Preservation of
which

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which was their principal Attention. They had repaired the Citadel, and covered it with a Camp, intrenched in such a manner, as to be able to sustain the Efforts of an Army. Our Armies which were, in a manner, join'd at *Gemblours*, gave them sufficient Reason to be in Pain for *Charleroy* and *Liege*, on the one side, and for their own Army and *Louvain*, on the other. If they had been divested of *Liege*, they would have lost a City that supplied them with the greatest part of the Arms they employ'd against us. We might, afterwards, have advanced to *Maestricht*, and consequently should have cut off all their Communication with *Germany*, except the Passages of the Lower *Rhine*, and the Lower *Maes*. If they had been defeated in their Camp at *Park*, *Louvain*, *Mechlin*, *Antwerp* and *Brussels* could no longer have been preserved, and all *Flanders* would have sustain'd a great Risque.

In this Situation of Affairs, the Prince of *Orange* saw the Ruin of his own Party equally involved in the Loss of *Liege* or *Louvain*, at the Opening of this Year's War; tho' with this Difference, that the Loss of *Liege* would not immediately have been felt so effectually as that of *Louvain*; the Conjunction, likewise, of our two Armies intimidated that Prince from hazarding a Battle, the Loss of which would have ruin'd the

whole Confederacy. He therefore made it his Endeavour to separate our Forces; in order to which, he posted himself, as I have already observed, at *Park*, with the greatest Part of his Army, and poured into the entrenched Camp at *Liege*, a considerable Body of Horse and Foot, sufficient, in his Opinion, to defend themselves, in case of an Attack, till they could be assisted by a new Body of Troops, who were to be covered by the *Demer*, in their march, and to be introduced into the Camp, from the other side of the *Maes*. The Scheme for supporting *Liege* in this manner, was attended with a great Inconvenience, as I shall shew at large, when I describe the Battle of *Neerwinden*. For in order to secure the March of this detached Body, it was necessary for the Prince of *Orange* himself to advance with his whole Army, near enough to protect those Troops, by which means he would be obliged to withdraw to a considerable Distance from *Louvain*, which would never be agreeable to the *Spaniards*. This Prince therefore, by supposing a Possibility of conveying Succours to the intrenched Camp at *Liege*, only gave *M. de Luxembourg* an Opportunity to convince him, that the Execution of his Design would be very difficult.

Such was the Disposition of our Enemies; and to avoid Repetitions, I shall only ob-

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serve that it was so far from being calculated to discourage M. *de Luxembourg* in the Execution of his Project, that it rather seem'd a Persuasive to pursue it. I shall now confine my self to my Subject of a Defensive War, and hope to make it evident, that M. *de Luxembourg*, by the Elevation of his Genius, preserved the Appearance of a Superiority in the Campaign, in the Series of which, he defeated the Prince of *Orange*, in the Battle of *Neerwinden*, and took *Charleroy* at the close of the Campaign. And tho', when his Majesty left the Army, this General was only charged with the Defensive, or, at most, with a War between equal Powers, yet he improved those happy Conjunctions against the Enemy, as secured him very considerable Advantages.

I shall now represent the judicious Motions, by which M. *de Luxembourg* changed the Constitution of the War.

Immediately after the King's Departure, he form'd his Camp at *Meldert*, which was separated from that of the Enemy at *Park*, by the Woods of *Meerdal*. In this Situation he had the Army of the Prince of *Orange* in his Front, and the Troops of the Confederacy in his Rear; so that these Troops would not presume to decamp, in order to join the Prince of *Orange*, by covering their March with the *Demer*, and that for two

Reasons. The one, that they could not possibly quit *Liege*, without giving us an Opportunity of surprizing it, before the Prince of *Orange* could disconcert this Enterprize, the Success of which the *Dutch* were extremely sollicitous to prevent. The other, that these Troops would have sustain'd a great Risque in their March from the *Demer*, to which M. de *Luxembourg* had made a near approach. The Prince of *Orange* himself durst not quit the Camp at *Park*, to favour this Conjunction, because he would then have exposed *Louvain*. As long therefore, as it was possible for M. de *Luxembourg* to subsist in his Camp at *Meldart*, he continued Master of the Campaign, tho' his Army was much inferior to the Forces the Prince of *Orange* would have had, could he once have effected their Conjunction.

This Situation, alone, enabled M. de *Luxembourg* to change the Nature of the War, into one between equal Powers; and yet he did not think this noble Proceeding sufficient. It may be proper, therefore, to consider those Measures, by which he render'd himself the Aggressor, and was in a Condition to attack his Enemy, with all the Advantages, by which a superior Genius can secure a fortunate Event. He was unwilling to come to an Engagement with the Prince

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of *Orange*, till he had weakened him by another Diminution of his Troops, which were already disposed into separate Bodies. That Prince was encamped, in such a manner, at *Park*, that it was impossible for *M. de Luxembourg* to make any Attempt upon the Enemy's Convoys or Forrage. In order therefore to accomplish his Design of engaging the Prince's Forces with Success, he was obliged to form some Advantage in his fertile Imagination, that would be more decisive than the Surprise of a Convoy, or the Defeat of a numerous Party of Forragers. And as he thought it necessary to give the Prince of *Orange* some Apprehensions for the entrenched Camp at *Liege*, he order'd the Marquis *d' Harcourt* to advance towards *Namur*, and *Huy*, with a small Body of Horse that cover'd the Country of *Luxembourg*, and the Lower *Maes*. He order'd a great Quantity of Bread to be baked at *Namur*, and gave Directions for a large Preparation of Ammunition and Implements of War, and for several Pieces of Cannon to be removed, as if they were to be drawn out of that City: When all this was perform'd, he quitted his Camp at *Meldart*, and advanced with his Army near *Liege*: He then took a View of the Intrenchments of that Place, and order'd a large Quantity of *Fascines* to be provided, as if his Intention

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had been to employ them in some Attack upon the Intrenchments. The Prince of *Orange*, who received Intelligence of all these Motions in *Namur*, was really persuaded that *M. de Luxembourg* intended to attack the intrenched Camp at *Liege*: With this Opinion, he quitted his Camp at *Park*, to follow that General at a Distance, and to be in a condition to reinforce the Camp at *Liege* with all the Horse he then had, and this was to be accomplished by marching them under the Covert of the *Demer*.

M. de Luxembourg receiving Information of the Enemy's advance towards him, and the Detachment for *Liege*, regulated his Motions, before that Place, in such a manner, as not to come to the intended Engagement, till he was certain of the Weakness of the Prince of *Orange*'s Army. This Prince, who knew his Troops to be much superior in Number to those of *M. de Luxembourg*, was satisfied with his Success in reinforcing the Camp at *Liege*, and drew up the rest of his Army, with their Right to the *Geet*, their Left to *Romsdorf*, along the little River of *Landen*, and their Front to the Village of *Neerwinden*. He likewise detached the Prince of *Wirtemberg* with a Body of ten or twelve thousand Men, to force our Lines at *Courtray*, and exact Contributions on our *Castellanies*, because he did not imagine *M. de*

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Luxembourg could be capable of attacking him in the Situation he had chosen.

M. *de Luxembourg* being now satisfied with the Motions made by the Prince of *Orange*, in confidence of the Superiority of his Troops, was solicitous to increase that Prince's good Opinion of his Camp at *Neerwinden*, where he thought himself in Security, and where M. *de Luxembourg* had determined to attack him.

With this View, he affected an extraordinary Concern for our *Castellanies* in *Flanders*, and caused all the second Line to march at Mid-Day, with publick Orders to advance as fast as possible to the Relief of those Territories, and with private Directions to halt in a place marked out for that purpose. As soon as it grew dark, he advanced with the rest of his Forces, against the Enemy, whom he found very quiet in their Camp, through a Persuasion that M. *de Luxembourg* had sufficient Employment in his Enterprize at *Liege*, and even weaken'd, as they were inform'd, by having sent part of his Army towards *Flanders*. A violent Storm that rose the Moment our Army began to advance, incommoded them to such a Degree, that they could not finish their March time enough to engage that Day; for which Reason they were obliged to defer the Battle till the next, and it was then fought with
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the glorious Success, I shall represent in a future Chapter.

I have related all these Particulars, to enforce what I have advanced in my Maxims of War, when I asserted that the Conduct of a Defensive War between equal Powers, resides entirely in the Imagination and Capacity of the General who is charged with that Province; the Superiority of whose Genius over that of his Adversary is often found sufficient to change the Constitution of this Species of War, which is always disagreeable to be sustain'd. For if *M. de Luxembourg* had only been Master of a moderate Genius for War, and had not been more expert than the Prince of *Orange*, the Campaign in *Flanders*, would have proved as disagreeable to the King, as that in *Germany*, which I shall describe in its proper place. Our gaining the Battle of *Neerwinden*, so effectually established the Superiority of the King's Army, for the remainder of that Campaign, that we besieged and took *Charleroy* at the end of *September*; after which we marched to prevent the Prince of *Orange* from taking *Courtray*, and subsisted our Troops at the Enemy's Expence, till the Season for Winter Quarters.

I shall now point out the Errors which divested the Prince of *Orange* of the real Superiority, in this Campaign.

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He committed the first, after the King had left the Army, and the *Dauphin* was on his march to *Germany*, in not quitting his Camp at *Park*, and preventing M. de *Luxembourg* from posting his Troops at *Meldart*. This Neglect render'd him incapable of drawing off from *Park*, while M. de *Luxembourg* continued at *Meldart*, and made it impossible for him to be join'd by the Troops who were then at *Liege*, because he was apprehensive that our General would make himself Master of that City, should it be left without a powerful Body of Troops to protect it. Thus did he omit the Opportunity of gaining that Superiority over M. de *Luxembourg*, which it was in his Power to have secured by the Conjunction of his Forces.

The second Error was, his believing M. de *Luxembourg*'s Feint against *Liege*, to be a real Design, and his decamping before our General had actually besieged that City.

The third appear'd in the Precipitation with which he detached M. de *Wirtemberg* to *Flanders*, under a Supposition that he would have sufficient time for the Accomplishment of that Expedition, whilst M. de *Luxembourg* would be fully employed at *Liege*.

The fourth was his Inadvertency in being drawn into a general Engagement, after he had weaken'd his Army by the Detachments

to *Liege* and *Flanders*. This was such an Instance of Misconduct as gave *M. de Luxembourg* an Opportunity of improving the three former, to his own Advantage.

The fifth was owing to the Persuasion he entertained, that as he had entrenched the Front of his Camp, the Wings of which were cover'd by the *Geet*, and the River of *Landen*, *M. de Luxembourg*, whose Infantry could not join him till Night, tho' he had arrived with his Horse at two in the Afternoon, and in the Enemy's full View, would decline an Engagement, when he should, the next Day, see the Front of the Camp entrenched as it was, during the Night. Had he not been influenced by this Opinion, *M. de Luxembourg* would have succeeded, very imperfectly, in his Plan for changing the Constitution of the War, and could only have improved it into a War between equal Powers, and without any particular Advantage, during the rest of the Campaign. If the Prince of *Orange*, instead of confiding too much in the seeming Advantage of his Post, had not turn'd his Thoughts to a decisive Action, which, in that Conjunction, he ought in Prudence to have avoided, and if he had only improved the Opportunity of the Night, in passing his Troops over the *Geet*, and posting himself with that River in his Front; it is certain that all the masterly

sterly Endeavours of *M. de Luxembourg*, to attack that Prince, to Advantage, would not have enabled him to change the Constitution of the War, and secure a Superiority over his Enemy, by any Motions he could form, since they never could have been decisive, without a Battle. For had the Prince of *Orange* only covered his Troops with the *Geet*, and avoided an Encounter, he might infallibly have drawn all his Forces together, and continued Master of the Campaign.

This Example makes it evident, that the first Error committed by a General, in his Operations against a Commander of a superior Genius, naturally introduces others, which at last decide the Constitution of a War.

I have observed before, that the Campaign in *Germany* was determined at first, to be carried on in the Defensive, and that the Enemies were not disposed to form any Attempt on that side, because they were intent to secure the Superiority in *Hungary* and *Piedmont*, from the consideration of their Success in those Countries during the last Campaign. But the *Dauphin* having marched his Forces into *Germany*, and join'd those that were to act in Conjunction against the Troops of the *Empire*, commanded by the Prince of *Baden*: This Prince, who saw himself threaten'd by an Army much superior to his own, endeavoured to post his Troops in such a manner,

manner, as to be able to defend the *German Territories* on the other side of the *Necker*. He abandon'd all the Country between that River and the *Rhine*; thinking it would be sufficient, in his present Situation, if he could prevent us from making any farther Advances, and hoping that either the Superiority of the Prince of *Orange*, in *Flanders*, or the Offensive War, which the Duke of *Savoy* had determined to maintain against us, would oblige us to draw off our powerful Forces from *Germany*, and march to the Relief either of *Pignerol*, or *Flanders*, and consequently that it would be impossible for us to fix our Winter Quarters in the *Empire*.

With this View, the Prince of *Baden* fortified a Camp for all his Army, on an Eminence that commands *Hailbrun*, where he had posted a Body of Foot. This Camp was unattackable from the Quarter of *Lauffen*, and very strong towards *Hailbrun*; for it could not be approached by the Enemy, till they had made themselves Masters of that Town. But it would not have been defensible, had we passed the *Necker* at *Nekersulm* and *Wimphen*, and changed the Disposition of the Camp with respect to our new Situation. But we neglected this necessary Motion, and attacked the impregnable part of the Camp that fronted *Lauffen*. Our

Our Troops likewise amused themselves with making Incurfions into *Wirtembourg*, which the Prince of *Baden* had abandoned, and when they had harrassed themselves, for some time, to no Effect, and committed a number of Hostilities in that Country, they withdrew from the Camp; because the Siege of *Pignerol*, as the Prince of *Baden* had judiciously presaged, began to make it necessary for the King to detach a great Body of Horse, from the *German* Army, to enable M. *de Catinat* to relieve that Place, and attack the Duke of *Savoy*, in case he should persist in the Operations of that Siege.

This Instance of the masterly Defensive, maintain'd by the Prince of *Baden*, in *Germany*, is a sufficient Proof that this Species of War may be sustain'd without any apparent Disadvantage, when the Aggressor can be reduced to the Necessity of forming some particular Attack, previous to any other Enterprize, and when the General who conducts the Defensive, instead of thinking it an essential part of his Plan to oppose himself, in the course of the first Operations, against an Enemy able to attack him with a much superior Force, is only attentive to compel that Enemy to some particular attack, antecedent to all other Motions of Importance.

It certainly was a very judicious Proceeding, in the Prince of *Baden*, to abandon all the Country between the *Rhine* and the *Necker*; because he could not have attempted to defend it, without exposing some part of his Army, which was much inferior to ours, and in a Situation where the least Disadvantages on his part, would have proved very considerable in their Consequences, and entirely decisive of our Superiority, at a time when it was of the utmost Importance to him, to preserve himself in a state of Equality, by the choice of a proper Post. It is as certain too, for Reasons of a contrary Nature, that a General should never suspend his Attention to acquire a Superiority over his Enemy. If the Marshal *de Lorges*, therefore, had proceeded with Activity, and not suffer'd so many Days to pass, without any other Effect than the Consumption of the Army's Bread, which they could only be supplied with from *Philipsbourg* and *Fort Lewis*; and if he had been vigilant to gain a previous Account of the exact Nature of the Eminence where the Prince of *Baden* had fixed his Camp, near *Hailbron*; he would have been sensible that this Post was not to be attacked from the Quarter of *Lauffen*, and consequently would not have employed his Army so ineffectually on that side. He would have
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known, that as *Hailbron* was separated from him by the River, and supported by the Enemy's Forces, he could not possibly attack it in the Situation where he then lay, and therefore that it was incumbent on him to pass the River at *Neckersulm*, or *Wimpfen*, in order to act successfully against that Town, where all the Provisions for the Prince of *Baden's* Army were lodged. Had he passed the *Necker*, he would easily have seen that his Enemy's post lay very open in the Rear, and might have compelled the Prince to abandon *Hailbron*, and retire behind the *Ko-ker*. It was even impossible for the Prince of *Baden* to have opposed our Passage over the *Necker*, for two Reasons. The one, that he was at such a distance, as made him incapable of succeeding in that Attempt, without descending from the Eminence where he was encamped. The other, that the Nature of the Ground was such, that his Troops must have suffered considerably from the Fire of the King's Forces, because the Land on this side of the *Necker*, rises higher than that on the other, for which Reason, our Artillery would have plaid with great Advantage, upon the Enemy.

It is evident from hence, that *M. de Lor-ges* conducted this Offensive War very injudiciously, and that the Prince of *Baden* sustained the Defensive with great Ability, and

derived considerable Advantages from a Situation that had only a seeming Security, and not any Similitude to those where a General may venture to post his Army against an Enemy of superior Power, because they cannot be surrounded, and are only to be attacked at a Front that has been fortified in due time.

The War which was carried on, this Campaign, in *Piedmont*, will furnish me with several Reflections, as well on the Defensive, conducted with Inexperience, as on the Offensive, which tho' Victorious, was not attended with any advantageous Success.

The Court, as I have intimated before, only resolved upon a Defensive War against the Duke of *Savoy*; but *M. de Catinat*, who in the preceding Year, found himself incommoded by the Situation he had chosen, was desirous of accomplishing some Alteration, because he imagined the Duke would maintain the Defensive in a different manner, than when he directed his Views to *Dauphine*. *M. de Catinat* disposed his Foot in this order. He distributed a considerable Body of them in *Pignerol*; form'd a Camp at *Rochecottel*; placed some Battalions in the *Pragilas*, the Passes of *Dauphine*, the Valley of *Barcellona*, and on the *Ware*. His Cavalry continued in the Camp of *Sablon*. Our General disposed his Forces in this manner,

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ner, through a persuasion, that when he presented such a large Body of Foot to the Duke of *Savoy's* view, that Prince would quit the Plain of *Piedmont*, and devote all his Attention to the Siege of *Casal* or *Nice*; and that the sole Appearance of these Foot, would be sufficient to disconcert the Duke from any Attempt on *Pignerol* or *Susa*; and consequently that the Defensive would continue very sure and undisturbed. This general Disposition would have been good, had M. *de Catinat* added a particular one, without which, the other could not possibly succeed.

In order to render the Duke incapable of forming the Siege of *Pignerol*, it was necessary to prevent his taking Fort St. *Brigide*, which was seated above the Citadel of *Pignerol*; and to put it out of his Power to dislodge the Body of Foot encamped at *Rochecottel*. To prevent his undertaking the Siege of St. *Brigide*, an entrenched Camp ought to have been formed, from that Fort to the Citadel; and that he might be in no Condition to dislodge the Foot posted at *Rochecottel*, that Camp should have communicated with *Pignerol*; and we should not have suffered the Duke to make himself Master of the Abby of St. *Peter*, and the Country behind *Rochecottel*. For what could induce M. *de Catinat* to be apprehensive that the

Duke would march his Foot into the *Pragilas*, through the Valley of *St. Martin*, or what could he perform there? He could at most, but have set Fire to a few Villages of no Importance, and would have found it extremely difficult to subsist there, even for an inconsiderable time. But all this Disposition would still have been ineffectual against *Pignerol*, as well as *Briancon* and *Susa*, which *M. de Catinat* protected from Mount *Genever*. It was necessary, in such a Country as that, to add an essential Circumstance, to this particular Disposition, and which was, to entrust the Execution of these Motions of the Foot, and the Command in *Pignerol*, to Persons of competent Abilities for that Province, but this was omitted.

When the Duke of *Savoy* therefore advanced with all his Army to *Pignerol*, he was easily sensible of our defective Disposition, and immediately improved it to his Advantage. He besieged and took the Fort of *St. Brigide*; dislodged our Foot from *Rohecottel*, and pursued them to Mount *Genever*; bombarded *Pignerol*, and then prepared to besiege it in Form. Such were the Effects of our inconsiderate Disposition; and they would have proved more fatal still, if the King had not order'd a considerable Body of Horse to be detached, with
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all Expedition, from his Army in *Germany*, to *M. de Catinat*. These Troops enabled him to enter the Plain of *Piedmont*, by the Valley of *Susa*, and to attack the Duke of *Savoy*.

This Prince was so elated with his first Success, and placed such extreme Confidence in his *German* Horse, that he suffer'd *M. de Catinat* to march through the Valley of *Susa*, without the least Opposition. He persisted in his Design on *Pignerol*, tho' the Trenches had not been opened; and imagined that if he defeated the King's Army, near *Pignerol*, he should not only facilitate the Siege of that Place, but should entirely cut off our conquer'd Troops, before they could retire to any Post of Security, behind *Susa*, where he even believed they would not presume to halt. He persuaded himself therefore, that if he should happen to be victorious over our Army, which was posted between his own and the City of *Turin*, he should not only make himself Master of *Pignerol*, without much Difficulty (which was a Conquest then considered by him as the least part of his Project for the Defensive, since he had been so successful in the first Actions of the Campaign) but should also retake *Susa*, and *Savoy*, and pursue the Operations of that War through *Dauphine*, and even to the Gates of *Lyons*.

It will be proper, after this general Account of the War in *Piedmont*, to descend to Particulars, in order to give a better Idea of all the Errors that were committed, in contradiction to the Maxims of Wars Offensive and Defensive.

When I bestowed some Considerations on a Defensive War, in the first part of my Memoirs, I laid down Rules for the various Forms of sustaining it, according to the different Constitutions of Countries. As those Rules are general, and as I am now to consider this Subject with Relation to the several Instances that occur to me, from the War of *Piedmont*, I shall enter into an exact Detail of the Situation of the King's Affairs in those Parts, that I may render my Reflections more intelligible, and support them with solid Reasons.

The King was Master of *Savoy*, and the County of *Nice*; he had a good Garrison in *Casal*, and was in Possession of *Susa*, at the Foot of Mount *Cennis*, and of *Pignerol*, seated where the Valley of *Pragilas* opens into the Plain of *Piedmont*. It was necessary, therefore, to secure a defensive Situation, which, while it protected the Places beyond the Mountains, might likewise secure *Provence* and the Lower *Dauphine*, from the Incurfions of the Enemy: For there was no Reason to be apprehensive of their forming
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any Enterprize in those parts, sufficient to procure them a solid Establishment on this side of the *Alps*. The King had, both in *Pignerol*, and beyond the *Alps*, a large Train of Artillery for Sieges; and all the Carriages employed in the preceding Campaign, and necessary for the Conveyance of Artillery and Provisions, were likewise in *Pignerol*. I may add too that we much exceeded the Enemy in Foot, but they were superior to us in Horse.

They were likewise in a condition to expatiate over all the Plain of *Piedmont*, where, as we were intent on the Defensive, we were not disposed to enter with our Army. They exceeded us in Horse, as I observed, and were weaker in Foot. It was reasonable, therefore, to imagine that as their Horse would be altogether unserviceable to them in the mountainous Situation, our Defensive would be sure, provided our Foot were disposed in such a manner as to be always confronting the Enemy to Advantage, either by their superior Numbers, or the Choice of good Posts, where they might be safely station'd, till the rest of the Foot could be assembled for Action.

It appears from this Account, that the Enemies were posted in the Basen of *Piedmont*, while we were intent to defend the Edges, from *Nice* and the *Mediterranean*,

to the Lake of *Geneva*. *Casal*, therefore, was in their Rear; *Pignerol*, *Susa*, and the whole Curve form'd by the Mountains, in their Front. Before us, lay the Plain of *Piedmont*, the entire Body of the Enemy's Army, and the City of *Turin*. Our first Disadvantage, therefore, consisted in the Separation of our Foot into several Bodies, to guard that vast Contortion of Mountains, and in the Disposition of our Horse at too great a Distance from our Rear, while all the Troops of the Enemy were assembled in one Body, so that tho' they were much inferior to us in Foot, yet they exceeded us in Strength, wherever they resolved to act in Conjunction, because they had an Opportunity, for some Days at least, of being more numerous than our Forces. This Situation was the more unfortunate for *M. de Catinat*, as the Danger with which it threaten'd us, could be only ascribed to the Errors committed against the Rules of a judicious Defensive; the good Disposition of which is the only Security against any calamitous Events, which may happen in a few Days.

To prove what I have advanced, it is certain, in the first place, that the Enemy could not form the Siege of *Casal*, without employing all their Foot, and leaving their Horse on our Front in the Plain of *Piedmont*,

mont, to dispute our Entrance, when we had assembled all our Forces, and should begin to form our March for the Relief of that Place. Their Horse, which out number'd ours, could not attack us in Front, with any Success, but must have endeavour'd to wheel upon our Flank, during our March, or have filed off to our Rear, in order to surprize our Convoys, in case we had been obliged to draw them from *Pignerol*, after we had advanced in our March. For how could this Body of Horse have presumed to continue so near our whole Army, on a Plain, which, tho' it lay very level, was filled with a vast number of Defiles? The Nature of the Situation would have compelled them to have made a distant Retreat, in proportion to our Advances; and had they attempted to molest us in our Forrage, our Foot would have secured us from all Apprehensions, since any Timidity of that Nature has less Foundation in *Pignerol*, than in other Countries that are the Seat of War. In a word, had the Enemy's Horse continued in our Rear, to prevent the Arrival of our Convoys from *Pignerol*, this Inconvenience would have been easily evaded, during the Time we employed in raising the Siege of *Casal*, had we loaded our Waggon with Flower instead of Bread; for the Distance from *Pignerol* to *Casal* is but twenty two Leagues,

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and that from *Pignerol* to *Turin*, is not so considerable, but that we might have driven this Body of Horse before us, beyond that City, which we might, at least, have bombarded, and reduced to Ashes, had we been so disposed; besides which, we should have been in a Condition to have desolated the Plain of *Piedmont*, which the Duke of *Savoy* would have prevented by any Concessions we could have demanded. In the present Conjunction, therefore, we had no reasonable Cause to be apprehensive for *Casal*.

In the second place, we ought not to have fear'd the Sieges of *Nice* and *Villa-Franca*, for they were in a very good Condition, and we had Bodies of Foot on the *Waal*, to throw into those Places upon an Emergency. Had the Enemy form'd any Design against them, they must have drawn their Foot from the Plain of *Piedmont*, and left their Horse to dispute the Possession of it with our Troops; which was an Event we were not to fear, for the Reasons I mention'd in my account of their Expedition against *Casal*, and which were still more efficacious with Reference to *Nice*; because the Enemy's Foot must, in consequence of that Expedition, have marched over all the *Alps*, in the County of *Nice*. The Duke of *Savoy* could have been supplied with Cannon, Ammunition, and Bread, only from
Oneglia,

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Oneglia, or the *Spanish* Territories in *Tuscany*; and how could that be practicable, when we were Masters of the *Mediterranean*? There was no Cause therefore to be apprehensive for *Nice*, *Villa-Franca*, or *Antibes*.

Thirdly, we had nothing to fear in the Valley of *Barcelonetta*, or the other low Lands beyond it, except a few Inroads to burn some Villages in *Provence* and *Dauphine*, and to carry off Cattle from the Mountains: But such Objects as these were very inconsiderable, for an Army who proposed a strong Offensive. Besides, we had Foot in those Countries, whose number could have been easily augmented, by those who were encamped on Mount *Genever*; the Conjunction of these would have been sufficient to make the Enemy retreat, and might have prevented their Establishment on the *Durance*. I may add to this, another manner of Reasoning which might have extinguished all our Apprehensions of the Enemy, in those parts, and it is this: they must either have advanced in a small or a large Body; if in a small, the Remedy would have been easy on this side of the Mountain, by our wheeling to their Rear when they had made their Advance. But if they had attempted this Expedition in a large Body, in what manner could they have subsisted,

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if we, by taking a Circuit at the Foot of the *Alps*, had pour'd all our Forces into the Plain of *Piedmont*, and driven off that Party of the Enemy's Forces, who were stationed at the Entrance into a Valley, in order to secure the Return of that Body of Troops, by whom this Penetration was to be effected?

Fourthly, all Apprehensions for *Savoy*, on the side of the *Morienne*, the *Tarentaise*, or *Chablaise*, seem'd to be without any Foundation; because the Enemy must have advanced into those parts, through the Valley of *Avosta* and little *St. Bernard*. The principal Operation, therefore, of the Defensive, ought to have been the Protection of *St. Brigide*, *Pignerol*, and *Susa*; and in order to reduce the Offensive of the Enemy, and our own Defensive, into this Point, there were several things to be performed on our part, some of which were only Appearances, and others Essentials.

The Appearances were the Reparations of the Carriages in *Pignerol*, which were used for the Conveyance of Provisions and the Artillery. This inconsiderable Expence would have induced the Enemy to believe we intended to derive Advantages from all the Operations they could form at a distance from *Pignerol*. This Persuasion would have prevented them from creating us any Attentions

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tentions inconsistent with our real Plan for the Defensive, because they would have concluded that our Design was of another Nature; since we were prepared to act offensively when they should give us an Opportunity, by drawing off their Troops from our principal Center.

I may add too, that M. *de Catinat* ought not to have encamped his Horse at *Sablon*, which was too far from his main Body of Foot, to give the Enemy any Reason to believe he intended to employ them in the Plain of *Piedmont*, in case they should afford him such an Opportunity, by confining themselves to their Enterprises remote from *Pignerol*. He ought to have subsisted his Horse in *Savoy*, in separate Parties, for the Conveniency of Forrage which the Mountains produced in that Season. Nor can I conceive why the sole View of protecting the Lower *Dauphine* and *Provence*, where, as I have already observed, the Enemy could be so little injurious, should induce our General to post his forty Squadrons, in such a manner, as to free the Duke of *Savoy* from all Apprehensions for the Plain of *Piedmont*.

The Court, likewise, ought not to have entrusted the Command in *Pignerol*, and at that Head of our Defensive, to such a Person as Count *Tessé*, who with a considerable

able Body of Troops, could not preserve Fort St. *Brigide* from being taken by the Duke of *Savoy*, who afterwards made himself Master of the Abby of St. *Peter Malenage*, and the Redoubt, and Eminences of *Turin*; cut off the Communication of the Camp at *Rohecottel*, with *Pignerol*; dislodged the Foot posted at *Rohecottel*, and drove them to *Manboul*, and *Fenestrelles*. So that if the Duke of *Savoy*, after bombarding *Pignerol*, had immediately form'd the Siege of that Place, he would have taken it, in all probability, before M. *de Catinat* could have been capable of advancing through *Susa*, into the Plain of *Piedmont*, in order to raise that Siege.

This Example justifies an Observation, in my Maxims of a Defensive War, that it entirely depends on the good Disposition in general, which the Commander in Chief is capable of forming, and on the judicious Precautions of those to whom he consigns the particular Motions, necessary for the Prevention of the Enemy's Designs; because all Errors in these Particulars are capital, and generally without Remedy. It is unjustifiable to have recourse to a Battle, for Success, when the Intention was to maintain a judicious Defensive; and it is utterly inconsistent with this Species of War, to resort to Extrems, when they might have been
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been declined without any great Inconveniences. This is demonstrable by the Event of the Battle of *Marfaglia*. The Victory was compleat, and yet the Change of the King's Affairs in *Piedmont* was very inconsiderable. For tho' the shatter'd Remains of the Enemy's Army marched to a remote Distance from ours, we were in no Condition to frame any Attempt upon *Turin*; to form the Siege of *Coni*; or even to fix our Winter Quarters in *Piedmont*, because we had no Carriages fit to remove the Artillery; and all our Provisions were insufficient for the Subsistence of our Army, at such a Distance from *Pignerol*, and our Magazines of Corn.

The last Example proves that a War should never be so absolutely determined for the Defensive, as to leave no Expedients for changing it to the Offensive, in case a Series of Success, or the Misconduct of the Enemy should render it practicable.

The Year 1694, was unfortunate to *France*, not by any Events of War, but the particular Calamities of the Kingdom. Towards the close of 1693, the malignant Disposition of some mercantile Persons, caused a greater Scarcity of Silver than was ever known before. The Harvest was bad in several Provinces, which raised the Price of Corn to such an exorbitant Height, that Multitudes of People perished by Want, and

such Distempers as are the inevitable Effects of that miserable Condition. These national Calamities induced the King to confine the War, this Year, to the Defensive.

M. de *Luxembourg*, who was charged with that in *Flanders*, under the *Dauphin*, had a sufficient Number of Troops, but was in no Condition to form any important Attempt. He was unwilling therefore to give the Enemy an Opportunity of concluding, by his Motions in a meer Defensive, that he was limited to this Species of War, which he thought incongruous in the Presence of the *Dauphin*. For which Reason he marched all his Army towards *Tongeren*, at the opening of the Campaign, to give the Prince of *Orange* a Persuasion that he would make some Attempt upon *Liege*, in case that Prince should advance towards *Flanders*. He had two Inducements to this Proceeding. The one, that he might divert the Enemy from any Enterprize in *Flanders*. The other, that he might subside the King's Army, during the whole Course of that Campaign, or the greatest part of it, at the Expence of the Enemy's Country.

This Design succeeded to his Desire; for the Prince of *Orange* always imagined that M. de *Luxembourg* intended to invest *Liege*, whenever his Highness should withdraw

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draw his Forces from that part of the Country, and therefore he form'd all his Encampments in such a manner, as to be in a Condition to protect *Louvain*, and engage the King's Army, if they made any Attempt against *Liege*. M. de *Luxembourg*, by these means, subsisted his Army, for a considerable part of the Campaign, near the *Maes*; he likewise permitted the Husbandmen to compleat their Harvest, through all *Flanders*, till at last, the King's Army being encamped at *Vignamont*, and the Prince of *Orange* at *Taviers*, this Prince judged that, in consequence of his Situation, he could march into *Flanders* much sooner than our Forces, and might, by concealing that Design, advance to the *Scheld*, and make himself Master of *Courtray*, before M. de *Luxembourg* could arrive with his Army. But this precautionous General formed his Marches so judiciously, that he advanced to *Hauterive* on the *Scheld*, a very few Hours only, before the Enemy, and, by that expeditious Motion, disconcerted all the Measures the Prince of *Orange* had concerted to seize *Courtray*, and fix his Forrage Quarters at the Expence of the *Castellany* of *Courtray*, which M. de *Luxembourg* now secured for his own Forces, and consequently disingaged the King's Territories from the Charges of their Subsistence.

This Instance of maintaining a Defensive War with a constant Air of Superiority, or, at least, upon a Level with the Enemy, sufficiently discovers the great Advantage a Prince derives from the Penetration of a General, who can trace out the very Moments his Enemy should improve, in the Execution of some important Design. For in such a Conjuncture as this, a General of less Activity and Judgment than *M. de Luxembourg*, would have brought the Campaign to a disagreeable Period; instead of which, this great Commander closed it with true Glory, and by a Series of judicious Motions, made it worthy to be ranked among the noblest Campaigns.

The Transactions in *Germany* and *Italy*, were too inconsiderable to furnish me with any Reflections. The Death of *M. de Luxembourg*, which happened at the beginning of the Year 1695, entirely changed the Aspect of the King's Affairs in *Flanders*; and it became necessary to provide a new General for those Forces, who had conquer'd in every Battle they fought, under the Command of *M. de Luxembourg*, and were even superior in every Motion they formed by the Direction of that great General. The Choice fell on Marshal *de Villeroy*, for the principal Army, and Marshal *Boufflers* was to command the second, under *M. de Villeroy*.

roy. The new General in Chief, in consequence of his Majesty's Plan for this Campaign, was only charged with the Preservation of the former Conquests; and tho' he commanded an Army which had always been victorious, he was not commission'd to hazard any Events, since the King could not expect those Advantages from them which attended the Conduct of *M. de Luxembourg*. The Prince of *Orange*, when he beheld himself deliver'd from so formidable an Enemy as *M. de Luxembourg*, whom he no longer would have had the Resolution to confront; was intent to act with an Air of Superiority over our new Generals, and with that View, concerted the Siege of *Namur*, but covered his Design with vast Preparations in *Flanders*, and the *Spanish* Places near the Sea, in order to draw our Attention equally on *Dunkirk*, *Ypres*, *Tournay*, and *Namur*.

As the King had determined to sustain the Defensive, this Year, in *Flanders*, and was sensible that the Prince of *Orange* would be as active as possible, his Majesty's Vigilance was equally extended to those four Places. It may be proper to observe that *Namur* and *Dunkirk* compose the Right and Left of the Country we were then to protect; *Namur* is seated at the Confluence of the *Sambre* and the *Maes*; *Dunkirk* on the *Sea*, *Tour-*

may on the *Scheld*, and *Ypres* near the *Lys*, and these two last Towns form the Center of this Extent of Country.

That our Armies might be in a Disposition to protect these four Places, at the Opening of the Campaign; the King ordered *M. de Boufflers* to assemble his Forces near *Mons*, in order to observe *Namur*; and Marshal de *Villeroy* was to post himself between the *Scheld* and the *Lys*, to support *Ypres*, *Dunkirk*, and *Tournay*. A strong Garrison of Foot was likewise placed in *Namur*, because this City is at a considerable Distance from the others, and not easily accessible. Monsieur de *Montal*, who was charged, in particular, with the Defence of *Dunkirk*, commanded a small Body of Troops, and encamped them at the Abby of *Loo*, between *Dunkirk* and the Fort of *Knocque*. He was likewise to defend *Ypres*, should that be the Place which the Enemy intended to attack. *M. de Crequi* was to secure *Tournay*, and Marshal *Boufflers* had Orders to throw himself into *Namur*, with a great Body of Dragoons, in Case the Enemy should determine to form the Siege of that Place.

These were the Measures taken for the Preservation of those four Places, and the support of a Defensive War in *Flanders*. The Prince of *Orange*, who resolved to besiege *Namur*, covered that Design by Feints
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on other Places, at the Opening of the Campaign. He was persuaded that our Intentions were only to sustain the Defensive, and as his Forces were superior to ours, he divided them into several Bodies, with too little Circumspection. He supplied the Elector of *Bavaria* with an Army which assembled towards the Upper *Dender*, and posted themselves, soon after, between the *Scheld* and the *Lys*. This Motion obliged *M. de Boufflers* to advance and cover the Lines of *Courtray*, after he had consign'd a Body of Horse to observe *M. d'Ouverkerque*, who was posted on the great Cawsey near *Flerus*. These Troops began to be sensible that the Prince of *Orange* was forming a Design, either against *Namur* or *Charleroy*, and it was not long before he advanced with his main Army to *Becelaer*, on the *Heule*, from whence he detached the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, with twenty two Battalions and some Squadrons, with Directions to advance by *Dixmude* till he had marched them over against Fort *Knocque* and *Fintell*. This first Disposition, by which the Prince of *Orange* thought to create in us an equal Jealousy for all our Places, was extremely hazardous, and he would never have ventured to separate his Forces in such a manner, before so powerful an Army as ours might have been render'd in six Hours, had he been still con-

fronted by *M. de Luxembourg*. But in order to prove that this Disposition exposed our Enemies to irretrievable Inconveniences, through the whole Series of the Campaign; it will be necessary to observe that the King's Army (which was almost entirely reunited, by the Motion which *M. de Boufflers* form'd to guard the Lines at *Courtray*) possessed the greatest part of the Country from the *Scheld* to Fort *Knocque*, and the Conjunction of all our Forces might be completed in six Hours, and would have had it in their Choice, either to overwhelm the Prince of *Orange*, who was encamped, to a great Disadvantage, at *Becelaer*, or the Elector of *Bavaria*, who had encamped before the Lines of *Courtray*, from whence he had not any Communication with the Prince of *Orange*. It would have been easy even for our 36 Battalions, and 20 Squadrons who were encamped along the Canal of *Bouzinges*, between *Ypres* and Fort *Knocque*, to have overwhelmed the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, in the Camp he had form'd between *Knocque* and the Abby of *Loo*, nor would it have been necessary for the Marshals *Villeroy* and *Boufflers* to have supported this Enterprize by any Motion of their main Armies.

The Success of any one of these three Enterprizes would infallibly have changed the Constitution of the Defensive War, without exposing

exposing the King's Army to any doubtful Event; since we could have attacked any of these three Bodies of the Enemy, with a Force much superior to their own, and they were equally obnoxious to the Efforts of the King's Army, and secluded from any Communication with one another. The Success would likewise have made it impossible for the Enemy to form the Siege of *Namur*, to any Effect, and would, for the remainder of the Campaign, have freed the King from all Apprehensions of the Enemy's Designs on his Towns, because his Army would then have gain'd an entire Superiority over theirs, without hazarding any dubious Operation. The Enemy even continued in this imprudent Disposition, for the space of eight Days, without any Motion made, on our part, to chastise their Presumption; and at the end of that Period, the Preparations for the Siege of *Namur*, being evidently compleated, the Prince of *Orange* reassembled his dispersed Forces, and repass'd the *Lys*, and the *Scheld*; after which the Elector of *Bavaria* was joined in his March, by the Body of Horse commanded by Monsieur *d' Ouverkerque*, and then advanced to invest *Namur*.

This first Instance is sufficient to make it evident, that whatever Species of War a Prince is disposed to maintain, it is absolute-

ly necessary for him to chuse a General capable of conducting himself in such a manner, as not to neglect any favourable Opportunities, which either the Presumption or Injudiciousness of his Enemy may present to him, for acquiring a certain Superiority, without hazarding any great Event. For in the Conjuncture I have described, it is manifest that the Destruction of any one of those three Bodies, would have render'd the Prince of *Orange* incapable of forming the Siege of such a City as *Namur*, during the whole course of that Campaign; because the Loss of one of those Bodies, posted in the manner I have represented, would infallibly have been fatal to the others, or they must, at least, have been deprived of their Superiority over the King's Forces, and consequently their Offensive War would have been reduced to a state of Inactivity. In this manner did the Marshal *de Villeroy* lose, at the Opening of the Campaign, a very favourable Opportunity, the Success of which, in any one of the three Enterprizes, which he was in a Condition to execute, would have changed the Constitution of the War, without exposing the King's Troops in any doubtful Expedition. But as the first essential Error, generally draws on a Train of others, it will be proper for me, in the course of my Reflections on this Campaign, with

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Reference to a Defensive War, to represent the other Instances of Misconduct committed by the Marshal *de Villeroy*, with Relation to this Subject alone.

The Elector of *Bavaria* form'd the Siege of *Namur*, with the Infantry of his own Army, in Conjunction with that of several *German* Princes, and a Body of Cavalry. The Prince of *Orange* with all his Forces, and the Cavalry that Monsieur *d' Ouverkerque* had commanded on the grand Cawsey, before *Namur* was invested, formed a precautionary Army without the *Mebaigne*, and in a condition to pass it, in order to support the Siege when it should be necessary. The Prince of *Vaudemont* was left to cover the Places in *Flanders* with above 60 Battalions, and about 50 Squadrons; and this Body of Forces encamped near *Dynes*, between the *Lys* and the *Mandel*. On our part, Marshal *de Boufflers*, who always advanced at a little Distance from the Elector of *Bavaria*, in his March to *Namur*, threw himself, by the King's Orders, into that Place, with 20 Squadrons of Dragoons, and sent back, to Marshal *de Villeroy*, all the rest of his Army, except a Body of Cavalry, intended to be station'd in the Places adjacent to *Namur*, in order to cover the Country between the *Sambre* and the *Maes*, and on the side of *Dinant*. The Army therefore, of Marshal *de Ville-*

Villeroy was very numerous, and this General encamped on the Lines of *Courtray*, within three Leagues of the Body commanded by the Prince of *Vaudemont*.

Such was this Disposition of the Armies, when the Siege of *Namur* began; but as I shall confine my Reflections, rather to the Measures we ought to have concerted, than to those we really pursued; and as the Transactions of a Defensive War, are my present Subject, I shall only take Notice of those Particulars that relate to this Species of War.

One preliminary Circumstance which might have been improved for the Relief of *Namur*, was our Ability to march thither with a very great Superiority, and without any Apprehensions of that considerable Body of Troops, which the Prince of *Vaudemont* commanded in *Flanders*. This General had been so inconsiderate as to encamp, in a very indifferent Situation, near our Army, which was infinitely stronger than his own. Marshal *de Villeroy*, therefore, was determined to overwhelm him in his Camp: His Motions to secure the Enemy from any Alarm, were very judicious, and his March towards their Camp was so well concerted, that our whole Army, at five in the Morning, were within twice the Distance of a Musket Shot from the Enemy's Left, without their having

ing any Suspicion of our Advance. Between their Left and our Infantry, flow'd a little Brook, whose Breadth did not exceed fix Feet, and which might have been immediately covered with Bridges, framed with the Doors of the adjoining Houses. We had nothing, therefore, incumbent on us, but to pass the Infantry over those Bridges, and force the Prince of *Vaudemont's* Quarters, where the Soldiers were all asleep. Had this Motion been attempted with sufficient Vigour, in that Conjunction, it might have been accomplished with ease; and yet in the very Moment that was so favourable to this Project, Marshal *de Villeroy* order'd the whole Army to file off to the Left, in order to pass the *Mandel*, a League and a half higher, at *Isenghen*, declaring that he was determined not to advance in a Column, against a Camp in Flank; so that the Enemy, being roused from their Slumber, decamped with all possible Expedition, before our Army had arrived at *Isenghen*.

It appears by this Example, that in all Conjunctions that are so decisive, for changing the Constitution of a War, and preserving a Place of such Importance as *Namur*, a General ought to be capable of improving his Enemy's Misconduct; and the Truth of this Observation will be render'd still more evident, by what pass'd the next Day.

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For it should seem as if Marshal *de Villeroy*, and the Prince of *Vaudemont*, were emulous to exceed each other in remarkable Errors; but in these, the Marshal happened to surpass the Prince, as the Event will declare.

It was reasonable to believe, that the Prince of *Vaudemont*, when he had escaped so imminent a Danger, would have drawn off his Forces to a sufficient Distance from our Army: but he neglected this Precaution, and form'd his Camp on the Height of *Artell*, with the Village of *Enterghen* in his Front; his Left to the *Mandel*, and his Right entirely uncovered. Marshal *de Villeroy*, when he had pass'd the *Mandel*, advanced with all the Cavalry of his Right, and the Brigade of the *French* Guards. He had left the rest of the Infantry behind, with the Left Wing of the Cavalry; and had order'd the Former to possess themselves of three or four little Castles, in which the Enemy had posted Bodies of Infantry, who cover'd the Front of the Camp they had abandoned, and which they had not time to evacuate. This wretched Expedition was soon finished, and then the Troops halted, in a Column, in expectation of Orders to advance, but did not receive those Orders till two in the Morning; at which time they began their March, and arrived about
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ten, in fight of the Enemy, who were formed, in Order of Battle, on the Height of *Artell*. It was very difficult to charge them in Front, but the Cavalry of our Right, and a Body of Infantry, might easily have passed the *Mandel*, to attack the Enemy's Left Flank, while the rest of our Army, marching to the Left, might have confronted the Enemy's Right, within the Distance of two Musket Shot.

Every Circumstance seemed conducive to the Glory of Marshal *Villeroy*, and the Presumption of his Enemy presented him with a manifest Opportunity of atoning for the Misconduct of the past Evening; but he still neglected to improve it. In the very Instant when we might have charged and overwhelmed this Army, which in the Space of 24 Hours, had, by their Inadvertency, been twice exposed to a total Destruction, our General deferred the Action till the next Morning, in Opposition to all the Instances that could be made to him, to begin the Engagement. The Prince of *Vaudemont*, in the mean time, was vigilant to improve his good Fortune, and our Inactivity, and retreated in our View, with as much Tranquillity as if he had formed that Motion out of our Sight, if we only except an inconsiderable Rear-Guard of Dragoons, and Infantry, which Marshal *de Villeroy* permitted

ted us to charge to the Right, and a few Vollies of small Shot which we poured from our Left, upon the Enemy's Rear-Guard.

This Example evinces the Necessity of confiding the Plan of a Defensive War, to a General who has a Capacity to improve every certain Conjunction for changing this Species of a Defensive War, into one of a more advantageous Nature. For it is manifest, with Relation to my present Subject, that if Marshal *de Villeroy* had improved the favourable Opportunities presented him by his Enemies, for destroying them in separate Parties; he would, undoubtedly, by the first Advance, have recover'd an Equality between the two Armies, which would have render'd it impossible for our Enemies to form any Enterprize. And thus, without engaging the King's Army in any hazardous Attempt, he might, at least, have changed the Defensive, into a War between equal Powers, which is much easier to sustain than any Defensive.

From this Year, to the Peace of *Reswick*, the War was generally of the third Species, which, as I have observed, is a War between equal Powers; except the Sieges of *Aeth* and *Barcelona*, which were formed by the King's Orders, at the time when the Plenipotentiaries for the Peace were assembled, and even after a mutual Agreement for the Restitu-

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tion of those Conquests that should be obtained during the Negotiation, provided it were brought to a Conclusion at a certain Period.

I shall, therefore, turn my Reflexions to those Incidents that changed the two first Species of the War I have been describing, and caused them to degenerate into the third, which is a War between equal Powers, who by a constant Care to regulate themselves by each other's Motions, endeavour to gain all Opportunities of resuming the Offensive, provided this can be practicable without hazarding any improper Engagement, and unless some Misfortune that human Prudence could not foresee, should cause it to relapse into the Defensive.

The War commenced by the *French*, against *Spain*, in 1667, would have declined into a War between equal Powers, in Consequence of the Tripple Alliance, if the King of *France* had not concluded an advantageous Peace at *Aix-la-Chapelle*.

In the Year 1672, the League which was formed against the King, almost as soon as he commenced the War against the *Dutch*, immediately changed the Constitution of this Offensive War; and reduced it to the third Species, which however, by the Wisdom of the Cabinet, and the Capacity of our Generals, was render'd beneficial to the King,

who derived considerable Advantages from it by the Peace of *Nimeguen*.

In the Year 1673, Monsieur de *Montecuculi* seized the Convoy of *Wirtzburg*, and by that Action, changed the Nature of the Offensive War which M. de *Turenne* maintained in *Germany*, and not only obliged that great General to return to the Upper *Rhine*, but likewise compelled the King to abandon his *Dutch* Conquests. Our Enemies even prepared for the Offensive in *Flanders*, the next Year, and yet the King conquer'd the *Franche-Comté*, in the Spring of that same Year. M. de *Turenne*, almost at the same time, by his Victory in the Encounter at *Sintzheim*, acquired an Equality of Force with the Enemy. In *Flanders*, the Prince of *Condé*, by the Advantage he gained in the Action at *Seneffe*, made the Enemy incapable of maintaining a Defensive War against us, and reduced them to an Equality. M. de *Turenne*, by the fortunate Event of the Battle of *Einsheim*, continued to secure himself an Equality, and by the Encounter at *Mulhausen* and *Colmar*, at last decided the Superiority in his own Favour, and changed the Constitution of the War even for the next Year, when he died.

In a word; almost the whole Series of the War, which was concluded by the Peace of *Nimeguen*, contributed to the Glory of the

the King of *France*, as well those Expeditions he undertook in Person, as those which were conducted by his Generals; by which means, tho' it corresponded with a War between equal Powers, it was render'd memorable in each Campaign, by a number of shining Actions.

The War which began in 1688, and was terminated by the Peace of *Reswick*, may be ranked in the third Class. It was, at first, Offensive on our part, against the Emperor, and soon became general, by the Association of the Powers of *Europe*, against *France*; but from the Year 1689, it appeared altogether Defensive on our part. In 1690, the King resumed the Offensive in *Flanders*, and *Piedmont*. The War in *Germany* was of the third Species, and continued in that Form till the Peace. We degenerated into the Defensive, in *Piedmont*, and the Offensive was carried on in *Flanders*, till the Year 1695, when it declined into a War between equal Powers, tho' with some Marks of Superiority on the part of our Enemies, who retook *Namur*.

The War which commenced in 1701, for the Succession to the Monarchy of *Spain*, should have opened with the Offensive on our part, because it was reasonable to imagine that the two Crowns of *France* and *Spain*, who were united by their common

Interest, would not suffer the Powers who intended to associate in Favour of the *German* House of *Austria*, to take proper Measures to act in Concert, and attack all the separate Dominions of the *Spanish* Monarchy.

We ought to have obliged the Republick of *Venice* to declare for the Tranquillity of the *Spanish* Territories in *Italy*, and it was imprudent to be satisfied with their Offer of a Neutrality, which we might presume would be advantageous to the Emperor; and when the *Venetians* permitted the Troops of each Party to pass through their Dominions, provided those Troops paid for what they took or consumed, we might naturally imagine that the Emperor's Forces would be the first who enter'd those Dominions, because they could not otherwise approach the Territories of *Spain* which are all situated on this side of the *Mincio*. By this first Instance of our Misconduct, the War in *Italy* opened with the Defensive on our part, and always continued in that Condition, till the Year 1706, when *Spain* lost all her Dominions in that Country.

We had, however, one favourable Opportunity of changing the Nature of this Defensive War, and might even have concluded it with Glory for the two Crowns; and this Opportunity was presented after the

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Encounter at *Calcinato*. The Plan was judiciously concerted by the Duke of *Vendome*, and it proved fortunate in the Execution; but this General should have had the Vivacity to march to *Salo*, on the Lake of *Guardia*, to prevent the *Germans* from reassembling in any place but the *Trentine*, and he should likewise have passed his Army over the *Adige*, and advanced to the Height of the *Alps*. If the Duke had accomplished this Motion, he would have driven all the *Germans* out of *Italy*, and obliged them to discontinue the War there, at least for that Year, in which Interval, we might possibly have engaged the *Venetians* and the other Powers of *Italy* to concur with us in establishing the Tranquillity of that Country for the future. This want of Vigour, therefore, in the Duke of *Vendome*, render'd his Victory at *Calcinato* ineffectual to him, and created no Change in the Constitution of the *Italian War*; because Prince *Eugene* had sufficient time to draw new Recruits from *Germany*, and re-establish the War in *Italy*.

We ought likewise to have spirited up our Allies in *Germany*, who were the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologne*, and the Duke of *Wolfembuttel*. Our Neglect of this Precaution lost us the Duke of *Wolfembuttel*, before the opening of the Campaign, and likewise t' e Electorate of *Cologne*; so that the advantage-

ous War we might have maintained in *Germany*, on the Lower *Rhine*, was soon changed into the Defensive, on our part. The particular Errors committed in the Course of this Campaign, may be imputed to Marshal *Boufflers*, who was not vigilant enough to protect *Keiserfewert*, and whose uncertain Motions gave the Enemy an Opportunity of advancing to the Lower *Maes*, after they had made themselves Masters of that important Place. We may therefore venture to declare, that the War which commenced in this Country, and ought to have been maintain'd in the Offensive, degenerated very soon into a dishonourable Defensive.

With respect to *Holland*, we ought to have detained those Troops which the States had placed in the *Spanish* Towns, till we had obliged them to give us sufficient Security not to arm or enter into any League against the two Crowns. It would likewise have been our Interest to ease this cautious Republick of any Apprehensions they might entertain of the new Grandeur of the House of *France*, and it would have been an inconsiderable Expence for the Crown of *Spain* to have parted with a small Tract of Land and a few Towns, in order to secure the *Dutch* from engaging in the Emperor's War. We ought, also, to have concerted such advantageous and exclusive Measures with them,

them, in Relation to their Commerce, as might have prevented their Union with *England*; which was such a Union as King *William*, who died about that time, had been very sedulous to establish between those two Powers, tho' they were always jealous of each other's Superiority at Sea, as well as in the Article of Trade.

But all these prudent Measures were either imperfectly concerted, or intirely neglected; and our Inaction lost us the Opportunity of commencing an Offensive War, which the great Superiority of the two Crowns, who were then united, would have reduced to a short Period. Our Enemies, therefore, when they had been raising Troops, for near 18 Months, and had mutually taken all the necessary Measures for invading the several Dominions of the Monarchy of *Spain*, declared War against us, and began with the Offensive, which, for some time, was sustained with the Appearance of Equality in *Italy*, but with great Disproportion on the *Rhine* and the *Maes*.

I shall now turn my Reflections to a fourth Species of War, which is that wherein a Prince engages to support his Ally: A War of this Nature, is maintained in various Manners, and with different Pretexs; namely, either in the Execution of antecedent Treaties; or in Consequence of some

particular Treaty entered into by a Prince from the Motives of Jealousy or Interest, against an ambitious Power; or to furnish the Succours which he stipulated to raise for his Ally, either in Troops or Money, Ammunition or Provisions; or finally, to form Diversions either against the Power who begins the Hostilities, or against the Allies of the Aggressor.

In Order to examine those auxiliary Wars I have seen in my time, together with the Reasons for their Commencement, and the manner of their Conclusion; I am to observe that the first War of this Species, was enter'd into by the King of *France*, when he assisted the *Dutch* with a Body of auxiliary Troops, against the Bishop of *Munster*, who invaded them on the side of *Over-Yssel*. We were unwilling to give the House of *Austria*, that ancient Enemy to the *French* and *Dutch*, time to engage in this Quarrel. This was our Inducement to succour our Allies the *Dutch*, and it produced the proper Effect in a short time; for *Barnard van Galen*, Bishop of *Munster*, was obliged to conclude a sudden Peace with the *Dutch*. This War, therefore, was undertaken in Vertue of a preceding Treaty of Alliance between *France* and *Holland*, and with a View to render the Emperor immediately incapable of having any part in it; for this Prince
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would willingly have engaged in it, to have been furnished with a Pretext for advancing his Troops to the *Spanish Netherlands*, without any seeming Violation of the Treaty of *Munster*.

The second Supply of auxiliary Troops, was sent by the King of *France* to the Elector of *Mentz*, for the Reduction of the City of *Erford* in *Thuringia*, which belongs to the Electorate of *Mentz*. The sole Presence of these Troops decided that Affair to the Satisfaction of the Elector; and as it produced no War, it had all the Effect which that Prince, our Ally, could possibly desire.

The King engaged in a third auxiliary War, when he sent, at his own Expence, a considerable Body of Troops into *Hungary*, to assist the Empéror, who, at that time, was powerfully attacked by the *Turks*. And tho' the Victory at *St. Godart*, which compelled the *Turks* to conclude a Peace, was owing to the Bravery of our Troops, the Emperor made an ungrateful Return for the Service they render'd him, in a Conjunction which prov'd so decisive in his Favour; and was not so much as attentive to any Means for their meer Subsistence, while they were acting for his Service, nor even in their return to *France*. This Example justifies a former Observation of mine, that
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a Prince, when he assists his Friend and Ally, ought to settle with him the most effectual Measures, as well for the reasonable Preservation and Subsistence of his Troops, as for those Indemnities and Retaliations that may be agreeable to the particular Nature of the Succours with which he furnishes his Ally. The Emperor even affected to consider this Supply, rather as a Duty owing to the Empire, in return for *Alfatia*, which the King possessed, tho' it had been dismember'd from the Empire by the Treaty of *Munster*, than as a Succour that was purely gratuitous. I may even affirm that this Succour was afforded with too much Generosity, and contrary to those judicious Maxims that ought to be observed on such an Occasion; because we might naturally suppose that the Emperor, who was constantly attached to his grand Views, would consider this auxiliary Service as a just Due to the Empire, and not as a gratuitous Assistance.

The fourth auxiliary War, was that in which the King of *France* assisted the *Venetians* with a Body of Troops in *Candia*, which was then besieged by the *Turks*. This Succour, which was entirely gratuitous on the part of his Majesty, was afforded with a View to support a Christian State, against a Power who was an Enemy to that Name.

Name. Nor had the King any particular Interest in that War, except the Glory of affording a generous Relief to the *Venetians* who were oppressed by the *Ottoman* Power.

The extraordinary Succours granted by the *Emperor*, the *Spaniards*, and the Elector of *Brandenbourg*, to the *Dutch*, in the Year 1672, were the Effects of the Jealousy they entertained of the mighty Power of *France*; to which I may add, that the Emperor was influenced by his Interest to preserve *Holland* from being overwhelmed, since he imagined that the Ruin of this State would be equally destructive to that part of the *Netherlands* which belonged to the *Spanish* House of *Austria*. This auxiliary War, therefore, resulted from a reasonable Jealousy conceived against a victorious Prince, and was justly undertaken, in Conformity to the Maxims of this fourth Species of War.

In the present War, which began in 1701, almost all the Powers who formed the Confederacy against the two Crowns, have been actuated by different Views. The Emperor was wrought upon by the personal Interest of the *German* Branch of his House, which had been divested of the Succession he claimed to the Dominions of the *Spanish* Branch. The *English*, the *Empire* and its Princes, the *Dutch*, and *Portugal* assisted the Emperor

in their auxiliary Capacity, and had no real Pretensions to any part of the *Spanish* Monarchy. It is evident, therefore, that this auxiliary War, on the part of all those Powers, was only excited by their Jealousy of the Greatness the House of *France* would acquire, were all the Dominions of *Spain* suffered to be peaceably united in the Person of *Philip* the V.

I shall now close my Reflections with the Article of Civil War, which constitutes the fifth Species.

France was the Scene of two fatal Civil Wars in the last Century; but I shall pass them over in Silence, because they were brought to a conclusion, the one, before I was born, and the other, in my Infancy.

That which has been called the War of *Rockelle*, resulted from the Ambition of some great Men, and was fomented by the Enemies to the State, and the Weakness of the Administration; but had for its Pretext, the Infraction of some Articles of the Treaty relating to Religion, and which was called the Edict of *Nantes*.

The second, which was called the War of the Princes, had not any Grievances in Religion for its Pretext, but sprung from the Dissatisfactions of the Princes, who thought themselves ill treated in the King's Minority, by the Queen Regent who was govern-
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ed by a Minister of foreign Extraction. All the other internal Motions which I have seen in the Kingdom, were popular Mutinies, rather than Civil Wars, since they were not fomented by any Chief of Reputation. They were likewise calmed in a short time, either by the vigilant Measures that were taken, before they were headed by any Person of Consequence, or by the Punishment of the seditious Party, or else by a seasonable Moderation or Suppression of those Imposts which occasioned the Commotion. We must, however, except from these popular Insurrections, that of *Cevennes*, which had Religion for its Pretext, and continued for a considerable time, tho' it was not conducted by any Chief, or, at least, not by any who publickly appeared: But it ran to such a Length, because it was fomented not only by the Money which was distributed by the Emissaries of our Enemies, but even by considerable Sums raised in the Kingdom by Persons of the same Communion with the Mutineers. This Commotion could only be quieted by Severity, and the Ruin of that Country. I may even say, that this popular Disorder would neither have been so considerable, nor of such a long Duration, had those Persons, who ought to have composed it, by their Authority in that Province, preferred the Interest of their Sovereign,

reign, before their own particular Advantage.

The Civil War in *England*, which ended in the Murder of King *Charles* the First, who was Beheaded by a Sentence of the Commissioners appointed by the Parliament of that Kingdom, under the Pretext of his Violation of the Laws; tho' it was an Instance of the utmost Barbarity, yet it sufficiently evinces the Ardour by which the *English* are animated for the Preservation of their Laws.

The War which the Malecontents in *Hungary* maintained, about 40 Years ago, against their Sovereign the Emperor, sprung from a Resolution to vindicate the Privileges of that Nation, which the Emperor was continually infringing. This Prince, who is of the House of *Austria*, after he had render'd the Elective Crown of *Bohemia* hereditary to his House, was desirous to effect the same Change in that of *Hungary*. The Grandees of this Kingdom, which is situated between *Germany*, and the Dominions of the *Turk*, who possesses more than a Moiety of *Hungary*, opposed this Alteration; but the Emperor gained several of them over to his Interest, by his Liberalities, and thought to crush all the rest with Impunity. Those who escaped the Poison, the Murders, and other intended Severities, had recourse to Arms, and

and the Protection of the *Turk*, and even contracted Alliances with several Powers who were then at War with the Emperor, and selected a Chief to command them, who was Count *Tekely*. This Chief, amidst a Series of different Success, sustain'd a War against the Emperor, either alone or in Conjunction with the *Turks*, till he was at last abandoned by them in the Treaty of *Carlowitz*, and obliged to seek a Retreat in the *Ottoman Empire*.

Some Years since, the Emperor, founding his Pretensions on his Conquests over the *Turks* in *Hungary*, concerted Measures to oblige the General Diet of that Kingdom to recognize the Hereditary Right of his House to the Crown. The Presence of the *German* Troops, and the Attachment of several *Hungarian* Noblemen to the Emperor, rendered the Event of that Diet favourable to his Imperial Majesty. After which this Prince resumed his severe Maxims against those of the Grandees whom he imagined were not devoted to the Interest of his House.

Prince *Ragotsky*, the Son of Count *Teke-ly's* Lady, was one of these Grandees, and was Imprisoned on very slender Prettexts; but having found means to escape from his Confinement, he retired into *Hungary*, and formed an Insurrection of the Generality of the People, who were exasperated at the
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Violation of their Privileges, and the Severity of the *Austrian* Government: And for the Space of seven Years, without any Assistance from the *Turks*, and by the sole Influence of his personal Credit, and the Money he received from the Powers at War with the Emperor, he continued to support himself, and divested his Imperial Majesty of several strong Places; caused himself to be acknowledged Prince of *Transilvania*, and by the Authority of his Partisans and Confederates in the Diet, procured the Proclamation of an Interregnum in *Hungary*.

This Instance sufficiently justifies my Observation, on the Article of Civil Wars, that a Prince ought to be very circumspect in his manner of governing his Subjects, whether old or new; that he ought never to incense them either by his own personal Conduct, or by the Instrumentality of those he intrusts with the particular Government of his People, against whom he should never have recourse to Severity, till he has employed all the gentle Methods to engage them; for when once a whole People are irritated, their seditious Commotions will become general; and these are such Calamities as a Prince can never be too cautious to prevent. For it is certain, that if the Emperor had not distressed the Protestants and Grandees of *Hungary*, who embraced
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that Religion, and if he had not abandoned them to the intemperate Zeal and Avidity of the Jesuits, to whom he consigned the Estates of those Lords; in a word, if he had not subverted the Privileges of the whole Nation, in the Diet of *Odenburg*, which declared the Succession to that Crown hereditary to his House, this Commotion would not have been so general as it proved.

Had the Emperor, therefore, been influenced by a political Circumspection to prevent a Civil War in *Hungary*, he would only have made gradual Attacks on the Privileges of that Nation, after he had entirely gain'd, by gentle Methods, and Promotions in *Germany*, those Lords whom he imagin'd to be least devoted to the Interest of his House. He even ought not to have extinguished the *Palatine* Dignity, which he had frequently delegated to a *German*, in Opposition to the Laws of *Hungary*, which exclude all Foreigners from that Promotion; but should rather have conferred it on some *Hungarian* Nobleman whom he knew to be well affected to his House. By this cautious and imperceptible Conduct, he might have brought the Grandees under the gradual Weight of the Yoke, without their being sensible of their Servitude, till it would have been impossible for them to shake it off.

I shall only mention the Revolution of *Messina*, in 1676, in order to add a further Proof of the Dangers that result from a rigid and tyrannical Treatment of a People who are naturally unsteady, but at the same time, desirous of preserving those Privileges they possessed when they submitted to a Prince. This Revolt would have divested the *Spaniards* of the entire Kingdom, had the Command of the King of *France's* Army been committed to any other General than the Marshal *de Vivonne*, whose natural Inactivity gave the *Spaniards* and their Allies time to provide for the Preservation of that Island.

It appears by this Example, that if a Prince ought to be circumspect to prevent the Revolt of his Subjects, that Prince likewise whom those revolting Subjects invite to their Assistance, should be vigorous to sustain their Insurrection, and cautious not to alienate their Affections from their new Choice, or cause them to regret the Dominion they so lately rejected.

Tho' the Revolt of the *Catalans* ought to be ranked in the Class of Civil Wars, since it was inflamed by a set of powerful Subjects who had taken Oaths of Allegiance to *Philip* the Fifth; yet it neither sprung from the Severity of the Government, nor the Infracti-
tion of the Peoples Privileges, but from the

meer Translation of the Royal Authority from one House to another.

Some of the *Spanish* Grandees who were well affected to the House of *Austria*, and dissatisfied at a Change that was accomplished without their Participation, formed secret Confederacies with the Enemies of their new Sovereign; but their bad Dispositions would have been altogether ineffectual, if they had not gain'd the favourable Concurrence of the People. They likewise employed the Insinuations of the Monks, a Species of Ecclesiasticks whom the House of *Austria* can manage to a much better Effect than any other Power in *Europe*, and who are the more dangerous in a State, as their Motions to disorder it, are secret and impenetrable.

This was the Origin of a Civil War, entirely different from all the rest I have mentioned. It might possibly have been prevented, by a little Attention to the Conduct of the disaffected Grandees of the first Rank; but it would have been very difficult to penetrate into that secret Tribunal, where the Monks alone are Masters. It may, however, be easily believed, that the lurking Infection which was diffused by that Clergy, would not have been very fatal, had not its Malignity been invigorated by the Chiefs who

then appeared, and by those succours which the Powers in Confederacy with the Emperor, transmitted to *Spain*.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the Disposition and Plans of War.

I Shall here treat of those general Plans and Dispositions which ought to be formed, in order to secure an advantageous Event of a War which has not been publickly declared.

I shall only examine those Instances of Misconduct that have been committed in my time, with Relation to the general Plans and Dispositions, which I have seen concerted previous to the several Wars; and shall reserve my Observations on any particular Dispositions, for those parts of this Work where the Subject will naturally require them.

It is certain that the Death of *Philip* the Fourth of *Spain*, might have been considered, for some Time, as an Event not very remote. Had the King of *France*, therefore, who, upon the Demise of that Prince, was determined to secure the Devolution of *Brabant* to the Queen, only levied, some time before

before that Conjunction, a sufficient Body of Infantry, which he might easily have effected, since *France* was so abundantly replenished with Men; and if he had secretly purchased a proper Number of Horses, for the Service of his Artillery and Provisions; and likewise prepared Carriages, and bought Quantities of Corn in those Countries that were distant from the Frontiers of *Flanders*; his Invasion of those Provinces might have been much more expeditious and effectual than it proved. He might easily have Conquered all the *Spanish Netherlands*, in the Campaign of 1667, and might have preserved them, by the Treaty of *Aix-la-Chapelle*, with as little Difficulty as he retained that inconsiderable part of them which he then possessed; because no Power, at that time, could have obliged him to abandon his new Conquest. But all these Attentions, so necessary to a Prince who proposes to be Victorious, were neglected, since the Levies of Infantry, and even of the Cavalry, were made after the Army had marched into *Flanders*. So that our want of Troops to guard the Towns we might have taken, prevented us from gaining a greater Number than we took in that Campaign.

It is likewise certain, that if the King had provided the proper Equipage for his Provisions and Artillery, he might, at the very

opening of the Campaign, have brought all his Army before *Brussels*, the Acquisition of which City would have been succeeded by the entire Conquest of the *Spanish Netherlands*, at a time when they were destitute of all Defence.

I may, therefore, affirm that the general Disposition for this War, deviated from those Maxims which ought to be observed by a Prince who deliberates on a Conquest he intends to make.

If the King, after he engaged in a War against the *Dutch* in 1672, and pursued his Conquests with such a Rapidity, had regarded their Proposals for a Peace, which were very advantageous, he might have secured a glorious Conclusion of that War, which he only seemed to have undertaken, in order to humble, and not entirely to destroy that Republick, which was grown too imperious, and incurred his Displeasure, by promoting the Tripple Alliance. And if his Majesty, after he had granted a Peace to *Holland*, had improved the Pretext which the *Spaniards* themselves had given him, for coming to a Rupture with them, in Consequence of the Succours they had afforded the *Dutch*, beyond the Limitations of the Treaty for their mutual Defence; he might, when he Marched his Army back to *France*, have conquered all the rest of *Flanders* and
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Brabant, in the Space of six Weeks, without any Apprehensions that the Emperor would be in a Condition to interrupt the Progress of his Arms, or even to declare War against him afterwards, in Favour of *Spain*; since the Territories of this Monarchy, after the Conquest of the *Spanish Netherlands*, would have been too remote from *Germany*, and the Hereditary Dominions of the House of *Austria*, to create any Suspicions of their Ability to incommode the King in his Possession of the new Domain he would then have added to his Kingdom. Our Views, therefore, in the Plan of this War against *Holland*, were very imperfect, and only extended to our Operations against that Republick; without considering, that if the *Spaniards* engaged in that War, we ought to have prepared our selves for improving that Conjunction, by conquering all the rest of the *Spanish Netherlands*.

If the King of *France*, when he declared War against the Emperor in 1688, by divesting him of *Philipsburg*, had ordered that Place to be razed, after we had taken it, and then left it to the Bishop of *Spire*, to whom the Land and the Domain belonged; and if he had not levied the Expences of that Siege, on those States of the Empire that were comprehended in the Circles of *Suabia* and *Franconia*; nor ruined the *Palatinate*,

minate, and dispossessed the Elector of those his Dominions; it is certain that the Empire would not have declared War against the King, by a Decree of the Diet, to espouse the personal Interest of the Emperor, at a time when that Monarch was entirely engaged in a War against the *Turks*. Or if the King had then been Master of more Troops in the Field, and had not made his Levies, contrary to good Politics, after the Declaration of the War; it seems reasonable to believe, that the Princes of the Empire, amidst their Apprehensions of being overwhelmed, before they could be in a posture of Defence, would not have declared against *France*; whereas now, the time we took in compleating our Levies, gave them an Opportunity of forming theirs.

I will add too, that our Rupture with the Emperor, in Consequence of our taking *Philipsburg*, ought, in sound Politicks, to have been no more than a judicious Precaution against that Monarch; since we foresaw that he would declare War against us, to make us restore *Strasburg* to the Empire, and resign our Re-unions, when he had disengaged himself from the *Turkish* War. It was imprudent in us, to incense the Empire by demanding Contributions without any tolerable Reason; nor ought we to have compelled the Empire to make a general Affair of
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our particular Hostilities against the Emperor, who alone was provoked at our taking *Philipsburg*. If the King had withdrawn his Troops, after they had dismantled that Place, it is evident that this Expedition to secure our selves, in the Event, from the Emperor's Designs, would not have brought the Empire to a Rupture with *France*.

After the Peace of *Reswick*, in the Year 1697, it would have been justly Politick in the King of *France*, to have kept up a powerful Armament of all the Troops he could possibly have maintain'd, in preference to any other Expence. The declining State of Health of the Kings of *England* and *Spain*, whose last Moments were visibly approaching, and whose Deaths would naturally introduce a great Change in the Affairs of *Europe*, should have induced him to continue armed, preferably to all other Considerations. And yet, in manifest Contradiction to this Motive of good Politics, the King very unseasonably cashier'd a great Number of Troops, the Generality of whose *Veteran* Soldiers passed into *Germany*, where they ended their Days in the Service of the Emperor, and the Princes of the Empire; because instead of disbanding them in the inferior part of the Kingdom, we made the Reform on the Frontiers.

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These are the Instances of Misconduct, which I have observed in *France*, with Reference to the general Plans and Dispositions for War that ought to precede its Declaration.

C H A P. IX.

Of Secrecy.

THIS Chapter relates to that Secrecy which is necessary to be observed in War, as well in the Conduct of general Plans, as the Execution of any particular Measures that may happen to be concerted. My Reflections on this Subject, will be comprehended in the Comparison that may be drawn between the Ministers who, in my time, have had the Direction of Military Affairs.

Under the Ministry of Monsieur *de Louvois*, who was a Man of great Capacity and Experience, and always extremely careful to recommend those to the King whom he believed to be Persons of Ability, and who, in Reality, were most capable of executing with great Secrecy, those Measures that had been concerted; the Military Transactions were generally successful.

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During the Ministry of Monsieur *de Barbefieux*, who, on the account of his Youth, had not so much Influence in the Choice of those Persons who were then employed; and who might possibly be governed by his Prepossessions, more than Monsieur *de Louvois*, his Father, who had a greater Share of the King's Esteem; the Enterprizes that were then formed, were not always executed with so much Secrecy, and consequently the Events were less favourable.

In the Ministry of Monsieur *de Chamillard*, whom no Circumstance but the King's favourable Opinion, had raised to one of the first Stations in the Kingdom, and for which he had not the least Ability; we have seen, to this very time, all Military Affairs very defective, because they are no longer conducted with Secrecy; but every Circumstance is discover'd long before the Execution; so that our Enemies are fully acquainted with our intended Measures. As the Minister was incapable of forming Plans of War and Campaigns, he consulted those who ought only to have transcribed his own original Thoughts. A number of Persons, therefore, have been employed to arrange the Execution of a Project, whose Success depended on Secrecy.

Examples of this Nature, would be as numerous as the Instances in which an inviolable

violable Secrecy has been necessary. Those very Persons who were chosen by Monsieur *Chamillard*, to act under him, had, for the generality, not the least Genius for the Affairs of the Cabinet. Secrecy, therefore, was not observed by such Persons as these, who were incapable of Thinking to any purpose. And thus I have accounted in general for that Declension of the King's Affairs which has so long been visible.

C H A P. X.

Of the Knowledge of Countries.

MY Reflections on this Subject shall be confined to the Errors I have seen committed, and of which I have a competent Knowledge.

It is certain that in the Year 1667, if the King, when he declared War against *Spain*, had marched his Troops directly to *Brussels*, he might easily have render'd himself Master of that City, whose Loss would have divested the *Spaniards* of all that Country; for the Reasons I have offer'd in another place. This Error resulted from an Unacquaintance with the true Constitution of the *Netherlands*, with Reference to the General Plan

Plan of that intended War, and which ought to have been settled previous to the Declaration of it, and the particular Operations on that Occasion. The Apprehension that the Army would be unprovided with Bread, during their March, were without any sufficient Foundation: For it is well known that the Soldiers could easily carry as much as would suffice them for six Days; and the Army might have been followed by a strong Convoy, which would have furnished them with Provisions for fifteen Days: And in less time than this, the large and defenceless Cities near *Brussels*, might have been reduced, and consequently they would have supplied the Army sufficiently with Bread.

The fear of not being able to convey the heavy Artillery, and a sufficient quantity of War-like Stores, along with the Army, to facilitate the Reduction of *Brussels*, was altogether as unreasonable as the last. Since this Conveyance would have been render'd very practicable, by providing Horses and Carriages out of *Picardie* and *Champaign*, in a Season when they were not employed in any part of Husbandry. Besides, *Brussels* was in so weak a condition, that its Defence could not have been drawn out into any length of Time. Our Army might have been furnished with Quantities of Powder
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from the great Towns near *Brussels*, which would have sufficed for the Infantry. It is even reasonable to believe, that several Places of War would have conformed to the Conduct of this Capital, in which the Power and the Finances of the Country were lodged, because it is the Residence of the Nobility, and the Tribunals of the State. It is easy therefore to conceive, that had we gain'd an exact Knowledge of *Flanders*, which we intended to invade, and of those Resources the King might have found in the adjoining Provinces and States; we might have carried the War, without Hesitation, into the Heart of the Country, and have conquer'd it in a single Campaign.

In the Year 1672, the Neglect to gain an exact Knowledge of the Level of the Canals in *Holland*, and their Effects, prevented the Advance of our Troops to *Amsterdam*, while the King was Master of *Utrecht*; and retarded us too long in taking *Muyden*, which supplies that great City with the most considerable part of its fresh Water. This Unacquaintedness with the Level of the Canals, likewise, obliged us to cut the Dikes, which produced Effects contrary to our Expectations.

In 1691, the King determin'd to content himself with a Defensive War in *Piedmont*, for the Year 1692; upon the Representa-
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tions made to him, that it might be easily sustainable, provided his Infantry were superior to those of the Enemy. But the Events of that Campaign discover'd the Imperfections of such a Project: For tho' the City of *Pignerol* was very formidable to the Enemy, and we were in Possession of *Nice* and *Susa*; and notwithstanding the Infantry *M. de Catinat* was supplied with to maintain the Defensive, were twice as numerous as the Duke's; yet that Prince made himself Master of *Ambrun*, in the Rear of our Troops, and would afterwards have penetrated into *Dauphiné*, had he not been seized with the small Pox, as I have formerly observed.

We were as much unacquainted with the *Alps*, during the War which commenced in *Piedmont*, in 1705, and were altogether as ignorant of *Pignerol*. We dismantled *Nice*, after we had taken it, and were only Masters of *Susa*, which we were willing to secure, as well as to preserve *Exilles*, and *Fenestrelles*, and to prevent the Duke of *Savoy* from advancing into *Provence*. Every one knows what it had like to have cost *Toulon*, and 45 large Ships which the King then had in that Port, and what it afterwards cost *Susa* in Reality. But tho' the Loss of this Place can only be imputed to our wanting an exact Knowledge of the Country,

Country, I shall, however, point out the Deficiency of the Project for the Defensive, in *Dauphiné*, which no Idea of the Country could ever rectify.

Piedmont may be consider'd as a Basin, round a Semi-Circle of which, the *Alps* rise; and consequently those who are in the Depth of that Basin, may as soon advance over one side of it, as they can over the other. The General therefore, who was charged with this Defensive, was obliged to be equally attentive to every part of this half Round, which render'd him inferior to the Enemy, in every place where they should happen to make their first Effort, which, on their part, would be always general, and covered by false Appearances, very remote from their real Intentions. This Inequality must needs be of a long continuance, because the Nature of the Country on this side of the *Alps*, makes it necessary to employ several Days, in assembling the Troops who are distributed around that Basin. I may likewise add, that the prodigious Number of Defiles, and Passages, which are open'd in those Mountains, after the Snow has been melted, afford an easy Entrance to those who would penetrate to that Quarter, from *Piedmont*, and makes it almost impossible to oppose them. Most of these Passages are struck out from the same Centre,

Centre, which is the Plain of *Piedmont*, but, in their Progress, slant off to a great Distance from one another; and therefore the different Bodies of Troops, that must unavoidably be separated, to oppose the Enemy in these Defiles that are most practicable, are too remote from each other, and find it extremely difficult to maintain any mutual Communication.

In the Year 1708, the Plan of a Defensive, without *Susa*, was the same as was pursued in those Parts, and the Court even employed a General who had not the least Knowledge of the Country, and who, besides the Precautions he was to observe for the Security of *Provence*, and Lower *Dauphiné*, was obliged to extend his Vigilance to *Savoy*, which was then in a bad state of Defence, and even to the Upper *Rhodie*; since it was believed, for some time, that the Duke of *Savoy* intended to penetrate so far, because he had a very great Body of Horse, which would have been useless in any Expedition among the Mountains.

The Variety of those just Attentions, gave the Duke of *Savoy*, who had marched a considerable Body of Troops to *St. John de Mauriene*, an Opportunity of Forming a sudden Counter-march above *Nodane*, and of taking *Exilles*, before our Forces, who were encamped near *Fort Barrault*,

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could be capable of relieving that Place; and we afterwards lost *Fenestrelles* in *Pragilas*.

These are the chief Errors that have been committed in my time, for want of an exact Knowledge of the Country, with Reference to the general Disposition of the War in *Piedmont*. From whence I conclude, that nothing, but gross Ignorance, could have crated a Persuasion, that it was possible to continue a Defensive War, in those Parts, without sustaining some incommodious Events, every Year.

I shall now consider the Errors, into which the want of knowing Countries betray'd either our Enemies or our Selves, with Relation to particular Events in the Course of Campaigns.

At the close of the Year 1673, when M. de *Luxembourg* marched a considerable Body of Infantry and but few Cavalry, back from *Holland*, the Prince of *Orange* having drawn all the *Dutch* and *Spanish* Forces together, advanced to the *Maes*, to attack M. de *Luxembourg*, between *Maestricht*, and *Charleroy*. Upon this, the Court order'd M. de *Schomberg* to assemble all the Cavalry of *Hainault* and *Flanders*, in order to join M. de *Luxembourg*, who was much inferior to the Prince of *Orange* in Cavalry. This Prince, therefore, should have been vigilant to prevent

vent the Conjunction of these two Generals, and ought to have attacked them, one after another, before their Troops could be united; but as he was unacquainted with the Nature of the Country, he mistook for Realities, those Feints that were made by *M. de Luxembourg*, while he was encamped on the *Ourt*, as if he intended to pursue his March through *Condros*, and the *Ardennies*, to arrive at *Sedan*, or *Mezieres*. The Prince of *Orange* made his Approaches to *Huy* and *Namur*, and by that Motion, retired too far from the great Cawsey, so that *M. de Schomberg* had an Opportunity of advancing with his Cavalry to *Tongeren*, at the same time that *M. de Luxembourg* past the *Maes* at *Mae-stricht*, in a vigorous March, and arrived at *Tongeren* without any Inconvenience. If the Prince of *Orange* had been well acquainted with the Disposition of *Condros* and the *Ardennies*, he would have been sensible of the Difficulties *M. de Luxembourg* must sustain in that Country, during the March of his Army, who could only be supplied with Bread, from the Places of the Upper *Maes*, after they had quitted *Mae-stricht* and *Liege*.

In the Year 1674, the Prince of *Conde*; who commanded the King's Army in *Flanders*, was encamped at the Commandery of *Piceton*, when the Prince of *Orange*, in Conjunction with *M. de Souches*, the General of

the Emperor's Forces, encamped at *Seneffe*. The Prince of *Conde's* Army was much weaker than that of the Enemy, who imagined they were enabled, by their Superiority, to form the Siege of *Tournay*. They had even the Presumption to believe they were in a Condition to decamp from *Tournay*, and advance to *Binch*, tho' they were to form the first Motions of their March with their Flank to our Army. They were to pass through two or three little Defiles, separated from one another by small Plains, which however were capable of containing a sufficient Body of Troops, to receive the Rear-Guard, in case they should happen to be attacked and thrown into Confusion. If the Prince of *Orange* had been so circumspect as to have left a Party of Troops in the first of these little Plains, to receive the Forces of his Rear-Guard, that were within, and behind the Village of *Seneffe*, it is certain that the Prince of *Conde* could have only attacked this Rear-Guard, when they should be in Motion to quit *Seneffe*, and the little Plain behind that Village, and could have pushed these Troops no farther than the Defile. But the presumptuous Enemy, from whom the Prince of *Conde* was enabled, by the Advantage of a little Eminence above *Seneffe*, to conceal his Dispositions for an Attack, disregarded the necessary and judicious At-
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tions to this particular Form of the Country, and continued their March, as if the Column had not been engaged in those Defiles, and as tho' they had nothing to fear from an approaching Enemy who could observe all their Motions. The Prince of *Conde* immediately improved this Misconduct to his own Advantage, by the Success which attended the Battle of *Seneffe*.

It is evident by this Example, that a General who presumes upon his superior Numbers, should never be unattentive, either to the Country through which he is to conduct his Army, or to that where he proposes to advance, whether he be near his Enemies, or believe they are at a sufficient Distance. And he is often deceived in this Persuasion, by the Vigilance of an Enemy, who, by some conceal'd Motion, will be in a Condition to improve the Errors his Adversary may have committed, either by his Negligence, or Unacquaintedness with the Country: This Neglect was almost fatal to the Prince of *Orange*, a second time, at the Siege of *Oudenard*. For had this Prince known the Country better, he would not have abandoned the Heights, on the Line of Circumvallation, to the Prince of *Conde*, but would have possessed that Situation before the Arrival of the King's Army.

In the same Year 1674, the exact Know-
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ledge which the Marshal *de Turenne* acquired of *Alsatia*, enabled him to defend that Province, against Forces infinitely superior to his own, and even render'd him victorious on several great Occasions; the last of which compelled the Enemy to abandon their Winter Quarters in Upper *Alsatia*, where they imagined them effectually established; and they were obliged to seek for others in the *Empire*.

The Year 1675, furnishes me with a fatal Instance of an Unacquaintedness with the Country that was the Seat of War, and which occasion'd the Loss of the Battle of *Consarbrick*. Had the Marshal *de Crequi* gain'd a better Knowledge of the Fords of the *Saar*, he would have known that they lay on each side of the Bridge, and would not have encamped his Army at an improper Distance from the Bridge and Fords. The Enemy receiving Intelligence that our Cavalry were out upon a Forrage, advanced to the River in three Columns; and the two Columns of Cavalry past the Fords on each side of the Bridge; the Infantry could not be retarded by the Fire from the Tower on the Bridge, which was only guarded by a Lieutenant and twenty Men. Thus were all their Forces suddenly form'd in order of Battle, on this side of the River, upon which they advanced to the King's
Troops,

Troops, who had not sufficient time to make the same Disposition, and defeated them without any Difficulty.

In the same Year, and much about the same time, if M. *de Montecuculi* had been well acquainted with the *Rancken* and the *Kintz*, he might easily have defeated the King's Army, in their Retreat, after the Death of the Marshal *de Turenne*, to *Altenheim*, where they had their Bridge over the *Rhine*: Or if this General, instead of pursuing them beyond the *Kintz*, to attack them at *Altenheim*, which he did, tho' without Success, had passed the *Rhine* at *Strasbourg*, which was intirely devoted to him, and had marched to *Schlestat*, which, at that time, was untortified, and if he had posted his Army there, he might easily have prevented our Troops from passing the *Rhine*, over the Bridge of *Altenheim*; at the Head of which he might have presented himself, with all his Forces. This Motion would have compelled the King's Army to advance up the *Rhine* to *Brisac*, in order to pass it at that Place; and even then, M. *de Montecuculi* would have had more time than he needed, to march with his Army over against *Brisac*, whose Bridge he might have entirely destroyed, after he had made himself Master of Fort *Mortier*, which was the only Fortification on this side of the *Rhine*. Had

these Motions been conducted by a General who had acquired an exact Knowledge of the Country, they would have render'd him Master of *Alsatia*, and *Lorrain*, as well as of the *Franche Comté* which was then destitute of Troops. And all this was the easier to be accomplished, because the Imperial Forces, who had defeated the Marshal *de Crequi*, might have advanced into the Bishopricks, and when the two Armies had joined, they might have been posted between the King's Army on the other side of the *Rhine*, and that which might have been form'd afterwards behind the *Maes*; tho' it would have been a considerable time before the Army could have been rais'd, and this Delay would have been more than sufficient to have occasion'd the Loss of *Lorrain*, and *Alsatia*, and, in all probability, even the three Bishopricks.

This Example most evidently proves the indispensable Necessity of gaining an exact Knowledge of those Countries that are to be the Seat of War; not of those Parts only that are adjacent to the Army, but likewise of such as lie much more remote, and in the very Heart of the Enemy's Country; in order to make an advantageous Improvement of any fortunate Event.

In the Year 1678, if the Prince of *Orange* had been well acquainted with the Situation
of

of the King's Army, on the Heath of *Château-Cambresis*, with the Rivulet of *St. Dennis* in their Front; as solicitous as this Prince might have been to precipitate an Action, with a View to disconcert the Peace, which was then sign'd by *Holland*, tho' not by *Spain*, he would not have attacked the Abby of *St. Dennis*, after he had seen us abandon it, to replace the Troops on this side of the Rivulet, nor would he have been so resolute as to enter upon an Engagement, from which he could never derive any favourable Event.

In the Year 1690, if *M. de Luxembourg* had not immediately improved his Knowledge of the Country, in such a manner as to conceal from *M. de Waldeck*, a bold Motion which he caused his Left Wing to form, and which changed all the seeming Disposition for the Battle, and placed his Troops on the Enemy's Right Flank, he could not have gain'd the famous Battle of *Flerus*.

I only mention this Action, to make it appear there are other Methods of knowing a Country, besides the Study of Maps, or Conversation with Travellers. These Expedients, indeed, give a general Idea of a Country, by which a Plan for a War, or a Campaign, may be formed; but 'tis the lively Eye of an able General which frequently decides a particular Operation of War, by
the

the Advantages he obtains from the Enemy, at the time of the Action, or in that which precedes it, the important Moment of which is not to be deferr'd.

In the same Year, if the Duke of *Savoy* had been acquainted with the Country, before he engaged in the Battle of *Staffarda*, he would have advanced his first Line five Hundred Paces forwarder than he did, and might have been Master of that Situation for several Hours. His Army, by this Motion, might have been stretcht into a much more extensive Front, than our Forces could form to oppose him. His Right would then have been cover'd by the Lodgments where he had disposed his Infantry, who were too remote from the Line to be able to protect it. His left would have been supported by an old Dike of the *Po*; and it would have been very difficult to have defeated him, had this been his Disposition.

I have only mention'd these Particulars, to make it evident that an exact Knowledge of a Country, will cause a General to be sensible, that tho' the Situation in which he proposed to wait for his Enemy, be good, if there should be one better, at a little Distance from him, and which he has sufficient time to possess, he never ought to neglect such an Opportunity; because a small advantage

vantage which he derives from his Capacity, is frequently decisive of a great Event.

In the Year 1691, If the Elector of *Bavaria*, and the Duke of *Savoy* had been better acquainted with the Country, when the King's Army decamped from *Moretta*, in order to advance to *Saluces*; and if those two Princes, instead of marching to the Plain of *Revel*, on this side of the *Po*, had past that River, with all their Forces, to *Moretta*, when they beheld us upon our March, and had advanced to *Saluces*, to encamp in the Plain of *Scarnesfis*; it would have been difficult for the King's Army to have past the *Brompt*, and the old Channel of the *Po*, to accomplish their Retreat from *Pignerol*, without sustaining some considerable Disadvantage. It would even have been impossible for us, during our Continuance at *Saluces*, to have accommodated our selves with the Forrage produced by that Country, from *Saluces* to *Forjan*; and this Motion alone would have compelled M. *de Catinat* to have abandon'd the Garrison of *Carmagnole*, in one Day.

In 1692, if the Marshal *de Lorges* had acquired more Knowledge of the Country round *Worms*, he would have defeated the Landgrave of *Hesse* at *Phederfheim*, as I have formerly observed.

In

In 1694, the just Account of the Country, which M. de *Luxembourg* procured, enabled him to make the necessary Preparations for his March towards *Flanders*, and to accomplish them with more Expedition than the Prince of *Orange*, tho' he had the Advantage of four Marches at least.

In 1695, if the Marshal de *Villeroy* had gain'd as exact an Idea of the Country, within the *Mebaign*, as M. de *Luxembourg* acquired in 1692, he would have enter'd it by the great and little *Leck*, and might have defeated the Enemy, whose Camp wanted a sufficient Space of Ground, and was contracted by the Inundation of *Bonessé*. In this decisive Conjuncture for raising the Siege of *Namur*, the Knowledge of the Front of the Enemy's Camp, which the Marshal intended to attack, was of less Importance to him, than the Knowledge of the Rear, because the bad Disposition of the interior part of the Camp, occasion'd by the want of Communication between the Right and Left of the second Line, afforded all the Advantage to Marshal *Villeroy*, in the Disposition he might have formed for his Attack; the principal Effort of which was in his own Election.

In 1701, if the Marshal de *Catinat* had been perfectly acquainted with the Country between the *Adige* and the *Po*; he would

would not have separated his Forces so much as he did, nor have exposed the King's Army to the Danger of being defeated in distinct Bodies, which had like to have been the Event of the Battle of *Carpi*.

In the Year 1704, if the Elector of *Bavaria*, and the Marshal *de Marfin*, had known all the Advantages they might have derived from the Situation of *Ulm*, after the fatal Battle of *Hochstet*, they would not have abandon'd it as they did; for they might have been join'd by the Army of Marshal *Villeroy*, in case the Enemy should have had any Intention to advance into *Bavaria*, after their Victory; and they would have been in a Condition to have supported themselves in *Germany*, at least in the Country about *Ulm*, and to have re-established the King's Affairs on this side of the *Rhine*, and even to the *Necker*. The Knowledge of the Country had induced the Elector of *Bavaria*, in consequence of the general Plan of the War in *Germany*, to make himself Master of *Ulm*: This Post, therefore, ought to have been maintain'd, since the Con-juncture for deriving Advantage from it, was then presented.

In the Year 1706, if the Marshal *de Villeroy* would have made a proper Advantage of his Knowledge of *Ramillies*, he might, without any Hesitation, have unguarded his
Left,

Left to re-inforce his Right, since he saw the Enemy unguard their Right to make their principal Effort on their Left. This General, who in reality only lost the Field of Battle at *Ramillies*, might have made an advantageous use of *Louvain*, and the Trenches on the *Dile*, the *Scheld*, and the *Lys*. All these Countries, and important Posts, were sufficiently known, but he wanted the necessary Tranquillity and Presence of Mind, to recollect the Advantages they were capable of affording him.

If, in the same Year, M. *de la Feuillade* had been better acquainted with the Plain of *Piedmont*, and the Foot of the *Alps*, he would not have amused himself, for two Months, in useless Excursions after the Duke of *Savoy*, who retired with his Cavalry from *Turin*: and when he had pursued that Prince to the Entrance of the Valley of *Lucern*, he would not have been so imprudent, as to have sent Advice to the King, that he had shut up the Enemy and his Cavalry in a Country, from whence it was impossible for them to escape; and he would have known that all the Vallies which extend to *Piedmont*, have several Communications with the neighbouring Vallies, and consequently that the Duke of *Savoy* might retreat from the Valley of *Lucern*; either to the Right or Left, in the manner as
would

would most easily disengage him from M. *de la Feuillade* who was then in his Front.

If Messieurs *de Marsine* and *Feuillade* had only known the Country adjacent to *Turin*, they would have been sensible, that as they were desirous that the Duke of *Orleans* should wait for the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*, in the Lines of *Turin*, they consequently left it in the Enemy's Power to choose their Ground, for attacking the Lines on either side of the *Doria*; and therefore that the side next to *Chivasso*, ought to have had as good Lines as the rest of the Camp. And yet these two Generals, for want of knowing the Country, never imagined that it was practicable for the Enemy to make any Attempt on the Quarter of *Balon*, and to pass the *Doria*, at so little a Distance from our Army. And yet they might naturally have entertain'd such a Thought, since they were shut up in their Lines of Circumvallation. The same Unacquaintedness with the Country, still induced M. *de la Feuillade* to advise the Duke of *Orleans* who was wounded, to march his Army to *Pignerol*, where they could not be supplied with any Subsistence, either for the Soldiers, or their Horses, instead of repassing the *Po*, on the Bridges we had above the Camp.

In the Year 1707, if Marshal *de Tessé*, after he had been unwilling to act against the Duke

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Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*, when they abandoned' the Enterprize of *Toulon*, had known *Piedmont*, and the Facility with which the Duke of *Savoy* could obstruct the March of the Infantry in the Plain, as soon as he had enter'd it, this General would have immediately dispatched all the Infantry from *Provence*, to cover the *Pragilas*, and *Susa*, which, by this Expedient, would have been sufficiently secured. And tho', on this occasion, we may justly blame the Marshal *de Tessé*, for not calculating the number of Days that the Duke of *Savoy* would employ, in accomplishing this March from *Toulon* to *Susa*, in consequence of that Knowledge he ought to have of the Country; yet I am more inclinable to ascribe this gross Error to a presumptuous Ignorance, than to any want of such a Calculation, which was made for him, by all the Officers of his Army, and with which it was impossible for him to be acquainted.

In the Year 1708, if the Duke of *Vendôme* had been more acquainted with *Flanders*, he would have been sensible, that in order to preserve an entire Superiority over the Enemy through the whole Campaign, it should have been his capital Endeavour to have secured a Conjunction with Marshal *Berwick*, before Prince *Eugene* could be in a Condition to join the Duke of *Marlborough*; tho' that

Prince, when he left the *Rhine* had the Advantage of the Duke of *Berwick*, by several Marches. The Duke of *Vendôme* therefore, had he known the Country, should have concerted such a Motion as would have constantly detained the Duke of *Marlbrough* between *Louvain* and *Brussels*, and compelled Prince *Eugene* to have attempted his Conjunction with that General behind the *Demer*. By which means the Duke of *Vendôme* would have render'd all those Marches ineffectual, which Prince *Eugene* had gain'd upon Marshal *Berwick*, who might have then join'd the Duke of *Vendôme*, before Prince *Eugene* could have effected his Conjunction with the Duke of *Marlbrough*.

This was a capital Defect, in a Motion, which the Knowledge of the Country ought to have convinced the Duke of *Vendôme* would have been effectual, to accomplish this Junction with Marshal *Berwick*, before that of Prince *Eugene*, and consequently would have given the Duke of *Vendôme* so great a Superiority over the Duke of *Marlbrough*, that it would have been impossible for the latter to have quitted his Station between *Louvain* and *Brussels*. If the Duke of *Marlbrough* had intended to pass the *Demer*, to meet Prince *Eugene*, he would equally have abandon'd *Brussels* and *Louvain*: And if he had retreated behind the *Senne*, he must

have abandon'd *Louvain* and *Malines*, and his Conjunction with Prince *Eugene* would have been render'd impracticable. It is certain therefore, that if the Duke of *Vendôme* had marched to *Genap*, instead of advancing to *Ghent*, he would have retarded the Conjunction of Prince *Eugene* with the Duke of *Marlborough*, long enough to have been join'd himself by Marshal *Berwick*.

If the Duke of *Vendôme* had gain'd a better Idea of *Flanders*, when he was no longer in a Condition to be join'd by Marshal *Berwick*, before the Conjunction of Prince *Eugene* with the Duke of *Marlborough*, it would only have been incumbent on him to have continued near the *Dender*, in order to form the Siege of *Oudenard*, after the taking of *Ghent*. If he had even past the *Scheld*, as soon as possible, he might have advanced so near to *Oudenard*, that if the Enemies, after their Conjunction, had endeavoured, with all their Forces, to have prevented him from forming the Siege of that Place, they at least would have been unable to make their Approaches to attack him, or to throw Bridges over the *Scheld*, before him, while he was posted on the Banks of that River. If the Duke of *Vendôme* had made this Motion, which a sufficient Knowledge of the Country would have pointed out to him, he would have preserved the Conquest of *Ghent*
and

and *Bruges*; and might have form'd the Siege of *Menin*, in his Rear, without any possible Opposition from the Enemy, and consequently might have saved *Lisle*, without being apprehensive of *Namur*, or *Charleroy*, during the Siege of *Menin*; because the Enemy, by withdrawing to a Distance, would have left *Brussels* defenceless.

If the Duke of *Vendôme* had been more acquainted with the Country adjacent to *Oudenard*, he would not have hazarded an Engagement with only a Front of Infantry and a Brigade, against a Body of Infantry of whose Number he was uncertain, and which the Wood-land Country entirely conceal'd from his View. In a Word, if the Duke of *Vendôme* had sufficiently known *Flanders*, and the fertile Country that surrounds *Lisle*, he would never have entertain'd a Thought of starving his Enemies, in their Siege of that Place, by enclosing them in that great Circle by which he fancy'd he should confine them; and he would have concluded, that as he was inferior to the Enemy, in every particular, they were able to force their way, by any Quarter they should judge proper.

If the Count *de la Motte* had known the Country, in which he commanded for the space of 15 or 16 Years, he might easily have made a more advantageous Use of the

considerable Body of Troops that obeyed his Orders, and might have prevented the Enemy, from receiving their Convoys from *Ostend*, for the Siege of *Lisle*, and would not have sustain'd so unseasonable a Defeat at *Winendal*, for want of knowing a Country in which he had continued for so many Years.

In 1709, Marshal *Villars* derived all possible Advantages from his Knowledge of *Artois*, in order to prevent the Enemy from penetrating into that Province, and advancing from the Maritime Parts. He can never be too much applauded for his general Disposition, to elude so great an Inconvenience. But his particular Disposition, to receive the Enemy at *Malplaquet*, was not so good. The Infantry of his Left, who were posted along the Wood of *Sars*, were too much extended, since they could not be sustain'd by the second Line, and might be inclosed by the Enemy's Right, that attacked the Troops to our Left, who did not even see the Enemy's Disposition for that Action, because their Motions were concealed by the Projections which the Wood form'd, above the Extremity to the Left of our Infantry of the first Line, and our Center was too far advanced in the hollow Way. I have made my self acquainted with these Particulars from the most exact Plan, and am very

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certain, that it would have been most prudent in us, to have continued our whole Army on the hither side of the Hollow, the Front of which might have been possessed by several Lines, form'd by a Deflection of the Right and Left to the Woods of *Sars* and *Sanfars*, which would have enabled those two Wings to have charged the Enemy in Flank, with the greater Facility, when they should advance from the Hollow to attack our Front, in case they would have ventur'd on such an Action; which I am not inclinable to believe. If Marshal *Villars*, even upon his Arrival on the Ninth at the Camp of *Malplaquet*, had known the Country beyond the Hollow, I am persuaded he would that very Day have attacked the Front of the Enemies, who made their Appearance on the other side of that Hollow; and would have endeavoured to have formed his Army in Order of Battle, by leaving the Hollow in the Rear of his Camp: And this Disposition alone, would have prevented the Enemy from attempting the Siege of *Mons*.

C H A P. XI.

Of the manner of Assembling an Army.

I Have only observed three considerable Errors in the manner of assembling an Army which is to act Offensively.

The first was committed in the Year 1667, when the King assembled his Army near *Amiens*.

It was then too remote from the first Object of the Action proposed, which was that of *Charleroy*. And the first March of a new Army should never be too long, without an absolute Necessity, because it creates an immoderate Fatigue to the Men and Horses, who are taken from a State of Repose; and less Service will be render'd to the Army, in the Articles of Baggage, Provisions, and the Artillery, for the remainder of the Campaign. If the King's Forces had assembled towards *Château Cambresis*, they would have given the *Spaniards* as many different Attentions, and would have been less harrassed than they were, when they arrived at *Charleroy*, where they were obliged to continue too long for an Army that was to act Offensively, and whose first Motion,

Motion, according to the true Maxims of an Offensive War, should contribute, as soon as possible, to the Execution of the intended Expedition.

The second Error was committed by M. *de Catinat*, at the Beginning of the War in *Piedmont*, in the Year 1690, and it was much more considerable than the other, which I have now described. The King's Army made equal Advances through the Valley of *Susa*, and through *Pignerol*; and the Duke of *Savoy's* Troops were, at that time, distributed along the Frontiers of his Dominions. In order therefore to have opened the War to Advantage with the Offensive, it would have been judicious to have drawn the Army together, in a good Country, from whence they might have prevented the Duke of *Savoy's* Troops from assembling to cover *Turin*; and where they might have enjoyed a long and commodious Subsistence. All these Advantages were to be obtain'd in the Plain of *Millefleurs*, near *Turin*; which was at an equal Distance from the two Out-lets of the Valley of *Susa*, and of *Pignerol*. This manner of Assembling the King's Army, would have secured the Superiority, through the whole Course of the Campaign, and would have immediately conducted the Troops to the great Object of the Expedition, which was *Tu-*

rin: But instead of pursuing this Method, *M. de Catinat* quitted the Valley of *Susa*, where he was then posted with part of his Army; after which he only gave his Troops a transient View of *Turin*, and then encamped at *Macel*, where he continued for several Days.

By this Misconduct in assembling his Army at the Opening of a War, which the Duke of *Savoy* would have been incapable of sustaining, had it been judiciously commenced, *M. de Catinat* gave that Prince sufficient Time to bring his Forces together near *Turin*, and to be join'd by the *Spaniards*, who advanced, from the *Milaneſe*, to his Assistance, with all the Troops they could draw from that State. The War therefore, of *Piedmont*, which, at the time of its Declaration, might have been Offensive, as it really ought on our part, immediately declined into a War between equal Powers, by this sole Misconduct in Assembling the Army.

The third Error was still committed by *M. de Catinat*, in 1701, when he assembled the King's Army on this side of the *Adige*. I know it has been alledged in his Vindication, that he was restrain'd, by the Orders of the Court, from advancing into the Territories of the Republic of *Venice*, on the other side of the *Adige*; but surely the Court

Court can never be introduced to palliate this capital Error, since it ought to have been known, that the immediate Advance of the King's Army to the Defiles of *Tirol*, and the *Trentine*, would have made it impracticable for Prince *Eugene* to have marched his Army, in a Body, through those Defiles, to attack M. *de Catinat*, who was posted very advantageously at the Out-lets, and that Prince would have been equally incapable of subsisting his Cavalry in a Plain, of which he was not the Master.

C H A P. XII.

Of Marches.

I Have represented, in my Maxims, all the different Manners of marching an Army; my Reflections therefore will be confined to the Particulars I have seen executed by the Generals, and of which I shall form such a Judgment as will correspond with the Maxims I have established.

At the close of the Year 1673, when M. *de Luxembourg* had, by the King's Orders, abandoned all the Conquests in *Holland*, through their whole Extent to the *Maes*, and had approached *Maestricht*, with a Body

dy of Troops, which he was re-conducting to *France*; he was sensible that the Prince of *Orange* was encamped on the great Cawsey, with all the *Dutch* and *Spanish* Forces, and that he had even been join'd by a considerable Body of the Emperor's Cavalry. The Enemy, therefore, was much superior in Cavalry, and it would not have been prudent in M. de *Luxembourg*, to have hazarded an Engagement, in such an open Country, and with the few Cavalry he then had. The Marshal de *Schomberg* had drawn together a Body of Cavalry near *Charleroy*, in order to advance to M. de *Luxembourg*, but how these Generals should be able to join, without being incommoded by the Prince of *Orange*, who was posted between them, was the great Difficulty.

It was necessary therefore, to deceive the Enemy, in this Conjunction, by false Motions that should be capable of procuring sufficient time to effect the Conjunction of M. de *Schomberg's* Cavalry with the Infantry of M. de *Luxembourg*, without any Danger. To accomplish this Intention, M. de *Luxembourg* made a Feint as if he had no Design to enter *France* by *Charleroy*, but was determined to march through *Condros* and the *Ardennies*, to arrive at the *Maes*. These Appearances induced the Prince of *Orange* to change his Situation. He accordingly ad-

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advanced to *Huy* and *Namur*, and *M. de Luxembourg* took that Opportunity to pass the *Maes*, very suddenly, at *Maastricht*, and to form a Conjunction, near *Tongeren*, with *M. de Schomberg*, who had advanced with that Design. So that these two Generals join'd their Forces, notwithstanding all the Precautions of the Prince of *Orange*.

This Example makes it evident that the good Conduct of a General, in his March, always enables him to make it fortunate, and to accomplish the Design for which he had Recourse to that Motion.

The admirable March which *M. de Montecuculi* performed, some Months before that which I have been describing, and by which he advanced, by *Wirtzburg*, to the Lower *Rhine*, to give the Prince of *Orange* an Opportunity of forming the Siege of *Bonn*, and procuring a Conjunction of the *Imperial* and *Dutch* Troops, having been already described, when I mention'd the Surprisal of the Convoy of *Wirtzburg*, I shall not repeat the Particulars here.

The Year 1674, will furnish me with several Instances of fine Marches.

The first was that which *M. de Turenne* perform'd, when he quitted the Upper *Alsatia*, where he was posted with part of his Army to secure the Conquests in the *Franche-Comté*, and defeated a Body of Troops which

the Enemy had Affembled at *Sintzheim*, between *Philipsbourg* and *Hailbron*. The Preparations for this long March were compleated with so much Judgment and Privacy, by *M. de Turenne*, who caused the Troops to advance successively in their Rout to *Philipsbourg*, that the Enemies were attacked and defeated, without any previous Intelligence of the Motions this General had form'd, to render his March the more expeditious.

The second extraordinary March was that which the Prince of *Conde* caused the King's Army to perform, when he quitted the Camp of *Espiers* to relieve *Oudenard*, that was besieged by the Prince of *Orange*. The Troops having not been able to arrive soon enough, to be posted on the Heights above the Line of Circumvallation, the Prince of *Conde* would not permit them to approach that Quarter, that they might not alarm the Enemy, nor cause them to entertain the least Thought of quitting their Line, to possess those Heights, which would greatly have obstructed his intended Succour. This Prince, therefore, employed the whole Night, in making the necessary Dispositions to possess those Eminences by break of Day; but a very thick Fog, which cover'd the Earth, a little before Morning, conceal'd the Retreat of the Enemy's Army from his Observation,

servation, and deprived him of the Fruit of his noble Motions, which he could not even improve against the Enemy's Rear-Guard, because M. *deSouches*, who commanded the Emperor's Troops, made the nature of the Country subservient to his Advantage, in so judicious a manner, that he formed the *Imperial* Cavalry in order of Battle, on a Eminence that rose in the Rear of the King's Forces, and from which they were only separated by a little Rivulet that flow'd between the two Heights. This Counter-march of an Army that seem'd to retreat, in order to avoid an Engagement, was form'd with so much Capacity, that the Prince of *Condé* durst not make any Attempt upon their Rear-Guard, because he could not advance to them, without exposing the Flank of his Troops to M. *de Souches*.

The third fine March in this Campaign, was that which M. *de Turenne* caused the King's Army to make, at the end of the Month of *December*, when that General quitted the Winter Quarters which he made a Feint to secure for his Army in *Lorrain*, in order to pour his Forces, through *Jannes* and *Bedfort*, upon the Quarters, which the Enemy's Army, that was infinitely superior to his own, expected to enjoy, with Tranquillity, in the Upper *Alsace*; and which he compelled them to abandon, after several
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Encounters, and obliged them to retire to others on the opposite side of the *Rhine*.

As the Quarters which *M. de Turenne's* Army possessed, were very distant from each other, but, at the same time, near the Foot of the Mountains that rise between *Alsatia* and *Lorrain*, this great General had dispatcht Orders to all the Troops in those Quarters, to march, as if their Intentions were only to extend themselves for their more commodious Subsistence, or in Order to possess themselves of Winter Quarters in the *Franche-Comté*, and to cover that newly conquer'd Province, which was too near the Quarters where the Enemies were posted in the Upper *Alsatia*. All these Routs, which *M. de Turenne* had caused his Troops to take, ended over against the Passages by which he intended to re-enter *Alsatia*. All the Troops, therefore, insensibly found themselves at the two general Rendezvouzes of *Jannes* and *Bedfort*, and from thence they advanced into the Upper *Alsatia*, to fall upon the different Quarters of the Enemies, who were all attacked, at the same time, without having any Intelligence of the general Motion of *M. de Turenne's* Army.

This Example will tend to make it evident, that it is always necessary to be attentive to the least Motions which an able General causes his Troops to form, because
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the Enemy ought to rest perswaded, that he never orders such as are insignificant, and that they always conceal some Design, and correspond with its Execution.

In the Year 1676, the Marshal *de Schomberg* perform'd a very noble March, in order to retreat from the Prince of *Orange*, after he had caused him to raise the Siege of *Maestricht*. He was much weaker than the Prince, who was desirous to attack him; but he had that Ability to conduct his Motions, and cover his Troops with the *Jaker*, that he, afterwards, advanced into the *Meubaign*, and took *Charleroy*, after he had made it impossible for the Prince of *Orange* to engage him in any Action, as sollicitous as he was to accomplish that Event.

In the Year 1677, all the Motions and Marches of the Marshal *de Crequi*, before the Duke of *Lorraine*, were judicious and extraordinary. The Marshal never lost Sight of his Enemy, for four Months; he always confronted him in all the Motions he had an Inclination to form, either to enter *Lorraine*, on the side of the *Saar*, or to pass the *Maes* near *Mouzon*; and yet not one of those bold Motions, which the Marshal *de Crequi* caused his Army to make, ever gave the Duke of *Lorraine* an Opportunity to attack him; because the Marshal, who had determined to decline a general Engagement, so judiciously

judiciously compleated even the least of his Motions, that he always made it impossible for this Prince to attack him, with any probability of Success.

I have not laid down any Precepts, in my Military Memoirs, for the Regulation of a General's Conduct, when he is charged with a Project of this Nature, because it would be impossible to offer any Particulars on that Subject, that would have the Effect of a general Maxim. However, all that was transacted by the Marshal *de Crequi*, in the Course of this Campaign, may be said to have had its Regulation, in my Discourse on the different Objects that may occasion the March of an Army. It is certain that all the Marches of the Marshal *de Crequi*, comprehend some Particulars of those Precepts and Attentions, by which a General ought to be conducted; when he causes his Army to march, and are to be differently applied, according to the particular Constitution of those Countries where he is obliged to oppose himself to the Motions of his Enemy.

I shall finish my Reflections on Marches, with that which M. *de Luxembourg* performed in 1694. In this Campaign, he commanded the King's Army in *Flanders*, under *Dauphine*. The Army was encamped at *Vignamont* and *Huy*, with the *Maes* in
their

their Rear. The Enemy's Forces were encamped at *Taviers*, with their Right supported by the *Mebaign*; and it appears, by these two Dispositions, that after the Forrage of that Country had been equally consumed by both Armies, the Enemy being no longer apprehensive for *Liege*, could have no other Intention than to finish their Campaign in *Flanders*, by making themselves Master of *Courtray*, before it could be possessed by our Troops; and by that Motion, to secure the Forrage between the *Lys* and the *Scheld*, and establish Winter Quarters, in the Post of *Courtray*, for a considerable Body of Troops.

The Prince of *Orange* believed this Motion to be very practicable, because he had the Advantage of at least three or four Marches, over the King's Forces: And yet M. de *Luxembourg*, who was perpetually attentive to the Enemy's Motions, made all the necessary Dispositions for a vigorous March, the Moment the Enemy began theirs. With this View, he order'd some Brigades of Cavalry to advance to the Height of the *Bussiere*, some Days before the Enemy were in Motion, with a Pretext to cover the Country between the *Sambre* and the *Maes*, from the Inroads of the Enemy, and caused all his Army to move with so much Expedition, when they began their March, that the Van-guard

arrived at the Eminence on the *Scheld*, a few Hours before the Front of the Enemy's Army. This Advance sufficiently enabled him to prevent the Prince of *Orange* from throwing Bridges over the *Scheld*, and to compel him to pass that River at *Oudenard*, and the *Lys*, near *Ghent*, in order to finish his Campaign at *Rouffelaer*; without being able to make *M. de Luxembourg* incapable of subsisting his Army, for the remainder of the Campaign, at the Expence of the *Castellany* of *Courtray*, and of the *Spaniards*, and even on the other side of the *Lys*.

All those Instances of extraordinary Marches, which ended with this Year, are a sufficient Proof of their advantageous Influence on the fortunate Events they produced, and discover the great Difference of Capacity between the Generals who then form'd them, and those whom the King has employed from that time, since not one of the latter have furnished a single Instance of a March that ought to be imitated.

C H A P. XIII.

Of Encampments.

THO' this Subject is very extensive in my Maxims, yet my Reflections upon it shall be but short, because the Science of Camps, relates more peculiarly to a Defensive War, or to a War between equal Powers, than to one than is Offensive; in which the Superiority frequently inspires those Ardours that would be prejudicial to any Army whose Province is to sustain the Defensive, or a War between equal Powers. I shall therefore find, at least to the time of this present War, more Camps form'd in contradiction to the Rules, by the Enemy's Generals, than by those who, till these latter times, commanded the Armies of the King of *France*; and who always preserved, in the Camps they form'd, that intrepid Conduct which creates the Superiority; even where their Forces were very unequal, in Number, to their Enemies who opposed them. I shall therefore distinguish these Reflections, in order to shew the Difference between Camps that are ill formed, either with respect to the Ground possessed by the Army,

or the Inconveniences that have ensued from an injudicious Encampment.

The first hazardous Camp which I have seen our Enemies form, when they were grown presumptuous by their Superiority, was that of *Seneffe*. But the Prince of *Condé* found means to chastise them, when they quitted that Post, and, by this Conduct, changed the Constitution of the War, to the Advantage of his Majesty.

It will be necessary to distinguish this Camp, from the others that I have seen defective, and which were render'd so, by the natural Situation of the Land. This Camp was not ill chosen, with respect to the Ground the Enemy possessed; but it was so injudiciously disposed, that when they withdrew from it, they marched with their Flank expos'd to a vigilant and experienced Enemy, who was posted in such a manner, as to be able to attack them with Advantage. As I have elsewhere represented the Precautions an Enemy ought to take, in order to avoid the Inconvenience, he may happen to sustain, it will be unnecessary to repeat them here; and therefore I shall only observe, that a Camp should always be disposed in such a manner, that the station'd Army may perform all their Motions with Freedom; or otherwise they will be obnoxious to great Inconveniences, especially

specially when they are posted near an Enemy.

The same Year 1694, furnishes me with an Opportunity of comparing this Camp of *Seneffe*, with that which Marshal *de Turenne* had form'd at *Marli*. This General was infinitely inferior, in Numbers, to the Elector of *Brandenburg*, who determin'd to oblige him either to abandon *Alsatia*, or sustain an Engagement to a Disadvantage; but Marshal *de Turenne* would submit to neither of these Alternatives. His extraordinary Capacity suggested to him, the Means of contesting *Alsatia*, by very bold Appearances, tho' they never exposed him to any Encounter; because he always posted himself in such a manner, that after he had made proper Dispositions for a Retreat to a new Situation, without any Apprehensions of being attacked in his March; he seem'd to prepare for an Engagement that Day, with such an Air of Intrepidity, that the Elector defer'd the Action till next Morning, This was an Interval of Time that Marshal *de Turenne* was determined to improve, and he accordingly made his Retreat, in the Night, to another advantageous Post. And thus he never resign'd to the Elector, any part of the Country, but what was already exhausted; and by this manner of disputing the Low Lands with that Prince, tho' he was

much inferior in Troops, yet he gain'd sufficient time to make it impossible for the Elector to form any Attempt against the Territories of his Majesty; which he would infallibly have done, had not Marshal *de Turenne* amused him in a manner for which he had sufficient Abilities, and caused him to lose all the remaining Season of the Campaign which he might have improved.

This Example makes it evident, that an able General can derive Advantage from those Hours and Moments that are offer'd him by an Enemy of an inferior Capacity; and that, in process of time, those repeated Moments and Hours will afford him an Opportunity, from whence he will derive great Advantages for his Sovereign.

The second Camp, which appear'd hazardous, was that which I saw Marshal *de Turenne* form in the Year 1675. This General was encamped near the *Rancken*, which separated him from the Enemy's Army commanded by Monsieur *de Montecuculi*. Marshal *de Turenne* would compel the Enemy to abandon the Country that extends between the *Rhine*, and the Mountains of *Wirtemberg*; but they were posted in such a manner, that he could not accomplish his Intention by an Engagement; and was therefore obliged to have recourse to some Expedient, to make them quit their advanta-

geous Post. If M. *de Turenne* had attempted this Dislodgment, by remarching up the *Rancken*, he would have been followed by M. *de Montecuculi*, who was too near, to be unacquainted with that Motion, and consequently it could not have tended to the Execution of his Project. It was necessary therefore to elude the Vigilance of M. *de Montecuculi*, by a secret March, which, for a short time at least, would leave that General in a state of Incertainty, with respect to that Motion.

Marshal *de Turenne*, therefore, detached the Count *du Plessis*, with all the second Line, with Orders to advance through the *Morass* which the Enemy possessed, and to encamp on their Left. This Motion seem'd perfectly hazardous to the whole Army, and would have been so in Reality, if Marshal *de Turenne*, who was encamped in Sight of the Enemy, had not made the necessary Dispositions to conceal the March of the second Line; and he succeeded so well, that M. *de Montecuculi* took the Arrival of the second Line, on the other side of the *Rancken*, for a great Detachment from the Army, as he saw all their Tents were struck. But as M. *de Turenne* rightly judged, that the Incertainty, into which M. *de Montecuculi* was cast by this Motion, would continue but a few Hours, after which the second Line would

sustain the Risque of being overwhelmed by the Enemy's whole Army; this expert General marched, himself, as soon as the Approach of Night conceal'd, from the Enemy, the Decampment of all his first Line, which he join'd to the second, so very judiciously, that the Enemy were equally unacquainted with this second Motion; and he had advanced to the Rear of the Camp of *M. du Plessis*, at the Instant when the Duke of *Lorraine* began to attack the Guards, with part of the Enemy's Army. But when this Prince was informed, by some Prisoners, at the Beginning of the Engagement, that Marshal *de Turenne* was arrived with the rest of his Army, he immediately began to think of a Retreat, which, however, he was unable to accomplish, without a considerable Loss.

It appears, by this Instance, that those Camps which, to common Eyes, seemed to be form'd in the most hazardous manner, can be render'd very safe, by the wise Precautions and Capacity of a General, when he only employs part of his Army; because he will make a proper Judgment of the time when he ought to arrive there with the rest of his Troops, as well as of that Space of time, during which his second Motion may be reasonably supposed to be concealed from the Enemy.

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In the Year 1692, the Administrator of *Wirtemberg* thought himself in a Condition to post his Army near our Troops, who were then at *Phortzheim*. This Prince had marched a Body of five Thousand Horfe, to cover *Wirtemberg*, and was encamped with his Left near *Entzwahingen*; his whole Front was covered by a Rivulet that was very marshy, and his Right was supported by a Village on the Rivulet, in which he had posted a Party of Dragoons. He imagined himself very secure in this Situation, or at least, that he should have time to decamp, and either retire to *Hailbron*, or else pass the *Entz*, in case he should be pursued by the King's whole Army. But he happen'd to be defeated in his Camp, because the Rivulet was practicable above his Right, which enabled our Cavalry to assault him in Flank.

I have related this Fact, to make it evident to all those Officers, who shall happen to be charged with a Body of Horfe, to form their Observations near an Enemy's Army, that they never ought to pitch their Camp, because it requires too much time to raise it, when an Army of superior Force advances to attack this Body, and that they should always be in a condition to raise the Pickets, when a more numerous Body marches against them; because what
favour-

favourable Opinion soever they may entertain of the Post where they have station'd their Front, if the Extent of it be exceeded by that of the Enemy, they may be easily assaulted in Flank; and then it will be impossible for them to accomplish an honourable Retreat, and their only Security will consist in an ignominious Flight.

In the Year 1693, the Prince of *Orange* having form'd his Camp at *Nerwinden*, imagined that Post to be so advantageous, that he waited there for *M. de Luxembourg*, who advanced to attack him. The *Geet* form'd the Right of this Camp, the Rivulet of *Landen* the Left, the Front of the Right was cover'd by a thick Hedge, which extended very near to the *Geet*, and was continued to the Village of *Norwinden*, which was in the Center of the Front of the Camp. Behind the Village was an Eminence, which sloped to the Village of *Romsdorph*, that was seated on the Bank of the Rivulet of *Landen*. There was also a Hollow Way, which extended from that Eminence to the Village of *Romsdorph*. The Prince of *Orange* was persuaded that this Front might easily be render'd impregnable, and with that View, during the Night that preceded the Battle, he intrenched the Village of *Nerwinden*, where he posted a great Body of Infantry. He likewise planted several Pieces of Cannon

Cannon on the Eminence that commanded the Village, and cover'd the Left of his Army; and drew up the rest of his first Line of Infantry behind, and along that River which flows from the Eminence, to the Village of *Romsdorph*, and in this Village he likewise posted a Party of Infantry.

The Prince of *Orange* was perswaded, that after the fatiguing March, our Infantry had sustain'd, M. de *Luxembourg* would not presume, immediately upon their Arrival, to attack a Front that was so well prepared to receive him. It was however very inconsiderate in this Prince, to hazard a general Action, after he had drawn off, from his Army, the Body of Troops he sent to *Flanders*, under the Command of the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, and had likewise weaken'd it by another Detachment, to reinforce the intrenched Camp at *Liege*; but the seeming Security of his Post prevailed over his Prudence, at that Conjunction. He had more than sufficient time to pass the *Geet*, in the Rear of his Camp, and to secure himself, by that Motion, from the Possibility of a general Engagement; but he had no Inclination to improve that Opportunity. He imagin'd he should destroy all the Infantry of M. de *Luxembourg's* Army, when they attacked the Village of *Nerwinden*, and his intrenched Front, which, however, was
forced

forced after a long Defence, and cost him the greatest part of his Infantry, with a great Number of his Cavalry and all his Artillery.

I shall make my particular Reflections on this great Action, when I treat of Battles, and confine my self, at present, to what relates to the Science of Camps. This of *Nerwinden* had its Front, in the manner I have described, and might seem to be a safe Situation to a Man of a moderate Capacity, who imagines the Security of the Front, and Wings, more than sufficient to procure him the Advantage of destroying his Enemy's Infantry, in their Attack of that Front: But I shall now point out the Defects of that Post. It was so streighten'd, in Ground, by a *Morass*, which border'd an Angle of the *Geet*, in the Rear of the Camp, that the Cavalry were drawn up in four or five Lines, which were crowded to such a Degree, as deprived them of a sufficient space of Ground for the Performance of their Motions: And even these Lines were form'd too remote from the Hedge, that extended from the *Geet* to *Nerwinden*, as I have already observed; nor were they supported by any Infantry, posted along the Hedge, to prevent our Cavalry from making their Approaches, and forcing themselves an Opening. As their Center likewise was as much contracted, in Ground, as the Right,
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it was impossible to place a Line of Cavalry there, to sustain the Infantry, in case they should happen to be dislodged from the Village of *Nerwinden*, and the intrenched Front. The Left Wing of Cavalry, which could not extend into a Front, and wanted Ground to enable them to form a Line behind the Infantry, threw themselves into the Figure of the Greek Letter Π , forming a useless Front to the Rivulet of *Landen*, and only ranged to the Right Flank of the Infantry. So that when the Infantry of the King's Army, had made themselves Masters of the Village of *Nerwinden*, and the Light-Horse had forced the Entrenchment, in that part where the Carriages of the Artillery were disposed, to shut up the Entrance; whether it was that the Enemy had not sufficient time to throw up a proper Entrenchment, or that the Prince of *Orange* intended to pour his Cavalry, thro' this Opening, upon the *French* Infantry, when they should be thrown into Disorder by the great Fire of his Artillery, and the Infantry who were posted in *Nerwinden*, and along the entrenched Front, is uncertain. And when the Infantry, to the Right of the King's Army, attacked, at the same time, the Village of *Romsdorpb*, and the Front of the Left, the Disorder that was diffused through the Enemy's whole Front, where

where they were streighten'd in Ground, as I have already observed, became so general, that it was impossible for the Prince of *Orange* to charge the King's Troops, or at least not with a Body considerable enough to repulse them. This Prince therefore, was obliged to have recourse to Flight, with those Troops of his Cavalry, who had not shared the Engagement, and were form'd into the Figure Π on his Left; for those on his Right, who, as I intimated before, were drawn up in several crowded Lines, entirely perished in the *Geet*, into which they were driven by the Cavalry of our Left; and all the Infantry of the Enemy's first Line, were either killed or taken.

It is evident, from this Example, that tho' a Camp may be good, and well intrenched in Front, and may even have its Wings cover'd and supported, those Circumstances alone, are not sufficient to render it secure and compleat; especially when the Troops encamped are in Expectation of an Enemy who determines to attack them; but that it ought likewise to comprehend a sufficient Tract of Ground, that all the Motions necessary to the Defence of the entrenched Front, may be performed without the least Obstruction. And that even a Field of Battle should be reserved within the Circuit of the Camp, together with a proper extent of Ground,

Ground, for the March of the whole Line of the Front, to charge the Enemy who were unable to force the Entrenchment, without sustaining some Disorder; and to prevent them from having time to form themselves within, the Front they have forced; and this inferior extent of Ground should be spacious enough, to enable those Troops who have been forced from their Entrenchments, to rally and form themselves anew.

I have seen our Enemies form several other defective Camps, and especially in the Campaign of 1695, but as they were not chastised by their Adversaries, for their Inconsideration, and as I have already bestowed some Observations upon them, in another place, I shall not make any mention of them here.

As I have not served in the present War, which commenced in the Year 1701, I can only form my Reflections on the Article of Camps, from the Relations I have heard, and from which it appears that our Enemies have formed several Camps, of which the Generals, under whom I served, would have given them sufficient cause to repent. But the Duke of *Orleans* shew'd me the Plan of one Camp, form'd by that Prince in *Catalonia*, and which at my first Inspection seem'd very hazardous, and contrary to
good

good Rules; but I afterwards found it judiciously plan'd, when his Royal Highness explain'd to me the particular Reasons for its Construction.

This Prince was obliged to receive his Supplies of Bread from *Balaguer*, and was under a Necessity of continuing within such a Distance of that Place, as might render it practicable for the Convoys to be transmitted to him in one Day, because he wanted proper Carriages for the Conveyance of the Provisions, to a Situation more remote. It was likewise incumbent on him to distribute the Subsistence for the Cavalry, with as much Frugality as possible, that he might remain in that Post, longer than the Enemy could be in a condition to continue near him.

M. de *Staremburg* was encamped at *Scio*, three Leagues above the Camp, which the Duke of *Orleans* resolved to form, for the two Reasons I have already mention'd. It was necessary, therefore, the Army should be supplied with Water from the *Scio*, and with Forrage from the Country on each side of that River, and that the Convoys should be protected.

The Duke of *Orleans*, in Order to secure all these Advantages, determined to have the River between his two Lines, and to form a Front to two Plains, for the equal
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Conveniency of his Convoys and Troops. With this View, he posted the Right of his first Line, at a Village on a little Eminence, and when he had render'd that Village commodious for his purpose, he placed in it a Brigade of Infantry, and disposed the Left of his second Line, in a Situation opposite to that Village, where there was a stone Bridge: He likewise laid two Bridges over that River for each Battalion, and as many for each Squadron, that the two Lines might have a Communication from the Rear of their Camps. It appears, by this Disposition, that the Army only presented to the Enemy, the Right Flank of their first Line, and the Left Flank of their second.

If the Duke of *Orleans* had been obliged to receive the Enemy in this Disposition, without any Possibility of changing it, the Defects of it would have been very considerable, but he wisely provided against all Inconveniences of that Nature, by securing a Field of Battle that was equally extended on both sides of the River. He made the Village on the Right side, form a kind of Point to his Right and Left; and found means by the Disposition of the Country, and the Communications he procured, to have this Village on the Right of his Front, in case the Enemy should advance to him on one side of the River, and on the Left of

the same Front, should they happen to approach him on the other side of that River. By which Expedient, the two Flanks of the Right and Left of the first and second Line being equally covered and protected, it is evident that this Prince could not want time to secure himself a Field of Battle, by a kind of Quarter Wheeling of those Extremities of the Lines that were remote from the Village which form'd their Point.

This Camp, however, was so peculiar, that those who would form another, by the same Model, must have the same Reasons as induced the Duke of *Orleans* to encamp his Army in that manner, and must likewise be enabled, by the Form of the Country, to advance their Troops into a Field of Battle like this, and by so great a Motion as the Quarter Wheeling of the entire Front of an Army seems to have been. And yet it must be acknowledged, that when the Advantages of this extraordinary Camp are well conceived, they are a sufficient Evidence that this Prince had a clear and solid Judgment for Military Operations.

In the Year 1709, all the Camps form'd in *Flanders* by Marshal *Villars*, were judiciously disposed, except that of *Malplaquet*, where he was obliged to come to an Engagement.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Forrage in general.

MY Reflections in this Chapter, will only relate to Forrage, because it is, easy to conceive that a General who facilitates the means of procuring it, and acts with Oeconomy in its Consumption, has likewise the Power to be furnished with all other Accommodations that can be necessary for the Subsistence of the Men and Horses.

I shall observe in general, that though the Trains of Equipage in our Armies, are much more inconsiderable than those of the *Germans*, yet we infinitely exceed them in the Consumption of Forrage. This unnecessary Consumption, made by our Troops, and the judicious Oeconomy of the *Germans*, may be imputed to several Causes. These latter always provide themselves with Forrage, in the Rear of their Army, and in proportion to the Necessity of each Individual; by which means, the Marches of the Escorts and Forragers are not so injurious to a large Country, as our Marches always prove. The *Germans* have likewise another manner of Forraging, by Detail, in the Front of their

Armies, and I think it a judicious Proceeding, since it produces a number of good Effects. They frequently cause a great Body of Cavalry to make a distant Advance from their Army; according to the Constitution of the Country that happens to be the Seat of War. This Body is preceded by small Parties for their Security, who could never be pushed very far by our Troops, because they can easily retreat to their large Body. These advanced Troops facilitate and secure the gradual Consumption, without any Prejudice to the Forrage that grows between the Army, and this Body of Horse, who find a Subsistence, in those parts where the Forrage is too remote from the Army to be all carry'd off, and they provide themselves with large Bundles of it, when they return to the Camp.

The use which the *Germans* make of chopt Straw, when the Armies have recourse to a dry Forrage, is a great Instance of Oeconomy in their Consumptions: And when a Trooper mixes a small Quantity of Grain with that Straw, his Horse is well nourished, and the Herbage of the Country continues for a considerable time; because the whole Production is improved, in the best manner for the Army, who, by those means, have fewer Motions to undertake for their Subsistence, and consequently, create less
Prejudice

Prejudice to the Horses of their Cavalry and Equipage.

Their first Method of Forraging in Detail, is to consume those Productions of the Country, that grow in their Rear, before they have Recourse to those on their Front, or Wings. These last continue green for a considerable time, because they are not prejudiced by the Marches of the Escorts and Forragers, as I observed before. And the use they make of chopt Straw, habituates them the longer to a dry Forrage. We have, therefore, been sensible, by constant Experience, that our Enemies can support themselves, in a Country, longer than our Troops, and that they can subsist, without any Inconvenience, when they have advanced into the Country after us, and even when we have quitted it, with a Persuasion that we have entirely exhausted it by our Consumptions.

C H A P. XV.

Of Convoys.

I Have only one Reflection to make on Convoys of Provision, which is that the *German Armies* can better dispense with their

regular Supplies of Bread than ours, who are frequently reduced to extreme Necessity, when their stated Supplies are intermitted, and even if they are not advanced before the common time. The *German* Soldier, who has been accustom'd to this Irregularity, is always frugal of his Bread; whereas a *Frenchman* who has never experienced those Intermissions in his Supplies, frequently sells part of his Bread, either to supply his Extravagance in other Particulars, or because he is too slothful, to carry it in his March. I am therefore inclin'd to think that it would not be amiss if this Regularity were suspended in some Measure, that the Soldiers might be insensibly habituated to more Circumspection.

But as the Soldier's Pay, when in the Field, is inconsiderable to an extreme Degree, in *France*, I think it would be proper, when there has been any Failure in their Supplies of Bread, to allow them an Equivalent in Money, upon the same Foot, as the King deducts it out of the Soldier's Pay. This Practice, in my Opinion, would produce a good Effect; since the General would not then be restrain'd from Movements which are often absolutely necessary; and he does not dare to undertake, because he is apprehensive of a Failure, in the regular Distribution of the Ammunition-Bread.

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The *Germans* have little Mills for the use of every Company, and when the Harvest is ripe, they grind the Corn into Flower, and bake their Bread. The *French*, on the contrary, amass a large Provision of Corn, which they use in a very improper manner. The Trooper gives too great a Quantity to his Horse, and they all sell it to the Sutler, or even to the Commissaries of the Provisions, who throw it into the cover'd Waggons, when they are returning empty from the Army, to the Place where the Bread is baked. I am well persuaded, therefore, that if the King would cause the full Price of the Bread that was not consumed in Kind, to be paid in Money, the greatest part of the Cavalry at least, would subsist on the Bread they made.

And would it not always be very advantageous to be eased of the Care of escorting Convoys, which can neither be so great nor frequent, in those Seasons when the Ways are bad?

This Practice can be only liable to one Objection, which rather pleads for its Establishment; and that is the Profits which the Commissary of Provisions makes, by the Deficiency of the Supplies he is obliged to provide, and by his Payments, in Money, for the Bread he ought to furnish in Kind; since when he accounts with the Generals,

for the Deficiencies of their Bread, he only pays them two thirds, at most, of the Sum he receives from the King, and only a Moieity to the Troops. This Abuse is the greater, as the Profit is entirely engrossed by the Commissary, who derives sufficient Advantages from his general Contract for those Supplies.

Convoys, as well as Ammunition and Provisions, are indispensably necessary for those Armies that form Sieges, and the Measures to supply them with Security, have been so well concerted by the Ministers who had the Direction of Military Affairs, and by the Generals whom the King has employed in the Execution of his Plans of War, that I have no Reflections to form on this Subject, till the Year 1708. But the Conduct that was pursued, during the Siege of *Lisle*, gives me a melancholy Opportunity to complain of the little Attention that was shewn, to create such Obstacles as would easily have interrupted the Enemy's Convoys, and have render'd it impossible for them to succeed in that daring Enterprize. But to make the Truth of this Remark more evident, I shall begin with a Description of the State and Disposition of the Armies, at the time when the Enemy form'd the Siege of that Place.

After

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After the Battle of *Oudenard*, the Duke of *Burgundy's* Army retreated behind the Canal from *Bruges* to *Ghent*, to protect those two great Cities; and the Count *de la Mothe* commanded a Body of Troops, that were detached to the Maritime Parts, to secure the Convoys that could only be conveyed to our Army by the Canal from *Newport* to *Bruges*. Marshal *Berwick*, who was unable to arrive in *Flanders*, till after Prince *Eugene*, as I have observed elsewhere, had marched all his Infantry into the Places of *Hainault*, the *Scheld*, and *Artois*, and was posted with his Cavalry behind the *Scarp*. The Enemy's main Army, commanded by the Duke of *Marlborough*, had advanced near *Menin*, and Prince *Eugene's* Forces were posted near the *Dender*, to cover the Places in *Brabant*. Such was the Disposition of the two Armies, from the time of the Battle of *Oudenard*, to the Day that *Lisle* was invested.

It might naturally have been imagined that the Enemy could not form so important an Enterprize, with only that Ammunition and Artillery which they had in *Menin*; and it was observed, for a considerable time, that they received from *Holland*, by the Conveyance of the *Scheld*, a prodigious Quantity of Ammunition and Artillery, which could only be transmitted by Land, from *Brussels* to *Lisle*. The Distance between these two

Cities, is 22 Leagues, and we were sensible that the Enemy were furnishing themselves with above 7000 Carriages, for the Conveyance of their Ammunition, tho' we never entertain'd a Thought of Defeating these Preparations. And this was the first Instance of our Misconduct.

When these Carriages were assembled, and loaded, they immediately were in Motion, and must certainly have form'd a File of five Leagues in Length, and which was only guarded, from *Brussels* to the *Dender*, by a Body of fourteen or fifteen Thousand Men. How can we possibly comprehend the manner in which the Enemy so effectually cover'd this long File, as to render our Armies incapable of making any Attempt upon the Convoy? But this is what no Person of common Understanding will be ever able to comprehend. From the *Dender* to the *Scheld*, the Party that escorted the Convoy, was reinforced by a Body of Horse, detached from the Duke of *Marlborough's* Army; the Convoy arrived at the *Scheld*, without any Molestation, and enabled the Enemy to open the Siege of *Lisle*. As considerable as this Convoy proved, it could neither supply the Enemy with a sufficient Subsistence, nor with all the Military Provisions necessary to compleat a Siege of that Importance; and they would have been compelled to abandon that

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Enterprize, if we had not committed such a Number of new Errors, as render'd the Execution of their Project practicable.

Our main Army quitted the Camp of *Lovendegbein*, leaving only a Body of Infantry in *Ghent*; and marched to the *Dender*, where they were join'd by Marshal *Berwick's* Forces. From thence the two Armies advanced to *Tournay*, where they past the *Scheld*, with an Intention to raise the Siege of *Lisle* by a Battle. During this Interval, our want of Cavalry made us unattentive to the Convoys that might be sent from *Brussels*; so that several small ones past from that Place, and they all arrived safe at the Camp before *Lisle*, which made it evident that we were extremely remiss in our Vigilance. In fine, when the King's Army retreated from the *Marque*, without having once attacked the Enemy, and had resolved to force them to abandon the Siege, for want of Ammunition to finish it; we drew that great Line around them, which I have mention'd in a former Chapter. The Dukes of *Burgundy* and *Vendôme* possessed *Artois*, the *Scarp*, and the Country that extended from *Tournay* to *Ghent*, with their main Army. The Count *de la Motte* was to guard the Line to *Ghent*; while our Enemies were posted in the Center of this Line, and judiciously attentive to supply themselves with Provisions and Ammunition.

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It appears, by this new Disposition of the Armies, that the Enemy could no longer derive any Accommodations from *Brussels*. They accordingly make no Attempt to procure them from that Quarter, and were only solicitous to subsist at the Expence of *Artois*, and our *Castellanies*, in which we never gave them any Impediment. They likewise form'd a Design to supply themselves from *Ostend*, with the Ammunition they wanted for the Completion of the Siege of *Lisle*, where they frequently continued several Days, without firing a single Cannon, for want of Powder.

It was easy for the Enemy to convey their Ammunition into the Port of *Ostend*; since the Privateers of *Dunkirk* never interrupted their Transports from *England*, and *Holland*. There seem'd to be an insurmountable Difficulty attending their Endeavours to convey this Ammunition, in Waggons, from *Ostend* to *Lessingen*, which the Count *de la Mothe* had suffer'd them to possess, or to the Bank of the Inundation form'd by the Canal of *Newport*, and to pass that Inundation, and the Canal, in Boats, and to have Carriages ready, on the Bank of those Waters, to receive the Ammunition, and convey it to *Lisle*.

The Count *de la Mothe*, who, for the Space of fifteen or sixteen Years, had been constantly

ly employed at *Ypres* and *Bruges*, and consequently ought to have known the Country, never opposed any of the Enemy's Expedients to draw their Convoys from *Ostend*. But he might have made a better use, than he did, of the Forts of *Plasendal*, and *Nieuverdam*, and even of *Newport*, to have prevented the Enemy from conveying their Convoys from *Ostend*, with all the natural Difficulties that attended them; nor would he have been defeated at *Winendal*, by a Body of Troops that was infinitely inferior to his own, in number; but would have destroy'd both the Convoy and its Escort, had he been more vigilant, than he really proved. He was sensible that the Enemy were under an absolute Necessity of receiving their Ammunition from *Ostend*, to enable them to compleat the Siege of *Lisle*. Why did he not improve, then, the Advantage he deriv'd from *Plasendal*, and from what Motives did he neglect to post a considerable Body of Troops near *Ostend*? For what Reason were his Attentions not constantly employed from *Plasendal* to *Newport*, and what induced him to let the Enemy establish themselves at *Lessinghen*? Could he assign any Cause for not destroying the advance Bridge? and since he had Boats sufficiently arm'd at *Newport*, why would he suffer a Vessel of any Bulk whatever,

ever, to appear upon the Inundation and Canal? The Loss of *Lisle*, was the Consequence of all these Inattentions; and it was preceded, by his Defeat in the Battle of *Winendal*, which being one of the principal Causes of that Loss, I shall relate a few of its Singularities.

The Enemy, with the Advantage of all those Neglects, before the grand Convoy set out from *Ostend*, and which might have been destroy'd, between that Town and the Canal, arrived at *Winendal*, notwithstanding a number of Difficulties that attended them. The Count *de la Motte* had quitted *Bruges*, with Thirty six Battalions, and Sixty two Squadrons, with a Resolution to attack the Convoy; but it is not easy to conceive why he chose to march through *Odenbourg*, and along the Canal, till he was within a little distance of the *Gbistel*, which is a Country very much inclosed, and intersected with Ditches, rather than advance through the great Road of *Bruges*, to *Winendal*, which is a more open Country. When he therefore arrived, at last, in sight of the Enemy, who were posted in the Wood of *Winendal*, with thick Hedges on their Flanks, which were guarded with Infantry, he attacked them with all those Disadvantages, in consequence of his injudicious March. As his principal Intention was to destroy the Con-

voy, he needed only to have wheel'd round the Wood, which was very small, and he would have advanced directly upon the Convoy, and might have easily destroy'd it, and then have fallen upon the Escort, if they had kept their Ground; but in case they had escaped him, the Disappointment would have been but inconsiderable, when he had succeeded in his capital Design; in consequence of which, the Siege of *Lisle* would have been rais'd for want of Ammunition.

C H A P XVI.

Of Parties of War.

ALL the Reflections I have to make on this Subject is, that an Army can never receive Intelligence of an Enemy's Motions, by too many Expedients; and therefore whatever number of Spies they may have abroad, as some of them may have been discovered, and others prevented from returning to give Intelligence, in consequence of the Enemy's having advanced a Body of Troops to cover their Motions; it is always very useful to have continual Parties upon the Scout, and compos'd agreeably to the Nature of the Country, into which they are

to penetrate; and by these Parties should the General be advertised of what passes, at any considerable Distance from his Camp.

The Method taken by the *Germans*, for the Security of their Parties, seems, to me, more judicious than ours. They detach a great Body of Horse when the Army is in a cover'd Country. These Troops are strong enough to advance without any Hazard, since they are preceded by little Parties which our Troops are unable to repulse, because they are sustain'd; for which Reason they are but seldom attacked. I find this Method much preferable to ours, because we only detach very inconsiderable Parties.

C H A P. XVII.

Of particular Encounters.

I Have observed in another Place, that a General may have several Inducements to engage in Actions of this Nature, but that he should make it his grand Attention, not to sustain them against his Inclination, on account of the fatal Consequences that may ensue. This Maxim is always certain, and in order to enforce it, I shall relate four Instances of particular Encounters brought on by

by entire Armies, with a Design to create a general Engagement.

In the Year 1674, the Inconsideration of the Prince of *Orange*, in the Disposition of his March, when he decamped from *Senneffe*, drew on a general Engagement, from a particular Encounter against a Rear-guard, separated from the Body of the Army, by two Defiles. As I have formerly related the Particulars of this imprudent Disposition of the Enemy, and shall have occasion to mention it in another Place, what I now offer on that Article, is only in the form of an Example, to illustrate the Subject of this Chapter. In order therefore to establish my Maxim, I shall observe, that the Prince of *Conde* had no Aversion to an Encounter, because he was sensible that the Disposition of the Country would enable him to discontinue it when he pleased. The Prince of *Orange*, on the contrary, suffer'd an Engagement to be brought on, without any Prospect of Advantage to himself, since he had not taken any Measures to have it in his Power to conclude it, when he should think proper: His Incaution, therefore, betrayed him into an Inconvenience, which a General should be always vigilant to avoid; I mean the Necessity of sustaining an Engagement, against his Inclinations, and

of being involved in a general Action, by a particular Encounter.

The Beginning of the Campaign, in 1676, furnishes me with an Example of a particular Encounter, which was prevented from growing general, by the judicious Attention of the Commander, who was desirous to decline an Action of that Nature.

M. *de Luxembourg* marched to possess the Post of *St. John des Choux*, near the *Savern*, in order to receive a Body of Troops there, who were advancing to him from *Flanders*. The Duke of *Lorraine* resolved to attack him, before his Conjunction with those Forces, and with that View, marched with his Army to secure the Post of *St. John de Choux*, before M. *de Luxembourg*; and with an Intention to engage him, when his Army had past a Rivulet they were to cross, in Order to enter this Camp. The Duke of *Lorraine's* Van-Guard came up with M. *de Luxembourg's* Rear-Guard, as they were passing the River. The Enemy who, as I have intimated, were determined on a general Engagement, charged our Rear-Guard with great Vigour; but the Expedition with which M. *de Luxembourg* posted his Infantry at the Rivulet, checkt the Enemy's Cavalry, who were not sustain'd by their Infantry, in such a manner, that the Duke of *Lorraine* could not pass his Cavalry over the Rivulet, before the Infantry

try who had been drawn up there. In this Conjunction therefore, *M. de Luxembourg*, who was not in a Condition to suffer a general Affair to be brought on, by a particular Encounter, succeeded in his Design, by causing the Encounter to discontinue, soon after it began.

I think it proper to observe, from this Encounter at *St. John de Choux*, that those Armies who are near each other in their March, and may come to an Engagement in a few Moments, should be always vigilant to render their March as secure as they at first proposed, and to come, upon an Emergency, to an advantageous Engagement with the Enemy, who has neglected the Security of his March.

M. de Luxembourg had no Inclination to engage, and was only intent to possess the Camp of *St. John de Choux*, before the Duke of *Lorraine*; and succeeded, by the just Disposition of his March. He foresaw that his Rear-Guard would be incommoded, in their Passage over the Rivulet, in case the Duke of *Lorraine* had proved as expeditious as might have been, with the whole Body of his Cavalry, with which he might either have overwhelmed the Rear-Guard of the King's Army, or brought on a general Engagement, if *M. de Luxembourg* had been disposed to support the Rear - Guard, on this

side of the Rivulet; but our General, in Order to avoid any Engagement whatever, had posted the Infantry on each side of the Rivulet, and their Volleys stopt the progress of the Enemy's Cavalry, in their Endeavours to pass the Stream, after the Cavalry of our Rear-Guard.

The Duke of *Lorraine*, who was so desirous to bring on an Engagement, ought to have considered that, in all probability, he must come up with the Rear-Guard of the King's Army, either before the Van-Guard had enter'd the Rivulet, or when part of the Army had past it. If he should be able to join the Rear-Guard, before the Van had begun their Passage, he might be certain that a general Engagement would ensue; for which Reason, his Infantry, ought to have marched with so much Expedition, and so near the Cavalry, as to have been immediately formed into a Disposition for an Engagement. But if he could not advance to the King's Army, till part of the Troops had past the Stream, he ought to have judged, that it would be impossible for him to accomplish his Design of bringing on a general Action, by a particular Encounter, unless he had such a Body of Infantry, as would be capable of dislodging the King's Army, from the Rivulet, since he would certainly find them posted there.

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In the same Year 1676, M. de *Luxembourg* could not, in his turn, compel the Duke of *Lorraine* to quit his Lines at *Philipsburg*, which were unattackable in the Front. When M. de *Luxembourg* approached them, he found a Body of two thousand Horse, posted before the Enemy's Army, to gain, without doubt, some Intelligence of the King's Troops; and he imagined that if this Body of Horse were vigorously repulsed, to the Enemy's Camp, it might oblige them to quit it, in order to receive those Troops, by which means he hoped to bring on a general Engagement. But the Duke of *Lorraine*, who intended to take *Philipsburgh*, caused his Troops to continue in their Camp, and suffer'd our Forces to defeat his two Thousand Horse, who had exposed themselves too rashly to that Event, by continuing near the Head of the Columns of their Army.

My Observation on this Encounter is, that an inconsiderable Body of Troops, tho' they believe themselves near enough, to be protected by the Army from which they were detached, should never presume to continue near the Enemy, who are in a Plain, and advancing towards them, with all their Forces, unless these Troops have the Advantage of a Defile in their Front, with-

out which, this Presumption exposes them to an inevitable Defeat.

In the Year 1677, the King's Army, commanded by the Marshal *de Crequi*, was on the Point of engaging with the Emperor's Forces, under the Conduct of the Duke of *Lorraine*. The *Imperialists* had encamped at a little Distance from the King's Troops, whose grand Guard of Horse was posted on the Mountain of *Kokersberg*. The German General Officer who disposed the Enemy's Horse-Guards, was likewise determin'd to post them on that Mountain, and while he was preparing for that Disposition, he discovered the King's Troops, and resolved to attack them. This Guard, by wheeling off in a judicious manner, gave Intelligence of the Enemy's Motions, to the Camp, upon which part of our Pickets immediately mounted, in order to support the Guard. The *Imperialists* were well fortified, and the Bodies of each Army began insensibly to be in Motion; so that, for the Space of two Hours, there were several Charges of Horse, and all the *Imperial* and *French* Forces, who had then taken Arms, would have engaged on that Mountain, which however was not extensive enough to contain their Fronts, if Night had not separated the Armies, just as the two Declivities of the Mountain were cover'd

ver'd with the Infantry that advanced from each Camp.

This Action is entirely different from all the particular Encounters I have yet described, and which were commenced with an Intention to bring on a general Engagement. The original Design of this Motion, was only to station a Guard of Horse, which, in the Conjecture I have related, was intirely insignificant, and I may likewise add, that the Ground on which the Encounter happen'd, was not spacious enough to contain a Front capable of creating a general Engagement. If this Action, however, had begun in the Morning, instead of the latter part of the Day, it is certain that the two Armies would have engaged, on a Spot two contracted to contain them.

C H A P. XVIII.

Of the Surprisal of Places.

I Have already observed, that a fortified Place may be surpris'd in several manners; either by Storm, for Instance, when the Fortifications are not sufficient to secure it from an Assault; or by maintaining an Intelligence with the Inhabitants; or lastly,

when either the Soldiers within, are remiss in their Service, or the Place is invested at a time, when it happens to be unprovided with Ammunition, Provisions, and a sufficient Garrison for its Defence.

I have offer'd certain Maxims, for the prevention of Surprisals, as far as a Governour can possibly avoid them, by his Attentions to what passes, both within the Place, and without. I shall only relate some Instances, which will discover the Misconduct that has been committed, in my Time, by a Deviation from the Rules I have propos'd, for securing a place from all manner of Surprisals.

The places most liable to be attacked by Storm, are those whose Fortifications are not lined with Stone; for if the Fortifications of Earth be not constantly kept in good Condition; or if the Ditches be not either flat-bottom'd, or very muddy, the Place may be surpris'd by Storm, when an Enemy can make his Approaches to it, with so much Secrecy, as renders his Motions imperceptible by the Troops within.

The first successful Execution of an Enterprize of this Nature, which I have seen, was that in 1706, when *M. de la Breteſche*, who was then a Colonel of a Regiment of Dragoons, in Garrison at *Maestricht*, surprized *Loo*, a *Spanish* Town on the *Demer*.

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He knew the Garrison of that Place was very weak, and that it was negligently guarded, both within and without; the Inhabitants placing their Confidence in their Remoteness from our Places, and likewise in the Waters that surrounded their Town. M. *de la Breteſche* regulated his Project and Disposition, by all these Particulars, and advancing with his Troops, surrounded the Place before Day appear'd; enter'd the Covert Way; let down little Boats of Oziers into the Ditch, or rather large Flaskets, cover'd with waxt Cloth, and past a considerable part of his Infantry over; reserving the rest to fire upon the Garrison, when they should oppose this Attack. The Infantry gain'd the other side of the Ditch; cut the Fraises, and mounted the Bastion. The other Body of Infantry, likewise, crost the Ditch, when they saw those, who had already past, Masters of the Bastion; and as they were then stronger, in the Place, than the Garrison they had surprized, they made them Prisoners, and preserved the Place for the King, till the Peace of *Nimeguen*.

This Instance of the Surprisal of a fortified Place, whose Works were not faced, confirms my Rules for the prevention of the like Surprisals of such Places by Storm.

In the Year 1698, the King of *France* invested *Ghent*, by a Surprize, without which
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the Circumvallation, in order to the Siege, would have been almost impracticable, if the Enemy had posted themselves, in due time, to prevent it. His Majesty's Intentions to form this Siege, were covered by several Appearances, and Motions of the Troops, to the Enemy's places that were most remote from this. The King even advanced, in Person, as far as *Mentz*, to make his Enemies entertain a stronger Persuasion, that he intended to attack *Luxembourg*, or *Namur*. In the mean time, all his Forces, in *Flanders*, were in Motion, and seem'd to form a Design against *Ypres*.

These three Places, being threaten'd at the same time, engaged the Attention of our Enemies, who never imagined it practicable to form the Circumvallation of *Ghent*, at the close of the Winter; by Reason of the Difficulty of opening a Communication between the Quarters. This Persuasion of theirs, contributed to the Success of this Enterprize, which ranks *Ghent* among the places that have been surpris'd, because they were attacked at a time when they were unprovided of a sufficient Garrison, and other necessary Supplies, for their Defence.

The third Instance of the Surprisal of a place, which succeeded by carrying off the Garrison, but was immediately abandon'd, because it was too remote to be guarded, was that of *Savigliano*, in the Month of *January* 1691.

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I commanded, in *Pignerol*, that Winter, and when the Duke of *Savoy* disposed his Troops in Winter Quarters, he placed his four Companies of *Gensdarmes* in *Savigliano*, where the Guard was kept by the City Companies, and the *Milice*. I was well acquainted with the Place, having frequently been there in the preceding Campaign, and I knew that, on the side of the Gate of *Carmagnole*, there was a Bastion of Earth, join'd to the Wall of the City, and near a Gate which was only shut at Night, without any Guard for its Security. The Knowledge of these Particulars, made me resolve to surprise the *Gensdarmes*, who were so negligent in their Guard. With this View, I improved the Opportunity of a hard Frost, because I should be obliged to pass the Ditch of the Bastion, which was full of Water. I likewise convey'd a Spy into *Savigliano*, on whose Fidelity I could depend, and who, on the Night appointed for the Execution of my Project, drew out the Nails that fasten'd the Lock on the Wall Gate, that open'd to the Bastion within the City; and I march'd a Body of eight hundred Horse, and four hundred Foot, who rode on the Cruppers, with so much Expedition, that I arrived at the Bastion, two Hours before Day; and when I had caus'd that Bastion, and the Gate in the City Wall to be survey'd, that

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I might be satisfied whether my Spy had executed my Orders or not; I order'd the Foot to advance to the *Glacis* of the Ditch; I then form'd them in Order of Battle, on the Place, seized the Guard at the Gate, which I caused to be open'd for the Horse, and, without the least Opposition, carried off the four Companies of the *Gensdarmes* into *Pignerol*; tho' the Duke of *Savoy*, if he had either suspected, or discover'd my Design, might have fallen upon me, with four times the number of Horse which I then had. In the Execution of this Enterprize, I marched above 28 Leagues, in the Space of 30 Hours, and past and repast three Rivers, of which, the *Po* was one.

My only Inducement to relate an Action, conducted by my self, was, that I might have an Opportunity of confirming the Rules I have offer'd, for Expeditions of this Nature; by declaring that their Success does not alone result from the Remissness of the Enemy, in their Guard, nor even from the Justness of the Measures, that have been concerted for the Execution of such Enterprizes, but chiefly from the Concealment of the March, and the Expedition of the Troops in their Return, when they were incapable of maintaining the Place they have surpris'd.

The fourth Instance which I shall offer on this Subject, is an Event, which, tho'
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unsuccessful, was yet attended with astonishing Particulars. I mean the Surprisal of *Cremona*, at the Beginning of the Year 1703.

This City was our place of Arms, during the War in *Lombardy*, and Marshal *de Villeroy* had established his head Quarters there, in the Winter Season. He there had a very great Body of Foot and Horse, and was likewise cover'd by a considerable Body, commanded by the Marquis *de Crequi*, whose Quarters were fixt between the *Oglio* and the *Po*, over which we had a Bridge, before *Cremona*, the Head of which, on the side of the *Modeneze*, and the *Parmesan*, was cover'd with a Work guarded by the Garrison of *Cremona*, for its Security against a Body of *Imperialists* who winter'd in the *Modeneze*. Prince *Eugene*, with the remainder of the Emperor's Army, possessed the Quarters between the *Oglio*, the *Adda*, and the *Mincio*.

From this general Disposition, Prince *Eugene* form'd a Design to carry *Cremona* by Surprize. He maintain'd an Intelligence within the Place, by which he was inform'd, that even the Presence of the Commander in Chief, with several General Officers, and the strong Garrison, had not render'd the Service more regular, nor caused the Guard to be kept with greater Strictness; but that it was entirely neglected, both within

the Place, and without. The Count *de Revel* the Lieutenant General, was charged with the particular Command of the Place, only with Reference to the *French* Troops, for there was likewise a *Spanish* Governor in the City.

No care was taken to post any Troops without the Place, in the Night; the Rounds were not made on the Ramparts within, nor was any Patrol of Horse and Foot order'd through the Streets. It was thought sufficient to station a Guard at the Gates, and upon the Works, but the Troops who compos'd this Guard, had not any Communication with each other, in the Night, by Rounds, nor were any Centinels so much as posted on the Ramparts, over the Gates, to observe if any Approaches were made. In a word, there was a general Inattention, in *Cremona*, to the Service necessary in all such places.

A Priest, who officiated at a little Church, something remote from the publick part of the Town, had his House near that Church, and an Aqueduct, which conveyed the Water, from the Streets, into the Ditches, was contiguous to the Cellar of his House. *Cremona* has a considerable number of these Conveyances, but not one of them was grated. The Priest caus'd Prince *Eugene* to be made acquainted with this Particular, and

he prepared for his Enterprize, upon that Information. He introduced into *Cremona*, by these Aqueducts, about fix Hundred Men, who were concealed, by the Priest, in his Cellar, and likewise in his Church, which was not daily frequented. He likewise introduced, in the Day time, a considerable number of Soldiers, disguised like Peasants, and who did not quit the City at Night, but were received by the Priest, or some others of the Conspirators. This Expedient was very practicable, because there was not any Guard at the Gates, and no Enquiries were made, whether those who enter'd the Town, in the Day, had either quitted it, or continued in the Place.

Part of the Men were furnished with Instruments for breaking Locks, and with other Implements proper for the Demolition of the Stone Work. Two of the City Gates, towards the *Oglio*, were chosen, by Prince *Eugene*, for the Introduction of the main Body of his Troops. One of these Gates, namely, that which was nearest to the Priest's House, had been walled up, and upon the Rampart over that Gate, was a small Corps de Guard, where only eight or ten Men were posted, who by the Remissness in the Service of the Rounds, had not any Centinel before the Gate of the Corps de Guard. The Enemy having, without any Noise, seized

seized the Men, who were sleeping in the Corps de Guard, caused their Workmen to pull down the Wall that closed up the Gate, without any Danger of being discovered by the Rounds, because they were entirely neglected. The other Gate, which, in the Day time, open'd the Communication between the Country and the City, had a Corps de Guard below, and the Guard of this Gate was more numerous, but without any Attention for the Centinels, because there were no Rounds for the Officer to answer. There was not any Portcullis, and consequently not any Centinel above, to let it down at any Exigencies; neither was there any Post without the Gate, nor so much as a Centinel upon it, to observe what Approaches were made from the high Road.

Marshal *de Villeroy*, who had taken a Progress, to visit the Quarters on the Upper *Oglio*, was on his return by *Milan*, where he received Intelligence that Prince *Eugene* was forming several Motions, in those Quarters of his, that were most remote from the *Oglio*. This induced him to return to *Cremona*, the Night before the Surprizal; not that he had any Suspicion that those Motions of the Enemy could be intended against *Cremona*, but rather that they had, for their Object, the Quarters which the Marquis *de Crequi* possessed along the Lower *Oglio*, and
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in which Marshal *deVilleroy* had order'd him to be very vigilant, because Prince *Eugene* was Master of the Post of *Vestiano*, on the *Oglio*, opposite to *Cremona*. The Marquis *de Crequi* had likewise, in his turn, sent Intelligence to Marshal *de Villeroy*, that all the Quarters of Prince *Eugene* were in Motion, and that he had been assured, by several Spies, that he was forming some Design against *Cremona*. Marshal *de Villeroy* had also been informed, that the Enemies were in Motion, in the Quarters they possessed in the *Modeneze*, but he imagined they were intent on some Operation against the *Plaisantine*, and he accordingly sent Intelligence to the Duke of *Parma*, to that Effect. It is evident therefore, that the Marshal was attentive to every Event, except the Surprisal of *Cremona*; and indeed, as this General was charged with the whole Weight of Affairs, he was excusable, for being unacquainted with the Negligence of the Troops in his Quarter, since he had consigned the Conduct of those Forces to the Count *de Revel*.

When the Hour for executing this Enterprize, at last arrived; Prince *Eugene* past the *Oglio*, at *Ustiano*, about six Leagues from *Cremona*; but neither Marshal *de Villeroy*, nor any of our Generals had Advice of that Motion, so universal was the Inattention to the Parts without, as I have already intimated,

and which, in this Conjunction, was inexcusable; for as it was generally known, that all the Quarters of the Enemy, on the other side of the *Oglio*, were in Motion, we ought, at least, to have had Parties of Horse on *Ustiano* (which was the only Bridge possessed by the Enemy on the *Oglio*) in order to be informed whether Prince *Eugene* had past that River.

But this inconsiderable Attention being neglected, that Prince advanced before the Gates of *Cremona*, with a Body of Horse and Foot, composed of about 7000 Men, without our receiving any Intelligence of his March. The Men who were either introduced by the Aqueduct, or had enter'd the Town, in the Disguise of Peasants, and had been conceal'd in the Priest's House, and other Places, seized, without the least Noise, the *Corps de Guard*, at the Gate that afforded a Passage into the Place, and which they open'd to a Column of Horse and Foot, who advanced to the great Square, where a Guard of Foot, and another of Horse were posted, and who were as remiss in the Service, as those at the Gate which had been surpris'd, and they consequently were all made Prisoners, without creating any Alarm.

The Enemy's Troops, of the second Column, who had been conducted to the Gate

that was walled up, were introduced by a Party of Men who had been conceal'd in the Priest's House, and had seized the little *Corps de Guard* at the Gate, after which they demolished the Wall that closed it up, and ranged the Materials in such a manner, as to open a commodious Passage to the Infantry, who were to be admitted at that Gate. These Forces, upon their Introduction, were to march according to the Orders they had received, along the Ramparts, to the Left, in order to seize the Gate of the *Po*, and the Guard who were posted there, after which, they were to open that Gate for the Admission of another Body of Troops, who were at the End of the Bridge, on the side of the *Modenese*, and had been order'd not to attack the Guard, who were posted in the Work that cover'd the Bridge, till they had received a Signal from the Gate of the *Po*, after it had been surprized.

Thus have we seen 7000 of the Enemy's Forces, introduced into the Middle of a fortified City, where they made themselves Masters of two Gates, form'd the Horse in Order of Battle, in several parts of the Place, and expatiated wherever they pleased; in all which time, not one of our Men awak-ed, neither did we receive the least Alarm. And yet an Accident, which it was impossible for Prince *Eugene* to foresee, defeated

this Project, which had been so well plan'd, and was so happily conducted to the Moment of the intended Execution.

The Marquis *de Crenau*, Director of the Infantry, having accompanied M. *de Villeroy* to *Cremona*, from *Milan*, had an Inclination to review part of the Infantry that Morning, and had order'd the Battalions who were posted near the Gate of the *Po*, to be under Arms, a little before Day, that he might review them, as soon as it grew light. When the Nights are long, it is easy for Persons to be deceived in the Hour when Day approaches. These Battalions, therefore, were all under Arms, at the Gate of the *Po*, sooner than their appointed Time; and when the Enemy's Troops, who advanced along the Rampart, to surprize that Gate, discover'd those Battalions under Arms, they imagined their Enterprize was discovered, and began to attack our Men, who not knowing by whom they were assaulted, in that manner, discharged several Vollies, and soon discovered them to be Enemies, which occasion'd an Engagement that awaked all our Troops.

The Battalions that were to be review'd, by M. *de Crenau*, after the others, and were lodged at a great distance from them, began to be in Motion in their Barracks, and were soon ready. A Party of Horse likewise,

wife, who had been order'd, the Day before, by Marshal *de Villeroy*, to advance towards the *Plaisantine*, were ready to mount. All these Troops marched to the Enemy, who were form'd in Battle, in the several parts of the Town, and had even possessed the Avenues, in a full Persuasion that it would be impossible for our Troops to resist them; and especially as they had taken not only Marshal *de Villeroy*, who had mounted his Horse, at the first Alarm, but likewise the Commissary of the Musters, and a great Number of other Officers, who were undoubtedly betrayed by the Persons at whose Houses they lodged. M. *de Crenau* when he quitted his Apartment, that Morning, had been so fortunate as to place himself at the Head of some Infantry, whom he marched to the little Square, and dislodged the Enemy, who retired, from that Situation, to their main Body, in the great Square; and this Motion facilitated the Conjunction of the King's Troops, who were posted in the remote Quarters.

The Engagement was carried on, through all parts of the City, by the mere Bravery, and good Disposition of the Troops, and inferior Officers, for Marshal *de Villeroy* was taken Prisoner, as I have already observed, and M. *de Crenau* had been mortally Wounded in the Attack he caused to be made.

Two Colonels, likewise, of those Regiments who were under Arms, at the Gate of the *Po*, were kill'd; and yet the Death of two of the Enemy's Officers, obliged Prince *Eugene* to abandon his Enterprize, and quit the Town, after he had, for several Hours, imagined himself to be Master of it. The Enemy's General Officer, who conducted the Column that enter'd by the Gate of the *Po*, to order the Troops who had advanced from the *Modeneze*, to attack the Work that cover'd the Bridge, was the only Person to whom this Order had been imparted, and had received Fuses to give the Signal: But this Officer having been kill'd, by the Fire from the Battalions, who were accidentally under Arms, at the Gate of the *Po*, before he could communicate to any other Officer, the Secret, with which he was charged, the Signal was not made, nor was the Bridge attacked at the appointed time, to enable the *Modeneze* Troops, when they had past the *Po*, to take a Circuit on the outside of the Town, in order to enter it, at least, by one of the two Gates the Enemy had possessed, provided they could not be introduced by the Gate of the *Po*, which the Enemies were never able to master.

The General Officer who commanded the Troops, appointed to attack the Work that cover'd the Bridge, and who alone was acquainted

quainted with the Secret of the Enterprize, having lost his Legs by a Cannon Shot from the Work, was no longer capable of issuing any Orders, by which means we had sufficient time to recover the Bridge. Prince *Eugene's* Troops, in the City, were likewise greatly diminished by the Loss they had sustain'd in the long Engagement, and he had reason to be apprehensive, that the Marquis *de Crequi*, when he should be inform'd of what had past at *Cremona*, would immediately advance with his Troops, and prevent the Retreat of the *Imperialists* from that City. The Prince therefore thought it advisable to withdraw from that Place, while he had an Opportunity; and he accordingly drew off his Troops from the Center of the City, towards the two Gates which he still possessed; but could not accomplish that Motion, without losing the greatest part of his Infantry, and a considerable Number of his Cavalry. However, he carried off Marshal *de Villeroy*, the Commissary of the Musters, and several other Officers, whom he had taken Prisoners, when the Surprisal first began.

This Relation is a sufficient Proof, that the proper Attentions for the Service of Places, both within, and without, should never be neglected; for if the Battalions, in *Cremona*, had not, by meer Chance, been

under Arms, a little sooner than was necessary for their Review; and if the Cavalry who were order'd upon an Expedition, had not been ready to mount, the Place had certainly been taken, and the Troops, who were posted there, must have been carried off by a Body much inferior to their own in Number, since they would have been incapable of making the least Opposition to the Enemy.

C H A P. XIX.

Of the Surprisal of Posts.

AFTER a Description of the principal Methods for succeeding in Surprisals of this Nature, with Reference to the different Situation and Strength of Posts, or the Precautions an Enemy may have taken for their Preservation, I think it necessary to give some Instances of Posts that have been carried by open Force, as well as of others that have eluded the Enemy's Designs.

In the Year 1692, M. de *Luxembourg*, who commanded the King's Army that continued in the Places, conquer'd from *Holland*, was always attentive to penetrate into the Heart of the Country; which, at that time, was
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only practicable by means of the Ice; because the Lands were all floated, and the Dikes were likewise secured, by Posts strongly fortified at their Head. This General, therefore, improved the Opportunity of a Frost, to fall upon the Reverse of the Enemy's principal Posts, at *Bodengrave*, and *Swamerdam*; and his Expedition was perfectly successful: But a sudden Thaw obliged him to retreat, and even to abandon those Posts which he had taken from the Enemy, because they lay open to their Troops.

This Example affords good Instructions, for the manner of fortifying Posts on Dikes, when it has been practicable to float the Country from the two sides of those Dikes.

The *Dutch*, in this Conjunction, were guilty of a Misconduct, that might have been entirely fatal to that Republick, since they were not attentive to fortify the Posts on their side, like that by which they expected to be invaded by *M. de Luxembourg*. For as these Posts were only fortified at their Head, they were liable to be invested, when the Frost should be hard enough to sustain the Weight of the Troops that marched over the Ice; for which Reason the last Posts on the Dikes towards *Holland*, and beyond the floated Country, might as easily be insulted as those at the Head, and it is certain that if the Frost had continued, it
would

would have render'd M. *de Luxembourg* Master of all the great Towns in the inward parts of *Holland*, which would have been the inevitable Event, if the Frost had only lasted, till the Arrival of our Troops in that part of the Country which was not laid under Water, and whose Distance, from the Place where the Thaw first began, was very inconsiderable.

I therefore conclude, that when the Form of a Country is constituted in the manner I have represented this to be, the Posts which are intended to be fortified on the Dikes, ought to be equally secured on both sides, because it is not sufficient for them to be good, when there is no Frost, but they likewise ought to be capable of a long Defence, during the Continuance of any Frost, that they may not be forc'd before a Thaw.

The only Objection that can be offer'd against my Opinion, in this Particular, is that a Post, thus fortified, cannot be kept by an Enemy, when a sudden Thaw obliges him to retire, before he had sufficient time to accommodate these Posts, on the side where they lay open, and which was an Event that happen'd in the Conjunction I have been describing. But this Reason can only be effectual, with respect to an Enemy who intends no more than a slight Inroad into the Country; but if he determines to
invade

invade it, and establish himself in his Conquests, this Reason has not any Validity. For if the Frost had continued, in such a Conjunction, it is certain that M. de *Luxembourg* would have made himself Master, not only of the *Hague* and *Leyden*, but likewise of all the other great Towns in *Holland*, which were entirely defenceless, and he could easily have secured his Acquisitions, by causing all the Troops, in the Provinces of *Overysfel*, and *Holland*, to advance.

In the Year 1688, after *Philipsburg* was taken, I was order'd to *Hailbron*, with a Body of Troops, to command on the *Necker*, and to raise Contributions in *Franconia* and *Suabia*, between the *Mein*, the *Regnitz*, and the *Danube*. Most of the Troops of those two Circles were in *Hungary*, where they served the Emperor; but there was a sufficient Number in the Country, to prevent us from making any considerable Penetrations. And yet I marched, with 800 Foot, and 900 Horse, to *Kreilsheim*, a little Town in *Anspach*, where I found two Battalions of the Circle of *Franconia*. I was unable to force this Place, which was surrounded with a Wall, and likewise strengthen'd by a good Castle; but the Colonel who commanded those Battalions was so indiscreet as to come out of the Place, to speak to me, without first obtaining my Promise for his Return;
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I caused him to be detained, and obliged the Garrison to surrender themselves Prisoners of War.

I only relate this Instance of the Surprizal of a Place, to make it evident, that when it is necessary for a Body of Forces to make themselves Masters of a Place, all Expedients should be practised, provided they are not dishonourable to the Person who employs them, as they would in this Instance, had I first given my Parole to the Colonel, at his Request, and not observed it with Punctuality, in the Event.

This Surprizal of *Kreilsheim*, discovers how easy it is to diffuse a Consternation through a Country, when the Inhabitants imagined it had been effectually cover'd by those Posts, that are taken from them by the vigilant Conduct and Dexterity of the General, who is commission'd to penetrate into the Territories of an Enemy.

In the Month of *January* 1689, after M. *de Montclar* had retired, with too much Precipitation, from the Quarters he had taken in the Dutchy of *Wirtemberg*, I continued there, in order to take upon me the Command in *Phortzheim* on the *Entz*. I found my self very much contracted, by the Quaters the Enemy had taken in *Wirtemberg*, and chiefly by the Posts they had established in the Cities of *Neubourg*, and
Entz.

Entzwabingen on the *Entz*, and above as well as below *Phortzheim*. I surpriz'd and carried those two Posts, and destroy'd them so effectually, as intimidated the Enemy from approaching me. By which means, my Quarters at *Phortzheim* became so free and extensive, that I obliged the Dutchy of *Wirtemberg* to continue the Payment of the Contributions they were desirous of evading, by the Protection of the *Imperial* Troops, notwithstanding the Disposition of their Post, and the Weakness of the Garrison in *Phortzheim*. As the Surprizal of these Posts was accomplished in a peculiar, as well as an instructive manner, I shall relate the Particulars.

Neubourg is three Leagues from *Phortzheim*, and seated in the Valley of *Entz*, on the Bank of that River. The City is encompassed with a good Wall, well secured from a Scalade; and there is a Castle within the City. It has likewise two Gates; one towards *Phortzheim*, the other in an opposite Situation, on the Bank of the River, which communicates with the other side, by a cover'd Bridge. The Enemy had thrown 500 Foot, and 150 Dragoons into the Place, and this Garrison was well precautioned for its Defence, on the side of *Phortzheim*, but exposed a little too much towards the other Gate, from whence they imagined they had

no Danger to apprehend, because the Ways to it were difficult to be past; and during the Day time, they posted, on an Eminence that commanded a View of the Gate of *Phortzheim*, a Party of 20 Dragoons, so that they could discover every Man who should happen to quit *Phortzheim*, by Day. The Gate of *Neubourg*, which was towards the *Entz*, and contiguous to the cover'd Bridge, was unprovided with a Draw-bridge, and had not any Work to protect it. There was only one Centinel over the Gate, and a *Corps de Guard*, of 15 or 20 Men, below. The Rounds, however, were very frequently made on the Wall.

When I had gain'd a full Information of the manner in which these incommodious Neighbours conducted themselves, in the Regulation of their Guard, I made the necessary Dispositions for carrying this Post, by the Gate of *Entz*, because the Garrison was least attentive to that Quarter. I waited till the close of the Day, that the Party of Dragoons might not discover my March; after which, I advanced with 600 Men, through by Ways, which conducted me to the Head of the Bridge of the *Entz*. A prodigious Quantity of Snow had fallen, but my March was so secret and expeditious, that I arrived, about Midnight, at the cover'd Bridge. I then advanced upon it with my Detachment, and
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when I was discover'd by the Centinel, who was stationed over the Gate, I told him, in *High-Dutch*, that I belong'd to a Regiment which I knew was quarter'd in *Wirtemberg*, and had lately return'd from the War that was carried on towards Fort *Lewis*, and I desired to be admitted, as being incapable of sustaining the Cold any longer. The Officer of the Guard having receiv'd Information of these Particulars, from his Centinel, ascended to the Place where he was station'd, and conversed with me, while he dispatcht a Messenger to the Commandent, who lodged in the Castle, at a considerable Distance from that Gate. During our Conversation, my Men fixt a *Petard* on the Gate, which was not perceived by the Officer, till it was ready to operate. He then ordered the Centinel to Fire, and caused a Drum to beat an Alarm, tho' too late; for the Gate was forced in a Moment, and I form'd my Troops, in order of Battle, on the Spot, before the Garrison was in any State of Defence, so that all the Troops who composed it, were cut in Pieces, in Retaliation for the Murder of a Lieutenant, and 20 Troopers of the Regiment of *Villeroy*, by the *Imperialists*, after they had taken them Prisoners, and promised to allow them Quarter. We found 300 Horses in the Town, and distributed them among the Troopers and Dragoons

Dragoons of the Garrison of *Phortzheim*; after which I order'd the Town to be set on Fire, to prevent the Enemy from fixing any future Post in that Situation.

I have related all the Circumstances of this Surprizal and Destruction of a Post, in order to prove, that an Officer who commands in any Post of this Nature, should never imagine himself in a sufficient state of Security, when he has taken all the proper Precautions for the Prevention of a Surprize, at the Head of his Post which is next to the Enemy; but that he should have the same Attentions to those parts which seem least exposed, and above all things, should be vigilant, not to suffer himself to be approached in the Night, by the Enemy, in such a manner as will give them an Opportunity of fixing a *Petard* on a Gate which is uncover'd, and not provided with a Portcullis or any other interior Protection. For if the Officer of the Guard, who was too credulous, had not enter'd into a Conversation with me, and had not permitted me, under a Pretext of taking Shelter from the Snow, to make all the necessary Preparations for playing off the *Petard*, I could not have succeeded in that Operation, nor should I have surprized the Post without, being discovered and sustaining a considerable loss of Men; whereas I had

had no more than two kill'd upon this occasion.

As to the Post of *Entzwabingen* on the *Entz*, below *Phortzheim* which is a little Town, situated in an open Country, its Garrison was composed of 500 Horse and 150 Foot, and, in imitation of the Garrison of *Neubourg*, had a Post, in the Day time, on an Eminence near *Phortzheim*, from whence the Soldiers who were station'd there, had a view of all those who should happen to come out of the Town. After I had remounted all my Cavalry and Dragoons, on the Horses taken at *Neubourg*, I marched to *Entzwabingen*, during the next Night. The Cavalry were ordered to advance, on the other side of the *Entz*, to prevent those of the Enemy from saving themselves, by passing that River, while I attacked the two Gates with my Infantry; and I marched with 600 Foot, divided into two Bodies, in order to form an Attack, at the same time, on the two Gates, one of which was towards *Phortzheim*, and the other towards *Hailbron*.

These Gates were unprovided with Draw-Bridges, and were not so well built as those of *Neubourg*. They, however, were covered with a pallisaded *Redan*, capable of containing about 15 Men, who retired, at Night, into the Town, and in the Day time it on-

ly protected the Guard who were posted at the Gate. As the Enemy had no more than 150 Foot in the Place, I judged that the Guard, at the Gates, would be weak, and that it would be necessary to attack those Gates with Vigour. I order'd Hatchets to be deliver'd to the Men who were detach'd for that particular Service, and as they were protected by the Fire of the Infantry, they soon cut down the Barriers, and the Gates, so effectually, that the Troops enter'd in good Order, notwithstanding the Darkness of the Night. All the Troops of the Garrison were cut to pieces, to retaliate the Massacre I have already mention'd; above 600 Horses were taken, and sent to *Phortzheim*, and the Town was burnt and plunder'd.

I have been so particular in this Relation, to make it evident, that it is almost impossible for two Posts, possessed by the Enemy, to have a perfect Similitude to each other, in their Situation, as well as in the Nature and Strength of the Garrisons, and the Attentions necessary for their Security; it is, therefore, prudent to pursue a different Conduct, in their Attack and Surprizal; this Truth is sufficiently evinced by the Examples I have related, since the Conduct, in the Execution of these two Enterprizes, was entirely different.

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At the close of the Year 1690, the Duke of Savoy having posted a Company of his Regiment of Guards, in the Castle of *Orbassan*, which is a League from *Turin*, to cover the Walk he had appropriated to his use in the City, and likewise that which belonged to his Palace of the *Valentine*; this Company, tho' within sight of *Turin*, and supported by the Horse who were in Garrison in this City, and in *Montcalier*, was surprized by my Troops. I petarded the Gate, though I was discovered; notwithstanding the number of the Enemies, and the Signals they made, to give notice of the Attack they sustain'd. I shall now relate the Dispositions I form'd to surprize this Post, and secure my Troops, during the Expedition, and in their return from the Execution.

I marched from *Pignerol*, at the Beginning of the Night, with 800 Horse, and 600 Foot, from the former of which I detached 50 Troopers, with orders to advance to the Bank of the *Po*, opposite to *Montcalier*, that I might receive proper Intelligence from them, in case the Cavalry of that Quarter should mount, in order to attack me in my Retreat; and when I approached *Orbassan*, I dispatched the rest of my Cavalry, to form themselves in order of Battle, as near *Turin* as possible, that they

might oppose the Troops who should happen to march from that Place, in the Night, to succour the Post. I continued with my Infantry, whom I station'd, as silently as possible, near the Castle, in order to support the *Petardeer*, and to force their way into the Castle, when the *Petard* had accomplish'd its Effect.

The *Petardeer* having been kill'd by a Centinel who was at a Window near the Gate, and the Garrison being awaked by the Report of the Piece, made a great Fire, and several Signals, and therefore no time was to be lost in the Execution of this Enterprize, consistent with the Security of my Troops in their return. I was therefore obliged to fix the *Petard* my self, since I could not find any one who understood the proper Management of that Engine; and the entire Company being forced in the first Court, would not expose themselves to the same Event, in the main Court, but surrendered Prisoners of War.

The Particulars of this Surprizal, present the Reader with a Disposition entirely different from those I have before described; since the Measures concerted for the Security of this Expedition against the Castle of *Orbassan*, were only calculated to oppose any Troops, that might advance for its Relief, and not to protect us against the Garrison,

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in the Place. These Precautions were conformable to my Maxim, for conducting such an Enterprize agreeably to its particular Nature, as well as to the Apprehensions that may be created from without the Place. For it is certain, that if I had been defeated in my Return from a fortunate Execution of this Enterprize, I might justly have been taxed with Imprudence, for having form'd it, without concerting the necessary Measures to secure my Retreat against any superior Body of Cavalry, who might advance from *Turin*, and *Montcalier*.

The same Winter, I surprized, at *Lucern*, a Battalion of the Regiment of *Loches*, composed of *French* Refugees, and which had been sent by the Duke of *Savoy*, to cover the *Vaudois*, who were determined to support themselves in the Valley of *Lucern*. The Surprizal of this Post was executed in a different manner from the others I have described, because its Situation was likewise different.

The City of *Lucern* had been burnt, at the beginning of the preceding Campaign, and its Walls demolished. The Ruins, therefore, form'd a kind of Intrenchment, around the Habitations that were destroyed, and the Troops of this Battalion, imagined that in a Season so rigorous among the *Alps*, as the Month of *January*, they should be in a

Condition to maintain themselves amidst these scatter'd Fragments, provided they kept a vigilant Guard, and continued, each Night, under Arms, notwithstanding the Cold; at the same time, causing the Rounds to be continually made, in order to be attentive to the Noise of any Motion of Troops without *Pignerol*. When I had been inform'd of all the Precautions observed by this Battalion, I took a large Circuit in order to surprize it, and arrived, between the Foot of the Mountain and *Lucern*, one Hour after Midnight, and waited in a profound Silence, till the Vigilance of the Rounds was in some Measure relaxed, and as it appear'd to be so, in the space of two Hours, I advanced by six different Tracts, to this disorderly Intrenchment, which was soon forced, and the whole Battalion destroyed. *Lucern* was almost inaccessible at three Quarters, or at least, it was only practicable to arrive at it, by Paths just wide enough to contain two in Front, and upon which were several guarded Intrenchments. In order therefore to succeed in the Surprizal and Destruction of this Battalion, who had not sufficient time to make a Retreat to the Mountain, the Foot of which was not more than two hundred Paces distant from the City; the Knowledge, therefore, which I obtain'd of the Situation of this Post, and the manner in which

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it was guarded, enabled me to regulate my Disposition, as well as my March and Attack, which was made between the Mountain and the City, at a Quarter from whence the Enemy did not expect any Invasion. This Surprizal, therefore, was in the Nature of an Assault given before the Enemy could be in any Preparation to receive it, and especially as the Night favour'd the Approach of the Troops, and the Execution of their Enterprize.

Hitherto I have only related successful Instances of the Surprizal of Posts, but I shall now offer the Particulars of one that miscarried, and assign the Cause of its Inefficacy.

In the Month of *January* 1691, *M. de Catinat*, who was then at *Susa*, determin'd to surprize and carry the Post of *Avigliano*, where the Duke of *Savoy* had a Garriſon of Foot in the Caſtle, which was well ſituated, and a Regiment of Dragoons in the Town, which was not ſecured from an Inſult. This Poſt is in the Valley of *Suſa*, and might be attacked, at the ſame time, on the ſide of *Suſa*, and that of *Rivoli*. *M. de Catinat* undertook to march thither from *Suſa*, with a number of Troops, and two Field-pieces, and order'd me to advance from *Rivoli*, with a conſiderable Body of Troops, and two Pieces of Cannon,

In order to have secured a fortunate Event of this Expedition, the Measures that were concerted, should have been executed with great Expedition and Exactness, because the Duke of *Savoy* could assemble more Troops, in the space of two Hours, for the Relief of *Avigliano*, than could be conducted thither, in order to attack it. This Enterprize, therefore, was unsuccessful, for want of due Exactness in the Moment of Execution.

The two Bodies of our Troops, who advanced from *Susa*, and *Pignerol*, marched in such different Routs, as deprived them of all Communication with each other, as well in their March, as when they first enter'd upon the Attack; and therefore they ought to have begun their separate Attacks, at the same time, and at the Dawn of Day; because we ought not, by successive Attacks, to have given this Regiment of Dragoons time to retire into the Castle.

I finished my March at the appointed time, and attacked and carried the Town of *Avigliano* on my Quarter, which was that of *Turin*, and most distant from the Castle; but M. *de Catinat* having amused himself, by the way, in raising one of his Pieces of Cannon which had been overturn'd, and not arriving at the Hour prescribed for the Attack on the Quarter of *Susa*; a Party of Dragoons, who were lodged near the Castle, had

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had time to retire into it with their Horses, and the Garrison had the same Opportunity to take Arms. By which means, the Execution of this Enterprize being protracted, the Duke of *Savoy* had time to arrive at the Place, with a considerable Body, about four in the Afternoon; upon which we were obliged to retire, after we had been Masters of the Town, between 7 and 8 Hours. I was even reduced to the Necessity of employing the Night, in advancing with my Troops, cross the Town, and under the Fire of the Castle; and to return to *Pignerol* by the Mountain, because the Duke of *Savoy* had blocked up my Passage through the Plain.

It is evident, by this Example, that when any Surprizal of this Nature is intended, and which can only be accomplished by Troops who advance to the place by different Routs, and are incapable of any mutual Communication, either in their March, or at the very time when they ought to begin the Attack of the Post they propose to carry, it is incumbent on them to arrive at the place with the utmost Punctuality, at the time prescribed for the Attack, without which Circumstance, it is almost impossible for the Enterprize to be successful.

I have frequently seen Posts for the Security of Convoys, taken, but as they should
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be always cover'd by the Army, and never hazarded, I have not seen any of them surpriz'd and carried.

The Post of *Poperingue*, taken in the Year 1708, by some Battalions of the Duke of *Marlborough's* Army, might have been of this kind. It was very hazardous, and was, therefore, carried.

C H A P. XX.

Of the taking of Quarters, and separate Bodies of Troops, by Force of Arms.

I Have seen but few Quarters taken in such a manner as can make it necessary to cite them as so many Examples ; because the Generality of them have been taken, amidst all the Precautions requisite for their Security. This Chapter shall therefore comprehend my Reflections on the taking Bodies of Troops separated from the Army, and who incur'd that Misfortune by the Negligence of their Commanders.

Among the Quarters that have been taken, I shall relate the Instance of that of *M. de Montclar*, which happen'd in the Year 1676.

1676. This General being desirous to make an Inroad into the Valley of *St. Peter*, behind *Fribourg*, was so remiss in guarding his Quarter, during the Night, that it was carried by the Enemy, and he was taken in his House where he had concealed himself. If *M. de Montclar*, who had an Inclination to pass the Night in a place shut up, on two sides, by a Mountain, had posted Guards, as well in the Avenues to the Quarter, as on the lateral Heights; and if his Troops had perform'd the *Bivoac*, in a Disposition to sustain the Guards, and he himself had been more vigilant during the Night, it is certain that he would not have had the Misfortune to be taken in his House.

This Instance proves the absolute Necessity of Vigilance in an Officer, who is charged with any particular Expedition, and ought to observe the necessary Precautions in a time of Repose, which is always chosen by an Enemy, who endeavours to derive Advantages from the Necessity of human Nature, which requires the Refreshment of Slumber, after a long Fatigue. An Officer, therefore, who is posted in a Quarter of this kind, ought to dispose his Guards in such a manner, as may enable them to give the Troops sufficient time, to preserve themselves from a Surprize by Night, to which they are easily exposed by any sudden Disorder. To
this

this Effect, they should never sleep, but in order of Battle, and under Arms; and the Commanding Officer himself ought to be continually vigilant, during the whole Night, and should oblige some of his Officers to observe the same Circumspection, and allow them to sleep only in the Day, and when he can be well assured that it will be impossible for the Enemy to approach him, without his receiving immediate Intelligence, and having sufficient Time to raise his Quarters without Confusion, or else to come to an Engagement, if he thinks himself in a condition to offer it.

In the Year 1693, Count *Tilly* having form'd his Camp near *Tongres*, while *M. de Luxembourg* encamped, with his Army, at the Abby of *Heylesem*, on the *Geet*, this General advanced with a Body of Cavalry, to surprize Count *Tilly's* Camp; but the Intelligence which he received of their Advance, tho' something late, prevented the entire Destruction of his Camp, which, however, sustain'd a considerable Loss of Men, and Baggage, and his Army was obliged to have recourse to Flight. If Count *Tilly* had posted several Parties of Troops near the Army of *M. de Luxembourg*, during the Night, he would not have been incommoded in that manner.

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In the Year 1694, the same Count *Tilly* was taken by Surprize, in a Castle he had chosen for his Post, and which was separated, by a *Morass*, from a flying Camp he commanded near *Tongres*. We may, therefore, conclude, from this Instance, that a Commander is inexcusable, when he chooses a Post merely for the sake of his own particular Conveniency, without taking the necessary Precautions for the Security of his Person, and the Facility of his Communication with the Camp he commands.

In the Year 1707, *M. de Vivans*, who had encamped, near *Offenburg*, with a Body of Horse, to the Rear of *Marshall de Villars*, who was encamped, with his Army, at *Ettlingen*, was surprized in his Camp, for want of the Circumspection requisite for a Person in his Situation, and he lost all his Troops and Baggage. His Camp was near a Range of Mountains, towards which he had neglected to post any Parties of Dragoons. The Air was darken'd, that Morning, by a great Fog, which ought to have render'd him more cautious; instead of which, he indulged himself in Sleep, and could only save himself, by flying, in his Shirt, to a Vineyard near his House, where he found means to conceal himself from the Enemy.

Two Particulars are to be learnt from this Instance; the one, that a General should never

ver assign the Command of a separate Body of Troops, to an Officer, of whose Vigilance and Capacity, for such a Trust, he is not sufficiently assured: The other, that an Officer, who is charged with a Command of this Nature, should always believe himself in danger of being surprized by a vigilant Enemy; and consequently ought never to relax his Attentions for the Security of the Troops who are committed to his Conduct.

C H A P. XXI.

Of the Surprizal of Convoys.

MY Maxims on this Subject, relate to the Measures necessary to be taken in the Surprizal of Convoys, either in their way to an Army, or their return from it; together with the Precautions that ought to be observed for the prevention of those Surprizals. I shall therefore only relate some Instances that will represent the Inconveniences that have been sustain'd, by suffering Convoys to be conducted, without a due Circumspection for their Security.

If M. *de Montecuculi* had not surprized the Convoy of Bread that was passing, from *Wirtzburg*, to the Army of Marshal *de Tur-*

renne,

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renne, in the Year 1673, that General of the *Imperial* Forces could never have compelled the Marshal to abandon *Franconia*, in order to obtain Supplies of Bread from *Philipsburg*; and as he would then have thought it infinitely dangerous to have left the *French* Army in the Heart of *Germany*, and near the Hereditary Dominions of the Emperor; it would have been impossible for him to have marched to the Lower *Rhine*, before the Marshal, and to have join'd the *Dutch* and *Spaniards*. We may therefore venture to declare, that Marshal *de Turenne* had too much Confidence in the Treaty made with the Bishop of *Wirtzburg*, who so little regarded his own Stipulations, that he gave free Passage, thro' that City, to a Body of *Imperial* Horse, who surprized this Convoy, without the City. If Marshal *de Turenne*, to whom it was of infinite Importance to be supplied with Bread from *Wirtzburg*, because there was not any other Provision of Corn, nearer than the Magazines in *Philipsburg*, had not, in this Conjunction, relied too much on the Punctuality of a *German* Prince, who, at that time, might be strongly solicited, to violate his Promise, by *M. de Montecuculi*, who was then near *Wirtzburg*, with the Emperor's Forces; and if Marshal *de Turenne* had posted a considerable Body of Troops, at the Gate of that City,

to receive his Convoy, it is evident that the Enemy would not have attempted to surprize it, because they would have been obliged to defile, without the City, before a Body of Troops, who would then have been form'd in order of Battlẽ.

This Event affords us an Instance of a remarkable Error, committed by one of the greatest Captains *France* ever enjoyed; and likewise discovers of what Importance it is for a General to be vigilant for the Security of his Convoys of Provisions.

I shall not enlarge on the Particulars of those Convoys that enabled our Enemies to form the Siege of *Lisle*, in 1708, and to make themselves Masters of that important Place. I am unable to comprehend how any Circumstance, but a voluntary Neglect, occasion'd by our absurd Contempt of the Enemy, could ever facilitate the Passage of that Convoy from *Brussels*, in a File that must certainly have form'd an Extent of five Leagues at least. The second Convoy was conveyed from *Ostend*, to the Enemy, for their use, in the Siege of *Lisle*, and its Passage seems, to me, more surprizing than that of the other; but the best Reason for that strange Event, is, in my Opinion, to be derived from the Incapacity of *M. de la Mothe*, who was commission'd to intercept this Convoy; and instead of succeeding in his Charge, tho' his

his Troops were infinitely superior, in Number, to the Escort, was shamefully defeated by that weak Body; which is one of the most singular Events that ever happen'd: For tho' a hazardous Convoy may have been conducted in Safety, in consequence of the Secrecy and Vigilance observed in its Conveyance, yet that a Convoy, attacked by an infinite Superiority of Force, should not only pass, without sustaining the least Detriment, but that the few Troops who guarded it, should defeat the Aggressors, whose Numbers so much exceeded their own, is an Event that was never known till then; and M. *de la Mothe* was reserved to convince us that it was not impracticable.

C H A P. XXII.

Of the Surprisal of Baggage.

MY Maxims on this Subject, represent the Conduct necessary to be pursued in the Surprisal of Baggage, when the Enemies have been remiss in a due Vigilance for its Preservation.

I have seen several Instances, wherein Baggage has been surpris'd and carried off, thro' the Misconduct of untractable Servants; but

this Inconvenience may be prevented, by the good Discipline of an Army that forms its Marches, with all the Precautions necessary for its Security. I shall, therefore, think it sufficient to cite some Examples of the Surprisal of Baggage in different Manners, as well as in Conjectures of various Natures, in order to represent the Errors that were committed in a March, or the particular Disposition of the Troops.

The first Instance is that wherein *M. de Luxembourg*, who then persisted in his Attachment to the Prince of *Condé*, surprised and carried off all the Baggage of Marshal *de Turenne's* Army. The Fact is as follows. Marshal *de Turenne* having determined to march his Troops, with all possible Expedition, for the Relief of *Arras*, left all his Baggage under the Care of *M. de Siron*, the Lieutenant General, together with such a Guard, as he thought sufficient for its Security. When *M. de Siron* beheld himself in View of *M. de Turenne's* Camp, and in a very open and spacious Plain, he thought the Baggage was perfectly safe; and as he imagined any other Precautions, for its Arrival at the Camp, unnecessary in that Conjecture, he advanced before, with the Van of the Escort, to inform *M. de Turenne* of the Success of his March. *M. de Luxembourg*, who had placed himself in Ambush, with
a Body

a Body of Cavalry, at a little Distance from the Baggage, observing this negligent Conduct, advanced, with great Expedition, to the Head of that Column, seized the Baggage, and conducted it to *St. Pol*, while the opposite Army had not any Intimation of this proceeding, till they had vainly waited, a considerable time, for their Baggage, which *M. de Siron* had assured them was actually arrived at the Camp.

It appears, by this Instance, that an Enemy may easily chastise the opposite Forces, when they are guilty of the least Remissness in the proper Cautions for their Security. For *M. de Siron* lost the Baggage of his Army, in this Conjunction, for no other Reason, than because he imagined that as the Enemy were shut up in their Lines of Circumvallation before *Arras*, at the same time that two Armies were near their Camp, with an Intention to attack their Lines, they would not think of detaching a considerable Body of Cavalry, on an Enterprize of this Nature.

The second Instance of the Loss of Baggage, is of a different Nature. We have seen, in the preceding Article, the Baggage of an Army lost, thro' the Negligence of the Officer to whom the Care of it was intrusted, during a long March, which he perform'd in the Rear of an Army, from

which he was then at a very considerable Distance. I shall now relate the Surprisal of an Army's Baggage, at the time of their Decampment, which is a very unusual Event, because Measures are generally taken, in such a Conjunction, for disincumbering the March with Baggage, by causing it to advance before the Army, or by covering it with a Body detached for that Service.

The Enemies, in their Decampment from *Seneffe*, before the Prince of *Condé's* Army, neglected all the due Precautions for the Conveyance of their Baggage, which advanced at too little a distance from our Army; so that the first Troops of their Rear-Guard, who were defeated, occasion'd the Discovery of the Column of the *Dutch* Baggage, which was entirely surpris'd and carried off.

The third Instance of the Loss of Baggage, is that of *Ramillies*, which is different from the two former. Tho' it be usual for an Army to lose great part of their Baggage, when they have not had sufficient time to disincumber themselves of it, in their March, or to send it to some place in their Rear, or even to secure it behind some River; yet in this Instance, when a General was advancing towards his Enemy, whom he expected to meet, in his March, it was very peculiar in him, not to take any Precautions

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to disengage himself from his Baggage, and that he should cause it to advance between his two Lines. This, however, was the Conduct observed by Marshal *de Villeroy*, in that Conjunction, and which created a general Disorder among his Troops; for tho' he had, at least, five Hours time to convey his Baggage from between his two Lines, into the Rear of his Army, he neglected that necessary Attention, which ought to have been previous to the Engagement; and therefore, when the first Line of his Right was attacked, it was impossible for the second to advance in Front, in order to sustain the first, when they were thrown into Disorder, by the Enemy; because they were obstructed, in their March, by the great Quantity of Baggage that lay between the two Lines.

All the other Losses of Baggage that I have seen, or which have happen'd since I engaged in the Service, were not general; and therefore I shall only observe, that a Detriment of this Nature, in the Operations of War, is commonly occasion'd by the Inadvertency of the General, in the Dispositions for his March.

When it becomes necessary to march the Baggage, in Columns detached from the main Army; should their Guard be either insufficient, or ill disposed; the Enemy will

have frequent Opportunities of forming Ambuscades, on the Wings, or else in the Rear; by which means the Baggage is surpris'd and carried off in detail.

When a General causes the Baggage to be conveyed between particular Columns of Troops, if the Officers who are charged with the Escort, either suffer the Baggage to advance at too great a distance from the Van of those Columns, or else leave it too remote in the Rear, it will be practicable for Parties of Troops form'd in Ambuscade, in the Front or Rear of such a March, to carry off the Baggage. Baggage may likewise be often lost, by the Indocility of Servants, who neglect to follow the Columns, unless they happen to be in sight of the Officers who command the Escort; and this is an Inconvenience that generally attends Marches by Night; but it should not be imputed, either to the General who has made a proper Disposition for the Security of his Army's Baggage, or to any Remissness in the Officer who commands the Escort.

C H A P XXIII.

Of Surprisals in Marches.

I Shall now treat of those Surprisals an Army may sustain, in Front, Flank, or Rear.

My first Instance will be that of *Seneffe*, in the Year 1674, which will exhibit the Misconduct of an Army that imprudently presented its Flanks to an Enemy, in its March, and hazarded an incautious Passage thro' Defiles that open'd at the beginning of the March, when the Army was most exposed to an Insult. I have already related the Particulars of this great Action, in the Course of the preceding Chapters. The Tendency therefore of my present Observations will be to prove, by a famous Example, that an Attempt may be form'd against the Army of an Enemy, when they march with their Flank too near their Adversaries, and regardless of the Precautions necessary for the Security of that Motion.

The second Instance is the Encounter at *Leuses* in 1691, and it represents to us an Army, who, in a Persuasion of their sufficient Remoteness from the Enemy, hazarded a Retreat, and left their Rear-Guard in order of

Battle, at the Head of the Camp they had quitted, and which was separated, by a Rivulet, from the Body of the Army, who, when they had past that Stream, did not form themselves, to receive the Troops of their Rear-Guard, and protect them till they had crossed the Rivulet.

All Motions in War, how distant soever the Enemy may be, should be undertaken with as much Circumspection, as if they were to be executed in their View, because it ought to be supposed that the Enemy may have been informed of any Neglect in the Regulation of those Motions, and are in a Condition to improve it to their own Advantage.

King *William*, who was encamped at *Leuses*, with the Rivulet of *Catoire* in his Rear, did not believe that *M. de Luxembourg*, who was then under the Walls of *Tournay*, six Leagues from *Leuses*, could receive Intelligence of the Decampment of his Troops, soon enough to attack the Rear-Guard, before they had past the Rivulet of *Catoire*; and this Persuasion betray'd those Troops into a Defeat, as I have observed in another Place.

The third Instance is that of *Luzara*, and it represents to us, an Army advancing to the Enemy, and preceded by a Detachment of Troops, who, tho' they were appointed to gain Intelligence in their March, neglected

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to make a sufficient Advance beyond the place where the Army intended to encamp; in Consequence of which Omission, his Majesty's Forces would have been entirely defeated, if the Enemy had not been discovered, by a fortunate Accident, the Particulars of which I have related in a former Chapter.

The fourth Instance is the Battle of *Spires*, the Circumstances of which exhibit, to our Consideration, an Army marching in Columns to the Enemy, whom they defeated, notwithstanding that improper Disposition into which they were ranged; and without being formed in order of Battle.

Tho' this Action had a happy Event, I can never recommend the previous Disposition of our Troops, as an Example that ought to be imitated: An accidental Instance of good Fortune, that could not be reasonably expected, since it was not the Result of any judicious Measures, should never be attempted, by such improper Expedients, for the future.

The fifth Instance is the Battle of *Cassano*, which represents the Case of an Army advancing near the Enemy, in their March thro' a Woodland Country, where they were conceal'd from View, by a little Eminence; and as this Army happen'd to be separated from their Enemies, by a Rivulet, they imagined

gined they might form a large Extent, with Impunity, tho' they were near an Enemy, with whose Motions they were unacquainted; and they likewise thought they might suffer their Line to be divided by the Branches of that Rivulet. It is certain, however, that if the General Officer of Prince *Eugene's* Army, who was station'd at *Paradis*, with an Intention to be always capable of opposing a Front of Troops to the Duke of *Vendôme*, had not marched too soon, in order to join the Forces of the Prince, and if the Troops of the King's Army had not advanced, with great Expedition, to re-join the Duke of *Vendôme*, it is certain that Prince *Eugene*, who had made a successful Attack on the Bridge of *Cassano*, by which our Army was equally divided, would have easily defeated us, in Consequence of that Separation.

The sixth Instance is the Battle of *Ramil-les*, which represents an Army marching in two Lines, in View of the Enemies, who advanced in a Column, from a considerable Distance, that they might have time to form themselves in order of Battle.

In this unfortunate Conjunction, Marshal *de Villeroi* continued immoveable, more than five Hours, in his first order of Battle, and without changing his Disposition, in the manner he saw the Enemy forming their
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own; and he likewise permitted them to improve all the Advantages of the Ground, of which he might easily have deprived them, by changing his Disposition.

All these Instances of the Surprisals of Armies in their March, and which are entirely diversified in their Circumstances, tend to corroborate my Maxims, for the safe Regulation of Marches, and make it evident that a General can never commit these Errors with Impunity, before a vigilant Enemy.

C H A P. XXIV.

Of the Surprisal of a whole Army.

WITH Respect to this Subject, I shall relate some Instances that have varied in their Events.

In the Year 1675, the Army commanded by the Marshal *de Crequi*, was entirely Surprised and Defeated, in its Camp near *Confarbrick*. I have mention'd, in a former Chapter, the Errors committed by our General, on this Occasion, and which were always advantageous to him for the future, since they awaked, in him, a constant Attention to every Circumstance capable of
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contributing to his Success, as will be evident by the following Instance.

In the Year 1677, this General surprised the whole Army of the Duke of *Saxe Eysenack*, and the Event was so very singular that it merits a particular Relation.

The Duke of *Saxe Eysenack*, after he had safely past the *Rhine*, at *Huninghen*, in the View of *M. de Montclar*, imagined he might post himself on the *Kintz*, near Fort *Kbel*, before the same General; at a time when the Marshal *de Crequi* was marching his Army from *Germany*, in View of the Imperial Forces commanded by the Duke of *Lorraine*, who, for the Space of four Months, had made several ineffectual Attempts to re-enter his Dominions, or *Champaign*, by the *Saar*, the *Moselle*, and the *Maes*. This Prince was then endeavouring to advance into the Lower *Alsatia*, but the Marshal *de Crequi*, by his judicious Conduct, made it impossible for him to approach that Province, through any Country but the *Palatinate*; by which means, he gain'd several Marches on the Duke.

In the mean time, the Duke of *Saxe Eysenack*, who was posted in the Situation I have mention'd, imagined he might safely continue there, till the Duke of *Lorraine's* Army had approached *Strasburg*, near enough to form a Conjunction of their Troops; but
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the Marshal *de Crequi*, who exceeded him in Expedition, past the *Rhine* with part of his Army, leaving the Remainder on the other side of that River, where the Remoteness of the Duke of *Lorraine*, enabled them to continue some Days in Safety, and he then advanced to the *Kintz*, with such a rapid March, that the Duke of *Saxe-Eysenack* who imagin'd he was only confronted by the Troops commanded by *M. de Montclar*, was surpris'd so unexpectedly, that he was constrain'd to throw his Troops into an Island in the *Rhine*, opposite to *Strasburg*, and where he continued, till the Marshal *de Crequi* granted him a Pass-port for his whole Army, with only one Trumpet to conduct them.

Marshal *de Crequi* was apprehensive, lest the Regency of *Strasburg*, which, at that time, was an *Imperial City*, should permit the Duke of *Saxe-Eysenack* to re-enter *Alsatia*, where he would have greatly reinforced the Duke of *Lorraine*, whose Troops were considerably weaken'd by their Losses and Fatigue in the Campaign they had made; and this Apprehension induced him to grant that glorious Pass-port, which was couched in very humbling Terms for the Duke of *Saxe-Eysenack*, who was permitted, by our General, to retire into *Germany*, with all his Army, by a particular Rout prescribed for
their

their March ; and all the Officers, Troopers, and common Soldiers of the *French Army*, were expressly forbid to offer the least Injury either to the Duke, or his Army, in their return to *Germany*.

These two Instances make it evident that an Army may be surpris'd in different manners. In the first Instance the Marshal *de Crequi's* whole Forces were surpris'd, because they were obliged to come to an Engagement contrary to their Expectations, and with much Reluctance; and likewise at a time when the Cavalry were out upon a Forrage, and the Horses of the Artillery were employ'd in the Conveyance of a Convoy. In the second Instance, we see an Army surpris'd, because they were ignorant of the Reinforcement of those Troops who oppos'd them.

I shall therefore close this Subject with observing, that a whole Army can never be surpris'd, but in Consequence of the Presumption or Negligence of their General, or the Vigilance of the Commander of those Troops, by whom they are oppos'd.

I have, on other occasions, seen Armies, whose ill Disposition render'd them liable to be easily surpris'd, and entirely destroyed. The Year 1693, would furnish me with several Instances of this Nature, if Marshal *Villeroy* had given me an Opportunity to cite them.

CHAP.

C H A P. XXV.

Of the Surprisals of Passages over Rivers, and of Defiles.

I N order to make it evident that my Maxims for succeeding in this Operation of War, are just, I shall relate some Instances of the Conduct I have seen practised by others, on such Occasions, and likewise of that which I have pursued, my self, with Success.

In the Year 1672, the *Dutch* having lost their Places on the *Rhine*, in a very few Days, and observing that the *French* Army marched to the *Yssel*, they intrenched the Banks, and endeavoured to render the Fords impracticable, from *Campen* to *Arnheim*; and as the Places on that River were fortified with strong Garrisons, the *Dutch* readily believed they should be capable of securing the intrenched Banks of the *Yssel*, with the rest of their Cavalry, for some time at least; but as the Tract they proposed to defend was very extensive, they were obliged to weaken their Forces in every part, and were unable to make any Resistance.

This Example proves the Impossibility of securing the Fords of a River, when the Extent of Land to be preserved, is very considerable;

derable; because the Assailants, who seem to form their Efforts against several Parts, in order to separate the Forces of their Enemies, and oblige them to be equally attentive to Quarters, remote from each other, at last determine their Operations against the Place where they find the least Resistance, and always frustrate the Labours and Vigilance of their Adversaries, especially when they execute their Enterprize by Night; because this is the most favourable Season for concealing the Place where their Efforts are to be most vigorous.

I shall not relate the Particulars of the famous Passage at *Tolhuis*, which happen'd much about the same time, because it was an Event only render'd successful by meer Temerity, and ought not to be cited, as an Instance for Imitation.

At the Close of the same Year 1672, the Marshal *de Turenne*, who was then in the Electorate of *Triers*, on the side of *Coblentz*, having been join'd by the Troops dispatcht to him by the Prince of *Condé*, by the Upper *Moselle*, resolved to drive the Elector of *Brandenburg* out of *Westphalia*, where he had disposed his Army into Winter Quarters, between the *Rhine* and the *Weser*, which he imagined to be a safe Situation, since he did not believe it practicable for the Marshal *de Turenne* to cause a Bridge to be thrown
over

over the *Rhine*, in that Season; which, however, was accomplished by this General with so much Expedition, that his Army past the River, before the Elector could have time to reassemble his Troops from their Quarters, from whence he retired in great Confusion, and caused his Forces to advance in separate Routs, beyond the Defiles of *Berkenbaum*, where he durst not halt, but proceeded in his March, past the *Weser*, and abandon'd all *Westphalia* to Marshal *Turenne*, who continued there, without any Molestation, during the whole Winter, which afforded his Troops an opportunity of refreshing themselves, after the fatiguing Marches they had sustain'd.

This Example perfectly corresponds with the two Subjects of this Chapter; and Marshal *Turenne* can never be too much applauded, for his Expedition in passing the *Rhine*, before the Elector of *Brandenburg* could draw his Troops out of their Winter Quarters; and for his Vivacity in marching his Army to the Defiles of *Berkenbaum*. For it is certain, that the Marshal's Passage over the *Rhine*, would have been of no Importance, if he had not driven the Elector out of *Westphalia*, and he could never have secured safe Quarters for his Troops, if he had not forced that Prince beyond the Defiles of *Berkenbaum*, and the *Weser*. This

Passage, therefore, over so great a River, was happily compleated, in Consequence of the speedy Erection of a Bridge, in that rigorous Season; and the Event was as favourable, since the Army advanced to a Defile, whose Possession secured the Tranquillity of those Quarters, where the Troops were intended to be disposed.

In the Month of *December* 1688, I surpris'd the Bridge of *Dillenghen*, on the *Danube*, which was guarded by 500 Men.

The Enemy had cut the middle Arch of this Bridge, which was built of Wood, and had placed a Draw-Bridge there, which was rais'd towards *Bavaria*; and the 500 Men were posted in a large Redoubt, at the farther end of the Bridge. When I approach'd the *Danube*, I found the Bridge drawn up, and the Guard station'd in the Redoubt, and on each side of the Bridge, beyond the Draw-Bridge.

In order to force them from the Bridge, my Conduct was as follows. I observed, in my Approach to the Bridge, that the Enemy had not perforated the Draw-Bridge; so that the Men I should cause to advance would be cover'd from the Fire of the Enemy, who were posted on the Bridge; and there were likewise several Piles of Fir Beams on the Bank of the River, towards *Dillenghen*. I posted the Dragoons in such a manner,

ner, that they were cover'd by those Piles of Timber, and the Vollies they poured upon the Enemy, beyond the Draw-Bridge, obliged them to abandon all the Main Bridge, except one particular Part that was just sufficient to cover them from the Draw-Bridge which was only protected by the Fire from the Redoubt : And to be secure from this, I caused several Beams to be placed about the Rails of the Bridge, from whence I order'd the Troops to fire, with great Violence, upon the Redoubt which was lower than the Bridge.

When I approached the Draw-Bridge, I observed that the Enemy, who had but lately cut the Arch, to throw a Draw-Bridge over that Part of the main Bridge, had left the Beams standing on which the Swipes of the Draw-Bridge rested, and which were near ten Foot in height on each side. I then judg'd it would be proper to cause some Boards taken from the Piles of Fir, to be thrown upon those Beams, which, by this means, would furnish me with two little Bridges, from which I likewise caused other Boards to be extended to the Draw-Bridge, because I observed, that the Men who had conceal'd themselves behind it, had made a Retreat. When I had compleated this new Bridge, a Party of Dragoons broke the Fastenings of the Draw-Bridge, with Hatchets,

upon which it immediately sunk down, and all the Dragoons marched to attack the Redoubt, which was soon abandon'd by the Enemy, and I obliged the City of *Augsburg*, which was twelve Leagues from that place, to pay Contribution.

I am not prompted by Vanity to relate the Particulars of an Action which was executed under my Command; my only Motive was to make it evident, that such an Operation of War as this, may be accomplished by an infinite variety of Expedients, which should be accommodated to the Circumstances of the Expedition in view. For how would it have been possible for me, in this Conjunction, to have made my self Master of the Bridge of *Dillenghen*, without Cannon to batter the Redoubt, and without either Infantry or Boats, to make a Diversi-
on elsewhere, if I had not made those Observations as enabled me to have Recourse to the Expedients I have mention'd.

In the Year 1672, the Enemy finished a Bridge over the *Rhine*, in my View, because I was in no Condition to oppose them. The Circumstances are these that follow.

It is generally known, that when the Waters of the *Rhine* are raised by a great Swell, they flow into two old Channels, but leave several rising Tracts of Land dry, between the proper Channel of the *Rhine* and the

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the two old Beds. The Enemy were encamped, in one of these favourable Seasons, opposite to the Isle of *Santhoven*, and they improved that Opportunity, in making their Bridge. Our General, who was encamped at *Markeim*, which was twelve Leagues from thence, appointed me to command a Body of Troops detached from the Army, to take a near View of the Enemy's Motions. Upon my Arrival, I found the Bridge continued from the Isle of *Santhoven*, to a rising head of Land, before which the Waters were still very high in the old Channel of the *Rhine*, and all the Enemy's Forces had already past to this Tract of Ground whose Extent was very considerable; and therefore as I could not presume to oppose their whole Army, when the Waters should be sunk, and which they accordingly were, in a very few Hours, I was obliged to retire behind the Rivulet of *Spireback*, and I sent Advice to the General of the Particulars.

I have related the Circumstances of this Affair, with an Intention to observe, that any Design to oppose the Building of a Bridge over a River which resembles that I have mention'd, will be impracticable without an Army equal to that of the Enemy; and it would have been too presumptive in me, to have confronted the Enemy with my small Body of Troops, when the Waters of the *Rhine*,

by retiring to their proper Channel, had left their old Bed dry, and which might have been taken for a constant River, by those who were unacquainted with the Country.

In the Year 1694, King *William* was remis in his March from the *Mebaign*, to the *Scheld*, as well as in the proper Attentions to secure a Bridge in *Oudenard*, in order to be placed at *Hauterive*, on the *Scheld*, before the Arrival of *M. de Luxembourg's* Army; and therefore he was incapable of accomplishing his Design to make himself Master of *Courtray*, and to establish his Forrage-Quarters at the Expence of the *French Castellanies*.

It appears by this Example, that in the Surprisals of Rivers and Defiles, when a successful Event is absolutely necessary for the Completion of an intended Enterprize, the General ought to be vigilant in the prevention of his active Enemy, that he may compleat his own Design, before the other can be capable of opposing the Execution; and he should likewise be precaution'd against all the Inconveniencies to which he may be obnoxious, since a very inconsiderable Accident is frequently sufficient to frustrate his Project.

The Year 1708, furnishes me with the last Example I shall cite, with Relation to the Subject of this Chapter; and which is the

the Passage of Prince *Eugene* over the *Scheld*, at *Berkeim*, which occasion'd the Loss of the Citadel of *Lisle*. I have observed, in a former Chapter, that the Duke of *Vendôme* had form'd a great Circle round *Lisle*, with his powerful Army.

He imagined, that as the Enemies were in the Center of this immense Circle, they would be unable to accommodate themselves with Provisions, for such a Length of Time as the Defence of *Lisle* might be continued, and that they could only be supplied with Ammunition, from Places without the Extent of that great Circle; in a Word, that when their Enterprize on *Lisle* should be render'd ineffectual, by the inevitable Necessities I have mention'd, Prince *Eugene* would be incapable of retreating from that Inclosure, without sustaining some Capital Disadvantage.

Every Article of this Supposition was false, according to the Principles I have laid down; and I have demonstrated the Truth of this Assertion, in my Observations on the Plan for the Defensive in *Piedmont*, and which is applicable to this Subject; and I have likewise made it evident, in my Reflections on the Surprisals of Convoys, that this Circle was ineffectual, with Relation to the Ammunition which the Enemy received from

Ostend, when they could no longer derive those Supplies from *Brussels*.

It may perhaps be objected to me, that my Reflections are unjust, because the Convoys from *Ostend* were not facilitated by any Misconduct in the Duke of *Vendôme*, and that M. *de la Mothe* is alone blameable in this Particular. This I acknowledge to be true, but am well persuaded, that the Duke of *Vendôme* had too much Judgment to imagine that the Disposition of his Posts, along the *Scheld*, from *Tournay* to *Ghent*, would enable him to assemble his Forces time enough to make a successful Opposition, in the Quarter where the Enemies intended to exert themselves with the greatest Vigour, either by advancing under the Protection of *Oudenard*, or by throwing Bridges over the *Scheld*, in other Parts of the Country. For, in the first place, the Advantages arising from the Banks of the *Scheld*, through all that Extent, can only be enjoyed by those who are posted between that River and the *Lys*, and who are enabled, by that Situation, to raise proper Batteries of Cannon, to support the Workmen in building a Bridge, and to secure a Passage over it.

In the second Place, the River is narrow, and consequently a few Boats will be sufficient for building a Bridge, and it may easily be compleated in a short Time.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, the Nights are very long in that Season of the Year; the Enemy's Motions, therefore, may be conceal'd for a considerable time. For which Reason, I am persuaded, that if M. de Souternon, who was opposite to the Quarter from whence Prince Eugene threw a Bridge over the *Scheld*, and afterwards past that River, had even employed his utmost Endeavours to interrupt the Erection of that Bridge, the Duke of *Vendôme* would, nevertheless, have wanted sufficient time to assemble such a Body of Troops as would have been sufficient to prevent the Progress of Prince Eugene, whom I always thought capable of passing the *Scheld*, whenever he should think that Motion advantageous to his Designs; notwithstanding the Dispositions made by the Duke of *Vendôme*, to oppose him.

I shall, therefore, close my Reflections on this Affair, with observing, that the General who distributes his Troops into the greatest Extent, to render the Enemy incapable of surprising the Passage of a River, succeeds the least in that Design, and that the only Expedient to frustrate the Enemy's Execution of their Project, is to keep the Troops together, at a reasonable Distance from those Quarters where the Enemy may attempt their Passage; and likewise to have vigilant Persons on the Banks of the River,

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in order to receive constant Intelligence from them, of the Enemy's Motions; and they ought to be Persons capable of distinguishing Appearances from Realities, that there may be sufficient time for marching the whole Army, in order to engage the Enemy, either before they have entirely pass'd the River, or at least, before they have had time to form themselves in order of Battle, when their Passage is compleated.

This Maxim may be pursued, with equal Propriety, for the prevention of an Enemy's Passage over a River, or through any considerable Defiles; because the Success, in each of these Conjunctions, will be certain, provided the Enemy be confronted by a sufficient Body of Troops, and attacked before they have past all their Forces over the River, as I have already observed.

C H A P. XXVI.

Of Attacks form'd against Armies in their Trenches.

I Have seen but two Instances of this Nature; the first of which was render'd ineffectual, on the very point of Execution, by
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the Misconduct of the General who undertook it, and might have succeeded in the most effectual manner, as will be evident by a Relation of the Particulars.

In the Year 1677, while the Duke of *Lorraine* found Employment for the Marshal *de Crequi*, in the manner I have formerly declared, the Duke of *Saxe-Eysenack* pass'd the *Rhine* at *Philipsbourg*, with a Body of 10000 Men, with an Intention to penetrate thro' *Alsatia*, in the several places of which M. *de Montclar* had station'd his Troops; and he at last encamped near *Basil*, in order to be supplied with Provisions from the Foreign Towns; but chose his Situation too near the *Rhine*, and at a very considerable Distance from a Redoubt we, at that time, possessed on a Tract of Ground where the King of *France* has since caused the Fortrefs of *Hunningben* to be built.

This Post was not of any Importance, for several Reasons. It was almost contiguous to the River, and consequently the Duke was streighten'd in his Ground, which was likewise commanded by the Plain that rose above it by a Gradation of several natural Amphi-theatres, and he could not have any Forrage but what he would be obliged to procure on the other side of the *Rhine*, when M. *de Montclar* had assembled his Troops, and form'd his Camp on that Plain,
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which he accordingly did, a few Days after the Duke of *Saxe-Eysenack* had chosen the Post I have described.

As I shall not enquire whether this General might have posted himself in any other manner, and shall only offer such Reflections as occur with Relation to the Attack of an Army in their Trenches; it will therefore be sufficient for me to observe, that *M. de Montclar*, having advanced by the Mountain, made himself Master of those natural Amphi-theatres, after a slight Skirmish of Horse, and, from his first Arrival, shut up the Duke in his Camp, which his inferior Situation made him incapable of quitting, in order to engage our Troops, and he could only be accommodated with Forrage on the other side of *Rhine*, by marching over the Bridge on that River, which was in the Rear of his Camp.

This Camp was cover'd in Front, by an Intrenchment of a considerable Height, and along which, several Platforms were raised higher than the Intrenchment; but the Cannon were only pointed at the Ground that lay between the Camp, and the first Amphi-theatre, against which it was impracticable to make them play, and they were likewise commanded, by its Elevation. The Left was cover'd by an Intrenchment so near the Territory of *Basil*, as render'd it impossible
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for the Troops to form themselves in order to attack the Camp, from any other Quarter than that Tract of *Swiss* Ground, and which the Regency of *Basil* might possibly not have suffer'd. The Camp was likewise fortified on the Right, with an Intrenchment, but the exterior Ground was so advantageous to our Troops, that they were enabled, by an old Dike of the *Rhine*, and the Amphi-theatres, which on that side approached very near the Front of the Camp, and the right Flank, to advance within a very little Distance of the Camp, and to place the Cannon in such a manner as would cause them entirely to ruin the Entrenchment, and play upon the Flank of the Camp, which had not a sufficient Extent of interior Ground, for the Enemy to form themselves in order of Battle, between the Front of the Camp and the Intrenchment.

This was an unfortunate Situation for the Enemy, and very advantageous to our Troops, whose Motions might be all concealed. *M. de Montclar* had likewise caused a Train of large Artillery to be brought from *Brisac*, and they batter'd the Front of the Camp with great Success. In a Word, every Circumstance tended to the Destruction of the Enemy's Army, when *M. de Montclar* permitted them to pass the *Rhine*, by Night, without the least Molestation, over a single Bridge,

Bridge, tho' he heard the Noise of the Baggage and Artillery on the Bridge: And thus did they escape from our Army, when any other General would not have suffer'd one Man of them to have saved himself by such a Retreat.

The second Instance of the Attack of an intrenched Army, which I have seen, is that of *Nerwinden*, on which I shall not enlarge at present, since I have related the Particulars in a former Chapter, and shall have occasion to resume that Subject, in my Reflections on the Article of Battles.

I shall conclude this Chapter, with a Comparison that naturally presents it self, between the Conduct of two Generals, in two Operations of War that are of the same Nature.

The first, who is *M. de Montclar*, suffer'd an Army to escape, after he had shut them up with all their Artillery and Baggage, which were afterwards carried off in his Sight, over a Bridge on such a River as the *Rhine*.

The second General, who is *M. de Luxembourg*, totally defeated an Army equal to his own in Numbers, and superior in Cannon and Ammunition; and who were entrenched with all the Advantages of Situation, and had several Opportunities of retreating, without coming to any Action, if they had been willing to decline an Engagement.

CHAP.

C H A P. XXVII.

Of Skirmishes.

I Have seen but one Instance of a Skirmish which occasion'd an Encounter, and, in all probability, would have brought on a general Engagement, if there had been sufficient Day-light, And it was that which, in the Year, 1677, preceded the Encounter at *Kokersberg*. It was brought on by *M. Harran*, one of the Emperor's General Officers, who had dined a little too plentifully, as it appear'd to us after he was taken Prisoner; and the Action was sustain'd by *M. de Villars*, Colonel of the Horse of our Grand Guard.

As I have taken notice of this Action, in my Reflections on particular Encounters, I shall only take this Opportunity to remind the Reader of my Maxim with Relation to Skirmishes, which is, that all those should be discontinued, which are brought on by trivial Motives.

CHAP.

C H A P. XXVIII.

Of Ambuscades.

I Have not seen any Operations of this Class, but such as were intended to procure little Advantages, that are not worthy of any Reflection but this; namely, that it is of the utmost Importance to an Officer, who engages in this Species of War, not to neglect any of those Attentions that are necessary to prevent his being discover'd in the Place where he has form'd his Ambuscade; and to secure his Retreat, as well when he has executed his Design, as when he has miscarried.

C H A P. XXIX.

Of the Attack of Lines formed to cover a Country.

AS I have related every Particular, in my Maxims, that can well be offer'd, either in Favour of Lines, or against them, I shall only mention some Instances of their
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Inefficacy, which I have seen, not only with Reference to Inroads, and Contributions, from which they are represented as proper Expedients to secure a Country; but also with Relation to the Advance of an Enemy into a Country covered by Lines, when they are even guarded by an Army; and especially when the Extent of the Lines is not so considerable as the Enemy's Front, which is always the Fact.

The shortest Lines we have form'd, to cover a Country which we were desirous to exempt from Contributions, were those of *Courtray*, between the *Lys* and the *Scheld*; and they were twice abandoned by Messieurs *de la Vallette* and *Villars*, when the Enemy approached them with a Body of Troops more numerous than those by whom they were guarded; in which Conjecture, the two Generals conducted themselves with Prudence, tho' their Motions were different. *M. de la Vallette*, who was too weak, retreated to a Place where he had an Opportunity of continuing in Security, till *M. de Luxembourg* relieved him, by gaining the Battle of *Nerwinden*. *M. de Villars*, who had a Body of near 14000 Men, had Recourse to a judicious Expedient. He judged, that were he to confront the Enemy, with an Intention to support the Lines, he might be easily forced; because he was much weaker than the En-

mies would be, in every Quarter where they should happen to make their principal Efforts by Night. He therefore chose a good Post towards the Center of his Lines; and this Disposition intimidated the Enemy from attacking him in a Situation, where he had drawn all his Troops together; and they were as much discouraged from penetrating farther into the Country; either by advancing with their Flank to our Troops, or by leaving them in their Rear.

The judicious Conduct pursued by *M. de Villars*, on this Occasion, proves the certainty of my Maxim in Disfavour of Lines of this Nature; and makes it evident, that the Risque sustained by a Body of Troops, who are appointed to support a Line through its whole Front, is very great; and that the safer Expedient is to choose some advantageous Post, to prevent the Enemy from penetrating farther into the Country.

The Lines of *Ypres*, on the *Lys*, were not forced, because they were not attacked; but it was thought necessary to guard them with a whole Army, in 1695, and they only furnished the Marshal *de Villeroy* with a Pretext, for not offering Battle to King *William*, when he encamped at *Bacelaer*. For if this *French* General had not received Orders to support the Lines, and cover *Ypres*, he must inevitably have overwhelmed the Enemies, whose
Numbers

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Numbers were much inferior to his own, and who were encamped to a great Disadvantage; and the King of *England* would not have separated his Forces, in that Conjunction, as he did, if he had not been sensible that our Troops, if they quitted their Lines, must have been obliged to defile, before they could approach him.

This favourable Opportunity which M. *de Villeroi* was incapable of improving, corroborates the Truth of my Maxim, against the Use of such Lines as these; for I have observed, that one of their greatest Defects is their making it necessary for the General, who is ordered to support them, to behold his Enemies forming hazardous Motions, while he is in no Condition to chastise their Temerity, because he can only defile from his Lines; by which means he loses so much Time, as enables the Enemy to rectify their dangerous Motion, and which they may not only accomplish with Safety, but will likewise be in a Condition to defeat their Adversaries, who have but half quitted their Lines; near which this hazardous Motion must undoubtedly have been formed.

The Lines that were thrown up from the *Haisne* to the *Sambre*, were not forced, because they were not attacked; but if a just Calculation had been made of the Expences, which the Country they were intended to

cover, must sustain by their Construction and Defence, I am persuaded the Sum would have been found equal, at least, to that which the Enemies might have raised by Contributions, provided the Garrisons of the several Places could not have prevented their Inroads in small Parties. And if, to those Expences, there had been an additional Computation of the Charges that would be created, by guarding these Lines, it would have been evident, that those Sums might have been expended to more Advantage in raising Armies.

The Lines of the *Maes* and the *Semois* were altogether as useless to *Champaign*, and the three Bishopricks, to whom their Construction and Defence were vastly expensive, and indeed they could only tend to enrich those who were appointed to support them.

The Lines of *Weissenbourg* and *Haguenau*, that were formed to cover the lower *Alsatia*, were either forced or abandoned, when the Enemy appeared in a Condition to attack them, and they had the Satisfaction to encamp, for some Days, within those Lines. The Marshal *de Villars*, who commanded the *French* Army, had Recourse to the same Conduct, in this Conjunction, which he had pursued in the Lines of *Courtray*; which was to draw his Forces together, and the Enemy did not presume to advance with their Flank

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to his Troops, in order to penetrate into *Alsatia*, since they would then have sustained too great a Risque; and they likewise durst not advance, lest they should lose their Supplies of Bread, which they could only procure from *Landau*. When they had, therefore, continued some Days, within the Lines, and shared the Forrage with the *French Army*, they were obliged to retreat.

If Marshal *de Villars* had thought it an Affair of great Importance to support the Lines, by continuing in a Situation adjacent to them, and if he had been forced in any Particular Quarter, which must have been the Event, his Army would either have been separated, or taken in Flank, without any Possibility of presenting a Front to the Enemies, who, by defeating even a small Body of the Army, would have secured themselves a Superiority, through the whole Course of the Campaign.

The Circumstances of this Action are so many additional Proofs of the Truth of my Maxims, with Relation to Lines.

The Event of those great Lines that were formed at the beginning of the present War, to cover all the *Spanish Netherlands*, is generally known.

The new contracted Lines that were formed, after we had abandoned those from the *Me-baign* to the *Demer*, were not productive of any better Consequence, tho' they were guarded

ded by the whole *French* Army, under the Conduct of Marshal *Villeroi*. The seeming Dispositions made by the Duke of *Marlborough* to attack these Lines, on the side of the *Mehaign*, were mistaken by us for some real Design against *Namur*. We accordingly were advancing thither, when the Enemy, favoured by the Night, marched to the Quarter of M. *de Roquelaure*, on the Left of the Army, and entered the Lines, without the least Opposition.

The Conduct of Marshal *de Villeroi*, on this Occasion, was very different from that of Marshal *Villars*, in *Germany*, the Particulars of which I have already related; for he was determined to defend the whole Front of the Lines, and consequently the Army was separated, and rendered incapable of opposing to the Enemy, such a Front as could sustain, with any Success, the general Effort that was forming against an inconsiderable Body of their Army. When the Enemy, therefore, had advanced within the Lines, they were every where stronger than the Troops that could possibly confront them; because the Army had been separated, and could no longer form a Front against their Assailants. The Confusion was therefore universal; and our Troops being thus divided, were obliged to make a flying Retreat behind the *Dill*; by which Means they

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abandoned, to the Enemies, the whole extent of a large Country, which, had it not been for these Lines, they could only have shared, for some Time, with our Army, with Relation to Forrage; and without being able to establish themselves in those Parts.

This unfortunate Instance of Lines being forced, with a considerable Loss of our Troops, and to their great Disadvantage in the Sequel of the War, because we were determined to guard those Lines through their whole Front, is a Corroboration of my Maxims, with Respect to the Danger a General sustains, when he resolves to defend his Lines in such a manner.

I shall now give an Instance of Lines that were formed to cover a Country, in Consequence of Views very different from those I have already described; and I shall enlarge a little on the Particulars, in order to make it evident, that such an Operation of War may be judiciously conducted, in some Conjunctions.

In the Year 1709, the Consequences that resulted from our Loss of *Lisle*, in the preceding Year; the Calamities that were occasioned in *France*, by the entire Deficiency of the Harvest; and the Neglect to secure our Army in *Flanders*, from their Apprehensions of perishing by Famine, obliged M. de *Villars*, who commanded that Army, to be constantly

stantly inventing new Expedients to subsist his Troops, without being ever certain of a Supply of Bread for eight Days: His Situation, therefore, was rendered very deplorable, not only by the absolute Scarcity of all Provisions in general, but likewise through the Impossibility of his subsisting at any considerable Distance from those Places which furnished the little Quantities of Corn that could be collected in *Picardy*. The Enemies, on the contrary, were supplied, from *Lisle*, the *Lys*, and the Maritime Parts, with all Accommodations necessary for their Subsistence, and with Ammunition to facilitate their Designs on the Places belonging to the King of *France*.

The Marshal's Inability, therefore, to form any Motions with his Army, to oppose the Enemies, made him equally apprehensive for the Maritime Places, and those in *Artois*, as well as for *Doway*, and the Places on the *Scheld*.

The Enemies, before they determined to form the Siege of *Tournay*, created him all these necessary Attentions for the space of two Months; and as they had drawn their Forces together between the *Deule* and the *Scarp*, they obliged him to extend his Troops from the Abby of *Aunai*, to *Denain* on the *Scheld*. It is evident, therefore, that this extensive Situation made it necessary for him to form

form such Dispositions in every Quarter, as would enable part of his Army to oppose any general Effort, long enough to be joined by the rest of the Troops, before the Enemy could force them.

He had likewise Reason to be equally apprehensive of an Attack from the *Scarp*. The Enemies were Masters of the Abbeys of *Hannon*, and *St. Amand*, on that River, and of *Mortaign*, on the Conflux of the *Scarp* and the *Scheld*. They were also in a Condition to pass the *Deule* below *Lisle*, and advance to *la Bassé* and *Bethune*, or even to *Aire*, the Siege of which would be facilitated to them, since they might convey all the Materials for that Expedition, by the *Lys*. This Situation of the Enemy made it necessary for the Marshal to employ all possible Means to reduce it to the principal Points of the Enterprize, in case the Enemy should resolve to execute some parts of the Project we had most Reason to apprehend, and which was the Siege of *Bethune* and *Aire*, or of *Doway*, which was of the greatest Importance to us, because we had, there, deposited all the little Stock of Provisions and Ammunition we were able to procure.

In order to prevent the Enemy from advancing over the Bridge of *Avendin*, and to compel them to pass the *Deule*, either at *Haut-bourdin*, or below *Lisle*, the Marshal caused

caused several Works to be formed before the Bridge of *Avendin*, and left *M. d'Artaignan* there, with the left Wing of his Army; and that he might likewise prevent the Enemy from advancing to the Posts he possessed on the *Scarp*, he dislodged them from *Hannon*, and made himself Master of the Abbey of *Marchiennes*; he also caused Lines to be formed from the *Scarp*, to *Denain* on the *Scheld*; after which he disposed his Right Wing along those Lines, and continued, in Person, near *Doway*, that he might be at an equal Distance from his Right and Left.

This Disposition was well concerted, because it warded off several great Inconveniences, and Marshal *Villars* had Reason, in this Conjunction, to have Recourse to Lines to cover the Country, because he formed them with a View to gain sufficient Time for drawing all his Army together, that he might engage the Enemy, before they could be in a Condition to force these Lines.

After we had lost *Mons*, in the same Year 1709, we formed new Lines, which extended to *Valenciennes*, on the Left, and were carried through the Forest of *Mormaux*, to *Barlemont* on the *Sambre*, on the Right, and were continued, from *Barlemont*, along the *Sambre*, by *Mauberge*, *Thouin*, *Marchiennes*, and *Charleroi*. The first part of these Lines, from *Valenciennes* to *Barlemont*, seemed to be
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formed with more Judgment than the rest, because *Quesnoi* was in its Center; by which means an Army that should be disposed to defend these Lines, might be more easily kept together, in order to support them.

However, they were very defective in two Particulars; for, in the first place, they were turned off from *Condé*, which enabled the Enemy to besiege it with a precautionary Army, and not only to post themselves between the *Honneau* and the Lines, but likewise to secure the Army appointed for the Siege, in good Lines of Circumvallation, with Bridges on the *Haisne*, to open a Communication between their two Armies. They were likewise defective; because, as they were carried through the Forest of *Mormaux*, to *Barlemont*, they left *Maubeuge* uncovered; so that if the Enemy, after passing the *Honneau*, had presented themselves before that part of the Lines which extended between *Valenciennes* and *Quesnoi*, and had advanced in the Night, covered by that part of the Forest of *Mormaux*, which was without the Lines, it is certain they might easily have surprized the Pass of the *Sambre*, between *Barlemont* and *Maubeuge*, and might have invested this Place on that side of the *Sambre*, before all our Army could possibly have marched thither. I therefore can venture to declare, that since we had an Inclination for new Lines, it would have

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have been much more judicious to have extended their Left to *Condé*, and their Right to *Maubeuge*, along the *Honneau*, and to have left this little River at the Distance only of half a Cannon Shot from the Lines, in order to have rendered it impracticable for the Enemy to form themselves between the *Honneau* and the Lines, or to accomplish any other Motion on that Tract of Ground.

Had the Lines been traced in this manner, they would likewise have been advantageous in several other Respects. 1st. They would have been comprehended in a less Extent. 2^{dly}, They would have been contiguous to two Places, which they then would have protected. 3^{dly}, We should have been discharged from our Attentions to the Lines from *Barlemont* to *Maubeuge*, and which created us very great Difficulties, on Account of the Bend which the *Sambre* forms from *Maubeuge* to *Barlemont*, and which caused that part of the Lines to be remote from Protection.

The second part of these new Lines, from *Barlemont* to *Chareloi*, was much more difficult to be defended; because, as the Enemies had posted themselves opposite to *Maubeuge*, with an Intention to force the Lines of the *Sambre*, either between *Barlemont* and *Maubeuge*, or between this latter Place and *Marchiennes*, at the Bridge where a considerable

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able Post had been fixed ; it is certain, that the Enemy's Forces would have been drawn together in this Situation, while our Troops would have been separated by the *Sambre*, as being obliged to be attentive to the Preservation of the Lines from *Marchiennes* to *Quesnoi*. These new Lines, therefore, were plan'd contrary to all Rules for the Construction and Use of Lines by which a Country is intended to be covered. And as the Defence of their Front was rendered extreamly dangerous, their Formation was altogether unnecessary, and ineffectual, because I have made it evident, by the preceding Instances, that the Countries intended to be covered by Lines, have entirely owed their Preservation to advantageous Posts, formed by the Generals who were charged with the Defence of those Lines, but who thought them of so little Importance, that they always abandoned them, since they found it very impracticable to defend the Front, without exposing their Army to great Inconveniencies.

This Method of forming Lines has likewise prevailed among our Enemies ; and the Prince of *Baden* caused some to be traced out, at the Beginning of the present War, to cover his Marquisate. Their Right extended to the *Rhine*, and was covered with a Morass, and the intrenched Village of *Bibel*: Their Left was carried on to a Mountain, on which

were several good Forts, and a great Number of Cannon. They were formidable, for some Years, to the *French* Generals in *Germany*, but when they had Judgment enough to wheel upon the Left of those Lines, they were immediately abandoned by the Enemy.

The Lines formed, by the Emperor's Order, for covering the lower *Austria* and *Moravia* from the Incurfions of the Malecontents, were daily forced by their Cavalry, tho' their Strength was not fufficient to render them formidable, in any other Operations of much Confequence.

To clofe my Reflections on Lines formed with a View to cover a Country from Inroads, and Contributions, or even for the Inclofure of an Army; I may venture to affirm, that they can only be thought important by a General of a moderate Genius, who is incapable of continuing in a good Poft near an Enemy, without being compelled to an Engagement, againft his Inclinations; and who always thinks himfelf in Danger, unlefs Ramparts of Earth interpoſe between him and his Enemy.

The Prince of *Condé*, and Marſhal *Turenne*, who were the greateſt Generals of the laſt Century, never entertained a Thought of conducting a War in this manner, tho' they were Perſons of excellent Abilities, and ſuperior, in Genius, to all the Commanders in their Time. Theſe great Men have frequently

quently supported themselves, thro' the Course of Campaigns, in a Situation near Armies much more numerous than their own; and, without throwing up Lines, have rendered them incapable of penetrating into our Territories, from no other Cause than a judicious Choice of good Posts. The Marshal *de Crequi*, who, as I have formerly observed, sustained very arduous Campaigns against the Duke of *Lorrain*, was entirely unacquainted with the Use of Lines. In a Word, *M. de Luxembourg*, who so gloriously pursued the Plans of those great Men, in the Command of Armies, and in Contradiction to that Opinion, by which the Use of Lines has been established in *France*; was always so fully persuaded that they were pernicious to a General intrusted with the Conduct of a War, that no Consideration could ever prevail upon him to encamp his Army within a Circumference of Lines.

I conclude, therefore, from all these great Examples, that Lines formed to cover a Country, can never be productive of that Effect, but when they have a contracted Front, and are not surroundable by the Enemy; and when the Troops that guard them, cannot be forced, in Flank, into a greater Extent than will be necessary to comprehend them in order of Battle: And I likewise add, that it is always very dangerous for a General

to inclose his Army within Lines on any Occasion whatever.

C H A P. XXX.

Of the Attack of Lines of Circumvallation.

I Have, in my Maxims, set forth the Reasons why such Lines are formed, together with the Danger a General sustains, when he waits, in them, for the Approach of his Enemy, and I have likewise described the manner of attacking them with Success. In order, therefore, to justify my Maxims on this Subject, I shall relate some Instances of Lines that have been forced, and of others that have been protected by precautionary Armies.

The Lines of *Arras* were the best that have been formed to this Time, and for the Security of which, no Circumspection whatever was omitted; and yet they were forced by the Marshals *Turenne*, *la Ferté*, and *de Hocquincourt*, with very little Loss; because they were attacked in three different Quarters, with the Addition of false Attacks: And as the Night was chosen for this Operation, it was impossible for the Enemy to distinguish, amidst

amidst the Darkness, the real Attack from the false.

When the *Turks* besieged *Vienna*, in the Year 1683, they inclosed themselves with Lines: Their Forces were infinitely superior, in Number, to those Troops the Emperor could then assemble, and they were in a condition to have attacked the *Christian* Army, without quitting the Siege: But they neglected this Advantage, and the Duke of *Lorrain* advanced with the greatest part of the Infantry, to attack the Lines, from the *Danube*, while *John Sobieski* King of *Poland*, with all his own Cavalry, and part of the Emperor's, wheel'd round the *Turkish* Camp, by the Mountains, without being discovered in his March; and form'd his Attack from the Lower *Danube*, and on a Flank which the *Turks* thought impregnable; and he soon broke thro' the Lines. The first Disorder which this Action occasion'd, render'd the Attack made by the Duke of *Lorrain*, so successful, that the *Turks* were equally forced in the two Extremities, as well as in the Center of their Lines, and as they had not a sufficient Tract of interior Ground, to form themselves in order of Battle, and to oppose a considerable Front, they had Recourse to an ignominious Flight, and were

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compelled to abandon their Camp, and the Siege.

In the Year 1706, the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene* forced the Lines of *Turin*, in which M. *de Marsin*, and M. *de la Feuillade* had, in a manner, obliged the Duke of *Orleans* to inclose himself, with all the Troops that arrived from *Lombardy*, to support the Siege, with the Conduct of which M. *de la Feuillade* was charged. Every one knows the fatal Event we sustain'd, on the Quarter where M. *de la Feuillade* neglected to form Lines, because he did not foresee that the Enemy, whose Motions to enter the Lines were not attended with any Impediment, might pass the *Doria*, and wheel about to *Chivasso*, which was the Quarter that was least supported by Troops, and entirely unprovided with Lines. This was certainly a very flagrant Omission; for how could it possibly be imagined, that an Enemy, who was suffer'd to make himself Master of the Country, and to perform his Motions with all imaginable Freedom, would not prefer the Attack of a very inconsiderable Quarter, that was separated from the Body of the Army, by a River, and entirely uncover'd, to that of a whole Front that form'd a great Extent, and was well cover'd by the Body of the Army? This was the negligent Conduct

duct that occasion'd the Defeat of the *French* Army before *Turin*.

After these three Instances of Lines that were forced, in Consequence of their being thought sustainable, I shall relate three other Examples of Lines that were protected by precautionary Troops.

When the King of *France* besieged *Mons* in 1691, the King of *England* form'd a considerable Army with an Intention to raise the Siege; but M. de *Luxembourg*, who was appointed to oppose him with a precautionary Army, chose his Situation so judiciously, in order to cover the Siege, that King *William* could neither interrupt it, nor bring that General to an Engagement.

When the *French* King form'd the Siege of *Namur*, in the Year 1692, King *William* was desirous to relieve that Place, and M. de *Luxembourg* again opposed him, with a precautionary Army; and tho' his Infantry were less numerous than those of the Enemy, he conducted his Motions with so much Judgment, that he render'd them incapable of entering the *Mebaign*, and obliged them to discontinue their first Intention to raise the Siege.

In the Year 1708, when the *French* Army advanced to the Relief of *Lisle*, that was besieged by the Enemy, Prince *Eugene* only

left such a Body of Infantry before the Place, as he judged necessary, and chose, for himself, an advantageous Post, on the Heights of *Seclin*, between the Town and the Lines; and we found it impracticable to attack him in that Situation, because his Right and Left were sufficiently secured, and our Efforts could be only made against his Front, which he had been careful to intrench.

These three Instances, on the same Subject, are, however, very different in their Circumstances, with Relation to the manner of supporting a Siege, by an Army without the Lines.

M. de Luxembourg, in order to protect the Siege of *Mons*, confronted the Enemy as much as possible: He appear'd before them in the open Field, in a condition to engage in Front, but always with the Advantage in his Favour; in consequence of the Situation of his Posts; which enabled him to charge the Enemy in Flank, in case it should be presented to him in their Advance to the Siege; while his Front was so well disposed, that he had not any Apprehensions of an Attack on that Quarter. This judicious Conduct enabled the *French* King to compleat the Siege of *Mons*, without any Molestation.

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M. de *Luxembourg*, in order to support the Siege of *Namur*, had Recourse to very different Measures, because the Situation of this Place had no Resemblance to that of *Mons*. It was necessary for him to prevent the Enemy from advancing into the *Mebaign*, because if they had accomplished that Motion, they might have extended their Right to the *Sambre*, which would have made it necessary for him to have redoubled his Precautions, to oppose their Relief of the Place; namely towards the Castle, which is situated between the *Sambre* and the *Maes*, and likewise towards the City, which is seated between the *Sambre* and the Lower *Maes*. The Enemy had a great Train of Artillery, and were much superior in the Number of their Infantry; which made it incumbent on our General to guard, with a stronger Body of Cavalry, the Banks of a Rivulet that were very narrow, and covered with Wood: And this he performed with so much Capacity, in the manner of placing himself always before the Enemy, at a proper Distance, that they durst not attempt a Passage into the *Mebaign*, where they could never be certain of a sufficient Body of Infantry, to protect the Advance of the rest of their Army. These vigilant Attentions continued for ten or twelve Days, and were always

exerted, by *M. de Luxembourg*, with so much Judgment and Penetration, that the Enemies were compelled to be Spectators of the Loss of *Namur*, without any Possibility of relieving it.

In order to protect the Siege of *Lisle* from *Seclin*, which was the only Quarter by which we attempted the Relief of that Place ; it was only necessary for Prince *Eugene* to choose a proper Post, in which the Flanks of his Troops might be cover'd, and their Front securely extended; and he accordingly made himself Master of such a Situation, on the Heights of *Seclin*. As this was the only Operation to which he needed to have Recourse, I may justly applaud his Choice of this Post, but not the Variety of his Motions, since he had only one to form, which was no more than his Establishment on this Eminence.

The Battle of *Cassano*, that was fought to support the Siege of *St. Omer*, has not escaped my Memory, with Reference to the Subject of this Chapter ; but as all the Circumstances of this Action will be related in the ensuing Chapter of the second Volume, and which will contain my Reflections on those Battles wherein I was personally present, or that have been fought in my time, I shall not mention any of the Particulars here ;

here; but intend to close my Remarks on Lines, with observing that my Maxim, which declares *that an Army ought never to wait for their Enemies, in Lines of Circumvallation, but should always advance out of those Lines to engage them*, is not only render'd decisive by the Examples I have cited; but it is likewise an infallible Truth, that an Army either inclosed in a place, or surrounded with Lines, is always constrain'd in its Motions, while the Enemies are perfectly free in theirs, which they can easily conceal in the Darkeness of the Night, and are in a condition to make their main Efforts where they please, without the least Apprehensions; and may likewise form as many false Attacks as they think proper, in order to make their Adversaries equally attentive to all parts. That they are likewise sure that those Attacks which happen to succeed, will separate the Army, without any possibility of their Reunion, after the Lines have been enter'd, and that they will then be compelled to have recourse to Flight, and must, at once, abandon their Camp and the Siege, because they have not a sufficient Extent of Ground in their Rear, on which they can form themselves between the Front of their Camp, and the Place besieged. In a Word, that a Body of Forces who wait in their

Lines, for the Approach of an Enemy, may be always attacked, thro' the whole Circumference of those Lines, and consequently can never have their Flanks secured, nor be in a Condition to oppose a Column of the Enemies, who have forced their Lines in any particular Quarter.

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